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Editorial Note 
 
One goal of the SBBR is to make available the unpublished M.A. theses 
that abound in university libraries but rarely reach the general academic 
audience.  One concern might be that the thesis, especially if published 
many years after its submission will be taken and critiqued as a 
representation of the latest in one’s body of research. Clearly, 
understandings and abilities change over time. To offset this, the original 
month and year of submission in theses published in the SBBR will be 
included in the title in parantheses. Citation of a thesis so published in 
the SBBR must include “(as submitted in month + year)” to be considered 
a fair use of the material. Of course, this also requires that the thesis 
printed here must be in its original, unedited form (with the exception of 
minor spelling or format changes). I have included my M.A. thesis as the 
first, in order to encourage others to follow course. 
 The thesis was written in 1992-1993 under the supervision of 
William H. Frederick and Elizabeth Collins at Ohio University and 
defended in June 1993. By that time, I had only studied Thai, French, 
and Spanish at the university level and, using Spanish, proceeded to 
study Portuguese on my own. Thus, while Iberian sources are used here 
frequently, Burmese sources were not, save for in translation (my study 
of Burmese would not begin until SEASSI in the summer of 1994 at 
Wisconsin-Madison). Another piece, an article based again on Iberian 
sources was written in 1993 and published in the Journal of Asian 
History in 1994.1 Thereafter began a long struggle with Arakanese 
chronicles and revised interpretations of Arakanese history. The major 
problem in writing the thesis, however, was that other than several 
useful pieces by Pamela Gutman on art history, numismatics, and an 
inscription, and a study of Buddhist art by U San Tha Aung,2 all focused 
                                                          
1 “The 1598-1599 Siege of Pegu and the Expansion of Arakanese Imperial Power into 
Lower Burma.” Journal of Asian History 28 (1994): 39-57. 
2 See Pamela Gutman. “The Ancient Coinage of Southeast Asia.” Journal of the Siam 
Society 66, pt. 1 (January, 1978): 8-21; idem, “Symbolism of Kingship in Arakan.” In 
David G. Marr & A. C. Milner (eds.). Southeast Asia in the 9th to 14th Centuries. 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986): 279-88. Pam’s dissertation was 
still unavailable to me at the time I submitted my thesis; San Tha Aung, The Buddhist Art 
 
 
 
SOAS BULLETIN OF BURMA RESEARCH 
 
SBBR 3.2 (AUTUMN 2005):974-1145 
 
975
on a period far earlier than the one I was examining, almost nothing had 
been written on Arakan, aside from Burmese-language studies 
unavailable to me at the time, since 1967, or about twenty-six years 
earlier, and, moreover, very few items had been published since the 
1920s. Without a strong body of secondary work to provide theory to 
bounce off of or a linear narrative to provide context, much of 1992 and 
early 1993 was spent charting unfamiliar waters. Readers interested in 
the Portuguese role in Lower Burma and Arakan are also directed to the 
work of Maria Ana Guedes who published a study on this topic in 
Portuguese in 1994. 
 In the next few years, with Vic Lieberman’s guidance, I further 
developed my understanding of Arakan through indigenous texts, leading 
to a study of river boats in Arakan and Burma in 1997 (Oriens Extremus) 
and two articles written in 1995 and 1997  that provided a more 
balanced and farther-reaching examination of the rise and fall of the 
Mrauk-U state (both articles were published in 1998, one in Journal of 
Burma Studies and the other in the Journal of the Economic and Social 
History of the Orient).3 These provided the rough structure for my 
doctoral study of Arakanese Buddhism, especially aranyavasi and 
gammavasi monastic rivalry, and Islam submitted to the University of 
Michigan in 1999 (“Where Jambudipa and Islamdom Converged: 
Religious Change and the Emergence of Buddhist Communalism in Early 
Modern Arakan (fifteenth to nineteenth centuries)”). 
While I work mainly on the Irrawaddy Valley today, my interest in 
Arakan continues. In a forthcoming issue, we will include an annotated 
list of Arakanese chronicles I compiled in 1995-1996 while on extension 
from the University of Michigan for language study at Northern Illinois 
University. This list tentatively identified the ‘lost’ Do We chronicle and 
mapped out the different chronicle traditions of Arakanese history.4 A 
fuller examination of this chronicle (‘Rakhine Mìn-raza-grì Arei-daw 
Sadan’. [Palm-leaf manuscript, number 1632] AMs, 1784 [1775], 
National Library, Ministry of Culture, Yangon, Union of Myanmar) was 
published in Michael W. Charney, “Centralizing Historical Tradition in 
                                                                                                                                                               
of Ancient Arakan (An Eastern Border State Beyond India, east of Vanga and Samatata), 
Rangoon: Government Press: 1979. 
3 ”Rise of a Mainland Trading State: Rakhine Under the Early Mrauk-U Kings, c. 1430-
1603.” Journal of Burma Studies 3 (1998): 1-35; “Crisis and Reformation in a Maritime 
Kingdom of Southeast Asia: Forces of Instability and Political Disintegration in Western 
Burma (Arakan), 1603-1701.” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 41 
(1998): 185-219. 
4 I provided the major portion of the text of the ‘Do We’ chronicle and the annotated list of 
Arakanese chronicle traditions to Jacques P. Leider, then of Chulalongkorn University 
and now of the EFEO, in 1998. With the increased interest in Arakan, it would probably 
be useful to make both available to the general scholarly community, and thus the text of 
the chronicle and translation will be published in the SBBR as well as the annotated list 
of Arakanese chronicle traditions in the near future.  
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Precolonial Burma: the Abhiraja/Dhajaraja myth in Early Kòn-baung 
Historical Texts” (South East Asia Research 10.2 (2002):185-215, see pp. 
193-196) and idem, “A Reassessment of Hyperbolic Military Statistics in 
Some Early Modern Burmese Texts” (Journal of the Economic and Social 
History of the Orient 46.2 (2004): 193-214, see pp.197-201). 
 
M. W. C. 
_________ 
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Michael W. Charney 
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Introduction 
 
The Portuguese shipmen were a mere handful...but as they were 
unopposed on the sea, they found themselves in command of 
it...But it was not enough to be in command of the sea; some point 
d’appui on land for trade and refitting was essential...The 
Arakanese, their wits sharpened by experience, saw that here was 
one of those chances given to nations and individuals, which if 
boldly exploited yield a great profit. It seemed that a mutually 
agreeable understanding could be arranged. While the Portuguese 
were able to provide mastery of seamanship, with a modern 
knowledge of arms and fortification, the Arakanese could throw into 
the bargain territorial concessions and trade openings. 
 
M. S. Collis and San Shwe Bu5  
                                                          
5 Maurice Collis and San Shwe Bu, “Arakan’s Place in the Civilization of the Bay,” 
Journal of the Burma Research Society 15, pt. 1 (1925): 41. 
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The History of the different Kings that reigned in Burma, during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries...is a round of wars and 
revolts, of treacheries and murders. Its chief interest is derived from 
the appearance of Europeans upon the scene. Two adventurers, a 
Portuguese and a Spaniard, played important parts in Burma 
during the early years of the seventeenth century. The story of their 
lives is worth telling. It shows how easily lawless Europeans could 
establish a rule over timid Asiatics by a display of reckless audacity. 
 
Albert Fytche6  
 
 
These two quotations indicate a controversy over the relationship 
between the rulers of the Burmese region and the Portuguese 
mercenaries whom they employed. In order to evaluate the situation 
adequately, several questions must be answered. Which of the two 
partners, the Arakanese (the example I have chosen) or the Portuguese 
mercenaries, was dominant in their relationship and why? If the 
Arakanese were dominant, then why were two groups of Portuguese 
mercenaries able to revolt against Arakanese rule during the reign of Min 
Yazagyi, the king of Arakan? If the Portuguese were dominant, then why 
were these rebellious mercenaries defeated after a decade or so of 
independence? There are many difficulties in finding an answer to these 
questions. I would now like to discuss what these difficulties are and how 
I propose to overcome these problems. 
 
Historiography of Arakan 
 
The history of Arakan has long been overlooked by scholars of Southeast 
Asian history.7 This problem exists not simply at the regional level, but 
                                                          
6 Albert Fytche, Burma Past and Present with Personal Reminiscences of the Country, 
2 vols., (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., `1878): vol. I, 50-51. 
7 It should be noted that authors on Southeast Asian history largely fall into two 
groups. The first group are historians who have examined the role of Southeast Asians in 
Southeast Asian history. Perhaps it would be clearer to say that this first group of 
Southeast Asia historians deal with the history of Southeast Asians rather than simply 
being a history of events which may have taken place in Southeast Asia, but really had 
little to do with Southeast Asians. The second group of Southeast Asia historians are 
those historians who deal solely or largely with events in Southeast Asia which concerned 
only “outsiders,” such as the Portuguese, Dutch, or English. An example of this second 
group are authors such as George Winius or Donald Lach, who really deal with European 
activities in the Indian ocean and Southeast Asia. To be fair, George Winius does not 
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is present in the scholarship of those who focus on Burma as well. It is 
difficult to understand why Arakan has been so overlooked. Indeed, 
Arakan possesses a long and rich history, a unique culture, and many 
epigraphical and archaeological remains which would seem to make it 
especially appealing to Southeast Asian historians. Further, Arakan has 
played pivotal roles in not only Burmese history, but in Thai history, and 
in the history of Southeast Asian trade. Many examples can be found of 
Arakan’s trade connections to not only mainland Southeast Asian 
countries, but to archipelagic Southeast Asia as well. Arakan also 
presents a unique situation in which all of the major elements of the 
religions of Southeast Asia are represented: Buddhism, including 
Mahayana, Theravada, and Tantric sects, Hinduism, animism, and even 
Islam. Whatever the reasons for this neglect, it is a fact which the 
current generation of Southeast Asian historians must face, and it 
presents a difficulty to those historians who wish to learn more about 
Arakanese history. 
Many of the primary sources for Arakanese history are unavailable 
or at the very least difficult to obtain. The old Arakanese dialect of 
Burmese is not taught, to my knowledge, in any universities outside of 
Burma,8  and all Arakanese chronicles remain untranslated. Even 
indigenous accounts have been argued to be untrustworthy for the 
period prior to 1400.9  The references to Arakan in the chronicles of 
Arakan’s neighbors, such as Pegu, Ayudhya, and Ava are on the whole 
biased or ill-informed. Likewise, early European accounts are just as 
biased. Although the Rev. Father Hosten, “the learned annotator of 
Portuguese and Spanish records,” has argued that the Portuguese have 
written accounts on which “many volumes might be written on Arakan 
and Pegu alone,”10 the Portuguese chroniclers which I have read, such 
                                                                                                                                                               
claim to be a historian of Southeast Asia, but rather of the Portuguese in Asia. His article, 
“The ‘Shadow Empire’ of Goa in the Bay of Bengal,” Itinerario 7, no. 2, (1983): 83-101, 
clearly deals with Arakan and Burma (as well as Bengal), while really only examining the 
Portuguese activities there. Donald Lach as well, in his Southeast Asia in the Eyes of 
Europe: the Sixteenth Century, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968, has 
examined the European experience in the Southeast Asia region, while providing 
important insights, at least incidentally, on some aspects of Southeast Asia history, while 
dealing little with Southeast Asians themselves. While I have utilized the work of 
historians belonging to both groups, I have adopted the perspective of the first group of 
Southeast Asia historians. 
8 Although the Arakanese have used the Burmese alphabet since the fifteenth 
century. See E. Forchhammer, Report on the Antiquities of Arakan, (Rangoon: 1892): 39. 
9 San Shwe Bu, “The History of Arakan,” Journal of the Burma Research Society 12, 
(1922): 167-169. 
10 Cited in San Shwe Bu, op. cit., 167. 
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as Antonio Bocarro,11 Manuel de Fariah y Sousa,12 and Manuel de 
Abreu Mousinho,13 all seem biased and simply repeat brief and 
superficial information about Arakan. We do, however, have the in-depth 
observations of Friar Manrique,14 but his account is of seventeenth 
century Arakan, when the glory of Arakan had begun to decline.  
At the same time there was a seemingly brief period in Southeast 
Asian historiography in which important, though by no means 
exhaustive, work was done in putting together some of the elements of 
Arakanese history. This brief period was largely limited to the years 
between World War I and World War II, when three scholars, Maurice 
Collis, San Shwe Bu, and San Baw U, filled the pages of the Journal of 
the Burma Research Society with accounts of sixteenth and seventeenth 
century Arakanese history based on Arakanese chronicles. Their work 
was a substantial departure from the previous generation of Burma 
historians such as Arthur Phayre15 and D. G. E. Hall,16  who only dealt 
                                                          
11 Antonio Bocarro, Decada 13 Da Historia Da India, 2 vols., Lisbon: Ordem Da 
Classe De Sciencias Moraes, Politicas E Bellas-Lettras Da Academia Real Das Sciencias 
De Lisboa, 1876. 
12 Manuel de Fariah y Sousa, The Portugues Asia: Or, The History of the Discovery 
and Conquest of India by the Portugues; Containing All their Discoveries from the Coast of 
Africk, to the farthest Parts of China and Japan; all their battels by Sea and Land, Sieges 
and other Memorable Actions; a Description of those Countries, and many Particulars of the 
Religion, Government and Customs of the Natives, etc, 3 vols., translated from the Spanish 
by John Stevens, London: C. Brome, 1695. 
13 Manuel de Abreu Mousinho, Breve Discurso Em Que Se Conta a Conquista Do 
Reyno Do Pegú, Na India Oriental, Feyta pelos Portugueses em tempo do Visorrey Ayres de 
Saldhanha sendo capitão Salvador Ribeiro de Souza, chamado Massinga, natural de 
Guimarães, a quem os naturaes do Pegú elegerão por seu Rey no anno de 1600, with an 
introduction by M. Lopes D’Almeida, Barcelona: Portucalense Editora, 1936. 
14Fray Sebastien Manrique, Travels of Fray Sebastien Manrique 1629-1643, 2 vols., 
translated from The Itinerario de las Missiones Orientales, with introduction and notes, by 
C. Eckford Luard, with assistance from Father H. Hosten, Oxford: Hakluyt Society, 1927. 
See also Maurice Collis, The Land of the Great Image: Being the Experiences of Friar 
Manrique in Arakan, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943. 
15 It should be noted that Phayre was somewhat of a pioneer in the British school of 
Arakanese history, publishing two important early accounts of Arakanese history, “An 
Account of Arakan” and “On the History of Arakan,” in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic 
Society of Bengal in the 1840s. As he shifted his interests to Burma east of the Yoma 
mountains, however, he seems to have abandoned research on Arakanese history to 
other scholars, only dealing with Arakan later in reference to historical developments in 
Burma proper. A good analysis of Phayre’s contributions to the study of Arakanese and 
Burmese history can be found in Hugh Tinker, “Arthur Phayre and Henry Yule: Two 
Soldier-Administrator Historians,” in D.G. E. Hall (ed.), Historians of South East Asia, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1961): 267-278. 
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with the Arakanese as an interesting minority group within the 
boundaries of British Burma. Their accounts are superficial and are 
more concerned with Arakanese linguistics than with telling the history 
of an important people. But just as World War I had ushered in a 
renaissance of Arakanese studies, World War II brought it to an end. 
Indeed, Burma was largely ignored until the 1970s, and the current 
generation of Burma historians, such as Maung Htin Aung,17 Victor 
Lieberman,18 and Michael Aung-Thwin (who focuses on Pagan)19  have 
largely ignored Arakan. 
 
The Issue 
 
I became interested in Arakanese history as a result of my investigations 
into the strange events surrounding two Portuguese adventurers in 
mainland Southeast Asia in the first quarter of the seventeenth century. 
                                                                                                                                                               
16 D.G.E. Hall, Europe and Burma: A Study of European Relations With Burma to the 
Annexation of Thibaw’s Kingdom 1886, London: Oxford University Press, 1945; Burma, 
New York: Hutchinson’s University Library, 1950; “English Relations With Burma 1587-
1686,” Journal of the Burma Research Society 17, pt. 1 (1927): 1-80; “Daghregister of 
Batavia and Dutch Trade With Burma in the Seventeenth Century,” Journal of the Burma 
Research Society 29, 2 (1939): 142-7. Beyond these general works dealing with Burma 
per se, Hall gives more specific treatment to Arakan in articles such as “Studies in Dutch 
Relations With Arakan,” Journal of the Burma Research Society 26 (1936): 1-31 and in his 
general treatment of Southeast Asian history in A History of South-East Asia, 4th ed., New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981. 
17 Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma, New York: Columbia University Press, 
1967. 
18 Victor Lieberman, Burmese Administrative Cycles: Anarchy and Conquest, c. 1580-
1760, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984; “Europeans, Trade, and 
the Unification of Burma, c. 1540-1620,” Oriens Extremus 27, no. 2 (1980): 203-226; “The 
Political Significance of Religious Wealth in Burmese History: Some Further Thoughts,” 
Journal of Asian Studies 39, no. 4 (August 1980): 753-769; “Provincial Reforms in Taung-
Ngu Burma,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 43, pt. 3 (1980): 548-
569; “Reinterpreting Burmese History,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 29, 
no. 1 (January 1987): 162-194; “Secular Trends in Burmese Economic History, c. 1350-
1830, and their Implications for State Formation,” Modern Asian Studies 25, no. 1 (1991): 
1-31. 
19 Michael Aung-Thwin, “Prophecies, Omens, and Dialogue: Tools of the Trade in 
Burmese Historiography,” in David K. Wyatt & Alexander Woodside (eds.),Moral Order 
and the Question of Change: Essays on Southeast Asian Thought, Monograph Series 24, 
(New Haven, Connecticutt: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1982): 78-103; Pagan: 
The Origins of Modern Burma, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985; “Spirals in 
Early Southeast Asian and Burmese History,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 21, no. 
4 (Spring, 1991): 575-602. 
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One of these “adventurers” was Philip de Brito, who carved a short-lived 
kingdom for himself at Syriam from 1600 until he was impaled on an 
iron stake by the Avan king Anaukpetlun in 1613. The other Portuguese 
adventurer was Sebastião Gonçalves y Tibau, who did roughly the same 
thing on Sundiva island in 1609. I was surprised to discover that these 
two events were linked: both of these men led groups of Portuguese 
mercenaries who had rebelled against their Arakanese employers. 
Further, they had rebelled against the same king, Min Yazagyi. After 
further examination, I found that Min Yazagyi was not seen as a weak 
king by the Arakanese, but considered by many to have been their 
greatest ruler and that his reign marked a “golden age” in Arakan. 
Indeed, Min Yazagyi was not weak, for he pushed the boundaries of 
Arakan over Lower Burma to the Isthmus of Kra in the east and further 
into Bengal in the west. I was thus confused: how were two Portuguese 
mercenary groups able to rebel against a kingdom that had shown itself 
to be immensely powerful? Why had the Portuguese not rebelled against 
the Arakanese when they were not so expansive, earlier in the sixteenth 
century? Further, was the cause of the Portuguese rebellions a 
concomitant of the process of Arakanese expansion or some fault of Min 
Yazagyi’s, or both? 
 
Sources 
 
To answer to these questions, I consulted English-language accounts of 
European travelers who visited Arakan in the sixteenth century and 
Captain Stevens’ three volume English translation of Fariah y Sousa’s 
great work, The Portuguese in Asia. Not satisfied, I examined the histories 
of Burma, Thailand, and Bengal for any secondary information that 
could be found regarding Arakan. Luckily, the Ohio University Southeast 
Asian Library possessed the Journal of the Burma Research Society on 
microfiche, making available to me the works of Collis, San Shwe Bu,20  
and San Baw U, as well as Mon texts translated by MacGregor,21  Hall, 
                                                          
20 Indeed, it should be noted that Collis and San Shwe Bu seemed to have worked 
together on most of their articles in the Journal of the Burma Research Society. This is 
shown especially by their joint-authorship of several important articles such as “Arakan’s 
Place in the Civilization of the Bay,” (previously cited) & “Dom Martin, 1606-1643: The 
First Burman to Visit Europe,” Journal of the Burma Research Society 16, pt. 1 (1926): 
11-23. 
21 A. MacGregor’s translation of what he calls an “anonymous” book, however, seems 
to me to be clearly Mousinho’s work, since MacGregor’s translation seems to read the 
same as Almeida’s  translation of Mousinho’s work. Even more indicative of the fact that 
these are the same works, both titles are exactly the same. For MacGregor’s translation, 
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and Furnivall. After collecting as many materials as I could from the 
Southeast Asian holdings of the major university libraries of the 
American mid-west, I turned my attention to Portuguese sources, studied 
Spanish and Portuguese, and I am only beginning to sift through 
important information recorded by Bocarro, Diogo do Couto, and  João 
de Barros.22   
 
Problems 
 
There are several problems, however, in analyzing the sixteenth and 
seventeenth history of Arakan specifically and of Burma in general. One 
major problem is that of the numbers provided for the soldiers or ships 
involved in various battles. G. E. Harvey, for example, assumed that 
Western accounts of historical events in Burma were more accurate than 
the accounts of the Burmese. He has argued that the figures for the sizes 
of armies, casualties, massacres, etc., provided by Burmese and other 
chronicles must be highly exaggerated. In the few places which he was 
able to cross-check, he believed that the actual numbers of were 
exaggerated three to ten times in the chronicles.23   
In many ways, his argument is convincing, but there is no reason 
to accept this view without considerable qualifications. From my 
examination of the Portuguese chroniclers, for example, I have developed 
a strong suspicion that Portuguese historians were just as likely to 
exaggerate their figures for indigenous armies, which they defeated, even 
more so for indigenous armies which defeated Portuguese contingents. I 
think that the exaggeration by Portuguese authors is probably due to the 
secondhand nature of their information, their sources often having 
themselves only heard stories which had been exaggerated by successive 
“storytellers.” Indeed, Ian A. MacGregor has dealt with this problem in 
some detail. He offers the case of Fernão Guerreiro’s Relations, based on 
original letters of Catholic missionaries which were largely based upon 
mere rumors. This problem led Guerreiro to make grave errors in his 
history, including “exaggerations, omissions, and undue glorification.” 
MacGregor also argues that the intent of the authors of reports sent back 
home to Lisbon played a big part in the exaggeration of their stories. 
                                                                                                                                                               
see A. MacGregor, “A Brief Account of the Kingdom of Pegu,” Journal of the Burma 
Research Society  16, pt. 2 (1926): 99-138. 
22 The last two authors, Couto and Barros, compiled the Décadas, with Couto 
writing the first two volumes, and Barros subsequently completing the last two volumes. 
See Diogo Couto & João de Barros, Décadas, 4 vols., with preface and notes by António 
Baião, (Lisbon: Livraria Sa Da Costa--Editora, 1945. 
23 G. E. Harvey, History of Burma, From the Earliest Times to 10 March 1824, The 
Beginning of the English Conquest, (New York: Octagon Books, 1967): 333-335n. 
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These authors were competing for a larger readership and thus more 
influence; a more imaginative story would probably receive the desired 
amount of attention. In the case of the important work of Tomé Pires, the 
rediscovery of which in 1933 “revolutionized” Western scholarship on the 
Melakan trading system, for example, “fervour outran caution” in his 
description of local resources.24 Meilink-Roelofsz has qualified this view, 
however, arguing that Pires’ account is an accurate depiction of the 
Melakan trading system. Instead, Meilink-Roelofsz believes that 
subsequent European observers may have left out information in their 
accounts which they may have felt was mundane and which they took for 
granted.25  But MacGregor touches on another important problem: 
many of the Portuguese accounts or “histories” were politically motivated 
and thus exaggeration or underestimates were made purposefully, with 
less than innocent intentions. As MacGregor explains, again in the case 
of Tomé Pires: 
 
Readers of the Suma have to remember that Pires was pleading a 
case. He wrote the Suma for king Manuel, whom he wished to 
impress with the worth of Malacca. He wanted to persuade the 
monarch to cherish his distant possession, to provide it--perhaps 
partly in Pires himself--with ‘excellent officials, expert traders and 
lovers of peace’ and to see that it was ‘supplied, looked after, praised 
and favoured and not neglected.’...Pires’ propagandist intention 
probably explains at least some of his exaggerations and also the 
way he glossed over difficulties at Malacca...26  
 
Further, Portuguese captains who were actual participants in the 
historical events which Portuguese historians described, like De Brito or 
Gonçalves, may have purposely tried to enhance their exploits. They 
probably thought that  local support for  Portuguese rule would increase 
as their reputation as great conquerors became more terrible and 
frightening.  
But the Portuguese historians are not alone in their exaggerations: 
the same principle may be applied to the situation of indigenous 
conquerors, who wanted to terrify prospective enemies or enhance the 
aura of their Buddhist legitimacy. I happened upon this problem during 
my early research on Philip de Brito’s “kingdom” at Syriam, in which I 
                                                          
24 I. A. MacGregor, “Some Aspects of Portuguese Historical Writing of the Sixteenth 
and Seventeenth Centuries on South East Asia,” in D. G. E. Hall (ed.), Historians of South 
East Asia, (London: Oxford University Press, 1961): 174, 178. 
25 M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofsv, Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian 
Archipelago Between 1500 and about 1630, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962): 1. 
26 Ibid., 175. 
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discovered that De Brito seems to have been competing for legitimacy as 
the leader of the local population in a way similar to indigenous Buddhist 
leaders.27  In other words, De Brito won and then lost this support, by 
‘playing by the rules’ of Southeast Asians  and Theravada Buddhism, 
until he failed in an attempt to make Southeast Asians ‘play by his rules.’ 
Other authors have looked more extensively at the legitimacy of Buddhist 
kingship and have implied similar observations in Thailand, notably S. J. 
Tambiah and Akin Rabibhadana.28 Tambiah argues convincingly that a 
legitimate Buddhist king is believed to be the person in the kingdom with 
the highest level of accumulated merit (bun). The king in a Buddhist 
society serves as the corrective process, by his righteousness (dharma), 
to the disordered world. Through his rule, he either accumulates more 
merit which is reflected in the well-being of his kingdom, or he 
accumulates demerit (bap), which is reflected in the development of 
chaos or destruction in his country. Further, a Buddhist king shows his 
Dharma by conquering non-Buddhist kings and thus spreading 
Buddhism in his role as a Buddhist world-conqueror, or chakravartan.29 
Thus a powerful king, who can command the largest armies and win the 
most battles is seen as a legitimate Buddhist king. Obviously, Buddhist 
legitimacy is much more complex than I can explain here, but it should 
be clear that Buddhist kings had a good reason to exaggerate the size of 
their armies and the extent of their victories. 
The problem is that we may never know what the actual figures 
were and it is impossible to cross-check every figure which has been 
                                                          
27 This work culminated in a paper which I presented at the Midwest Conference on 
Asian Affairs in 1992, entitled “Buddhist Kingship, Philip de Brito y Nicote, and Constans 
Phaulcon: The Causal Value of Buddhist Ideals of Kingship as the Basis for Legitimacy of 
the King in a Buddhist Land.” In this paper, completed under the guidance of Dr. 
Elizabeth Collins, I argued that beyond the theoretical constructs of Buddhist legitimacy 
of kingship, there were three “real” requirements, by which anyone, Buddhist or not, 
could win legitimacy as the king in a Buddhist country: 1. The stability of the country; 2. 
The protection of the country against foreign enemies; 3. The guarantee of the safe 
operation of the Buddhist Sangha. Nan-dá-bayin had failed in terms of all three 
requirements and lost Mon support for his rule. De Brito, was able to meet all three 
requirements for a time, and won Mon support, but sometime after 1609, De Brito 
suddenly became a staunch Catholic crusader and alienated the Mons, leading to his 
defeat by Anaukpetlun in 1613, who was able to meet these requirements.  
28 J. S. Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and 
Polity in Thailand Against a Historical Background, London: Cambridge University Press, 
1976; Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period, 
1782-1873, Southeast Asia Program data paper, no. 74, Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Department of Asian Studies, July, 1969. 
29 Tambiah, op. cit., passim. 
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provided, since sources are often few and an incident might only be 
related by one or two chroniclers in varying detail. When cross-checking 
is possible, I have done so, with explanation in the notes. In other cases, 
I have noted the figures which sources have provided, with comment and 
justification. But it is necessary to relate the figures, whether they are 
exaggerated or not, for several reasons. The first reason, again, is that 
often an exaggerated figure may be all we have to go on, and exaggerated 
or not a figure usually contains a good deal of value, whether absolute or 
relative to other figures which are provided. Second, and probably most 
important, a numerical figure carries a value which lies outside of the 
realm of telling us “how many:” a number conveys an understanding of 
how participants in a given battle or massacre viewed the events around 
them. In the Arakanese, Toungoo, or Avan sieges of De Brito’s fortress at 
Syriam for example, I do not think that it is probable that fifty to one 
hundred Portuguese successfully destroyed indigenous armies of tens of 
thousands. But I do think that when we are given such figures, we can 
better understand how the Portuguese viewed their situation; often 
tenacious or even hopeless or, when they won, blessed or saved by divine 
intervention.  
Further, the figures provided tell us too little as often as they tell 
us too much. In the case of indigenous armies, we are rarely told how 
much of the army was allocated to supply or logistical units, or how 
many were camp-followers, religious leaders, or various personnel or 
slaves sent to take care of the personal needs of lords or kings. In the 
case of Portuguese chronicles, we rarely read of how many indigenous 
troops fought alongside, and often saved, their Portuguese comrades. In 
the case of Salvador Ribeyro and Philip de Brito, for example, it took 
some time before I was able to determine that while there were indeed 
only several hundred Portuguese in any given battle, they were usually 
accompanied by thousands of Mon soldiers, with the Mon captain, Ximin 
Barragao, as a good example. Indeed, Portuguese victories against tens of 
thousands seem more palpable when we consider that the Portuguese 
force probably numbered two or three thousand, when we include Mon 
auxiliaries. Again, I have tried to make these figures available when 
possible, and certainly the fact of indigenous participation in the 
Portuguese war effort, though often unspoken, always needs to be kept 
into account. 
Another problem in examining chronicles of this period involves 
the use of personal or geographical names. In the case of the Arakanese 
kings, for example, they often had three or more names, Islamic, 
Buddhist, or otherwise, and Portuguese corruptions of their names 
makes the confusion drastically worse: the same person may be called by 
five or six names in any group of accounts and given a century of 
Arakanese history, this problem of determining who is who must be 
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multiplied by the hundreds. The same problem exists in indigenous 
chronicles, such as in the case of Philip de Brito, who is referred to as 
Changa, Xenga, Nga Zinga, or a variety of other names. Interestingly, 
European accounts have corrupted De Brito’s name into various 
misspellings: I have counted at least ten versions. The same problem 
exists for geographical names and the historian has to face accounts 
which may use San Iago, Cirian, Siriam, etc., for Syriam,  Chatigan, 
Chatigam, Chittigon, etc., for Chittagong, or Jungoma for Chieng Mai. 
Luckily, two great resources are at the historians disposal: G. E. Gerini’s 
tremendous work of 1909, Researches on Ptolemy’s Geography of Eastern 
Asia,30  and Henry Yule and Arthur Coke Burnell’s similarly exhaustive 
work of 1886, Hobson-Jobson.31 I have used these works extensively as 
reference for place names, and special note should be given to Yule and 
Burnell’s work, which was the most helpful in determining sixteenth 
century geographical references. 
Related to the problem of variations in place names is the problem 
of contemporaneous authors who related secondhand notations of 
geographical locations as if they had been there, or the 
misunderstanding of these contemporary travelers of where they had 
been.32  This problem is especially evident in the location of Portuguese 
fortresses and trading stations, which may be said to have been located 
in completely different countries than where they actually were. These 
travelers also had no idea of which kingdoms certain sites they may have 
visited were in, and extended the problem by providing extensive 
commentary on political and economic relationships between these sites 
and the supposed country around them which are simply false or, at the 
very least, misleading. I have tried to make it easier for the reader to 
“navigate” through the sixteenth and seventeenth century Bay of Bengal 
and Burmese region, by my own investigative work and corresponding 
notations as well as with several maps which are provided in the text. 
One last point needs to be made to allay a criticism of my work 
which will probably be made with some justification. Despite 
MacGregor’s observation that Barros might be criticized by the “modern 
historian” for his focus on the “minutiae of small battles and sieges,” 
                                                          
30 G. E. Gerini. Researches on Ptolemy’s Geography of Eastern Asia (Further India 
and Indo-Malay Archipelago. London: Royal Asiatic Society. 1909. 
31 Henry Yule & Arthur Coke Burnell. Hobson-Jobson Being a Glossary of Anglo-
Indian Colloquial Words and Phrases and of Kindred Terms: Etymological, Historical, 
Geographical, and Discursive. London: John Murray, 1886. 
32 In some cases, the accounts of Lisbon-based historians were more accurate than 
those of actual visitors to the countries they wrote about. See I. A. MacGregor, op. cit., 
179. 
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rather than “economic and administrative matters,”33 examining the 
plethora of small battles and sieges is inescapable, in many cases, for 
several reasons. First, as previously explained, the Portuguese and 
indigenous historians, who are often our only sources, had a field-day 
with battles and sieges. Few historians were interested in, nor did they 
seem to have realized the importance of, ascertaining long-term 
administrative trends in any meaningful way other than ‘proving’ the 
legitimacy of the current ruler of their nations. Secondly, the ‘minutiae of 
small battles and sieges’ can offer important information to the careful 
observer. The complexity of small battles, for example, often offer insights 
into the personalities of not just the leaders, but also of the average 
soldier involved. These insights include loyalties, goals, beliefs, as well as 
how these often forgotten ‘little’ participants lived, fought, and behaved: 
all of these things tell us something very important in the aggregate 
about their societies and about how they viewed the historical events 
happening around them. Particularly, I have used battles and sieges to 
indicate the true nature of the value of Portuguese weaponry and 
organization relative to Arakanese weaponry and organization. But I have 
also used these battles and sieges to determine the leadership qualities 
of men like De Brito, Gonçalves, Min Yazagyi, Min Bin, and Min 
Khamaung. Further, these minor battles are only considered alongside 
general economic and administrative analysis. 
 
Questions 
 
Which of the two partners, the kings of the Burmese region or the 
Portuguese mercenaries was dominant in their relationship and why? 
Some scholars have argued that the mainland Southeast Asian rulers 
who employed Portuguese mercenaries were dominant in this 
partnership and that the Portuguese were merely ‘tools’ of Southeast 
Asian statecraft. Lieberman’s important article, “Europeans, Trade, and 
the Unification of Burma, c. 1540-1620,”34 has elaborated on this point 
carefully, while conceding that the Portuguese eventually became 
independent players in the Southeast Asian political realm, but only 
within the parameters of established Southeast Asian political behavior. 
But if the Arakanese were dominant, then why were two groups of 
Portuguese mercenaries able to revolt against Arakanese rule during the 
reign of Min Yazagyi, the King of Arakan?  
                                                          
33 I. A. Macgregor, op. cit., 182. 
34 Victor B. Lieberman, “Europeans, Trade, and the Unification of Burma, c. 1540-
1620,” 203-226. 
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On the other hand, George Winius, in his article, “The  ‘Shadow 
Empire’ of Goa in the Bay of Bengal,”35 seems to imply that the 
Portuguese and not the indigenous Asians, were the true masters in their 
relationship. Indeed, Winius seems to feel that the Portuguese 
mercenaries in Pegu and Arakan fit into an ‘informal empire’ of the 
Portuguese. But if the Portuguese were dominant, then why were both of 
the rebellious mercenary groups, those of Pegu and Sundiva, defeated 
after a decade or so of independence?  
Falling somewhere between Lieberman and Winius is the 
argument of G. V. Scammell. Scammell does not question European 
dominance in the relationship between the Portuguese and the 
indigenous rulers. Instead, Scammell, in his articles “Indigenous 
Assistance in the Establishment of Portuguese Power in Asia in the 
Sixteenth Century”36 and “The Pillars of Empire: Indigenous Assistance 
and the Survival of the ‘Estado da India’ c. 1600-1700,”37 argues that 
although the Europeans were dominant, this dominance could not have 
been achieved without indigenous support or the “adept exploitation of 
conflicts and divisions in indigenous societies.” Scammell’s chief concern 
is to attack the oft-cited claim that meat-eating Europeans (as opposed to 
the protein deficient diet of Asians), supposedly dominant in technology, 
simply entered Asia and took control without much effort. Scammell’s 
view thus differs from Lieberman’s since Scammell provides a scenario in 
which Europeans were dominant in their relationship with the  
indigenous rulers (Scammell only questions the means by which this was 
done), and Scammell differs from Winius since Scammell sees an 
important relationship between the indigenous population and the 
Portuguese. Scammell’s argument, however, leads to another question. Is 
it not possible, for example, that the situation was sometimes reversed 
and Asians took advantage of conflicts within the Estado da India to 
expand their own power or that Portuguese help was sometimes used by 
the Asians to achieve their own ends? 
The answer to these questions can be found in an examination of 
Min Yazagyi’s reign, during which Arakan both reached its greatest 
territorial extent and experienced the two mercenary rebellions. Min 
                                                          
35 George Davison Winius, “The ‘ Shadow Empire’ of Goa in the Bay of Bengal,” 
Itinerario 7, no. 2 (1983): 83-101. 
36 G. V. Scammell, “Indigenous Assistance in the Establishment of Portuguese Power 
in Asia in the Sixteenth Century,” Modern Asian Studies 14, 1 (1980): 1-11. 
37 G. V.  Scammell, “The Pillars of Empire: Indigenous Assistance and the Survval of 
the ‘Estado da India’ c. 1600-1700.” Modern Asian Studies 22, 3 (1988): 473-489.38 
Arthur P. Phayre, History of  Burma including  Burma Proper, Pegu, Taungu, Tenasserim, 
and Arakan: From the Earliest Time to the End of the First War With British India, (London: 
Trübner & Co., 1884): 171. 
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Yazagyi’s reign thus seems to be something of contradiction, since 
Arakan seems to have been at its greatest power and yet it was 
experiencing its greatest weakness at the same time. The major question 
which should be answered, then, is why this seeming contradiction 
developed.  
In order to answer these questions, as well as those mentioned 
earlier, three developments will be looked at: (1) the Portuguese-
Arakanese relationship in the sixteenth century; (2) the revolt of Philip de 
Brito; and (3) the revolt of Sebastião Gonçalves y Tibau. In examining 
these three stages of the Arakanese-Portuguese relationship, attention 
will be focused both on the Arakanese approach to dealing with the 
outside world, especially with the Portuguese and on the economic and 
administrative concerns which provoked the Arakanese desire to expand 
their state territorially and economically.   
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Chapter I 
Arakanese State and Society at the Beginning of the Sixteenth 
Century 
 
For many years after the retreat of Tabeng Shwéhtî, Arakan was 
left, undisturbed. Situated between Bengal and Burma, and far 
inferior to either in extent and resources, the strength of Arakan lay 
mainly in woods and swamps, which opposed the passage of an 
enemy, and offered a safe refuge for the people. Trusting to these 
natural defences, the kings of Arakan might long have remained 
secure against foreign foes. But they were not content to exist in 
obscure independence at home, and they encroached northward 
and eastward as they found opportunity from the weakness of 
either neighbor. 
Arthur P. Phayre38  
 
Mrauk-U, having turned the tables in Bengal proceeded to do the 
same on Burma. This was the first and only period in its history 
when Arakan was able not only to repulse the Burmese but even to 
annex part of their country. Razagri...took Pegu. This campaign was 
rendered possible by his excellent navy and Razagri, in appointing 
the Portuguese de Brito, as Governor of Syriam was repeating the 
policy of the north-west frontier. He depended on those mariners, in 
conjunction, presumably, with his own seamen, to keep his borders 
for him. 
 
Maurice Collis and San Shwe Bu39  
 
 
These two quotations indicate that there was a great change, 
between the first-half of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, in the way in which the Arakanese kings both 
viewed the world around them and how they adapted themselves to the 
changing economic and political climate. What, for example, provoked 
the Arakanese kings to change from isolated monarchs to great military 
conquerors? Was this change due to economic developments? If so, what 
were these developments and how did they affect the world-view of the 
Arakanese kings and perhaps Arakanese society in general?  
In order to answer these questions, the world-view of Arakanese 
society at the beginning of the sixteenth century will first be examined. 
Then I will examine the way in which Arakanese kings legitimized their 
rule: first, in terms of theoretical religious legitimation of kingship and 
                                                          
39 Collis and San Shwe Bu, “Arakan’s Place in the Civilization of the Bay,” 43. 
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second, in terms of the economic basis of kingly legitimation. This 
analysis will be used as the basis for the next chapter in which the 
development of the relationship between the Portuguese and the 
Arakanese monarchy during the sixteenth century will be examined. 
 
Arakanese Society and the Arakanese World-View 
 
Before examining the world-view of the Arakanese kings and their means 
of legitimation of kingship, it would be useful to look at what Arakan 
society was like at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The Arakanese 
were similar to many peoples found throughout the world, who, finding 
themselves stuck between large and powerful empires, choose either to 
isolate themselves from the outside world or to purposefully look at other 
cultures for religions or tools of state-craft through which they could 
express their own views in a way easily recognizable to the outside world. 
This choice between isolation and adaptation was faced not just by 
Arakan, but by many other societies throughout Southeast Asia. Some 
Southeast Asian societies chose to adapt and opened themselves up to 
the outside world, as in the case of modern Thailand.  Other societies in 
Southeast Asia chose both adaptation and isolation, in which outside 
models were utilized but the “doors” to their societies remained closed to 
the outside world, as shown by examples as varied as modern Burma 
and premodern Vietnam. 
The Arakanese chose the second path, and their culture at the 
beginning of the sixteenth century reflected both their isolation and their 
adaptation. One way that we can see both isolation and adaptation is by 
looking at the temple iconography of Mrauk-U, the Arakanese capital. In 
the Shithaungparã (Shithaung pagoda), built in C.E. 1535 on Pakaung-
daung hill, eighty-four thousand images of the Buddha were enshrined 
“after the fashion of the great Asoka.”40 While King Min Bin planned on 
housing these Buddhist images in the Shithaungparã from the 
beginning, the pagoda was stylistically Hindu, so much so that “the 
entire structure is alien in its main features to native architectural 
style.”41 In addition to the Buddhist images, the pagoda includes 
garudas, statues which are probably of Vishnu, and other iconography 
indicating the old Brahmanic social order, with the Brahmans on top, 
then kings, below them warriors, and, at the bottom, commoners. 
Further, the gateway is protected by “a six-armed figure and richly 
                                                          
40 San Baw U, “My Rambles among the Ruins of the Golden City of Myauk-U,” 
Journal of the Burma Research Society 16 (1926): 37. 
41 Forchhammer, op. cit., 20. 
 
 
 
ARAKAN, MIN YAZAGYI, AND THE PORTUGUESE 
 
SBBR 3.2 (AUTUMN 2005):974-1145 
 
992 
dressed Brahmans at one side of it.”42  This “mixture of sculptural 
representations from the Buddhist cultus and Hindu pantheon”43 clearly 
indicates Arakanese religious syncretism. At the same time, another 
pagoda built by Min Bin, the Andaw pagoda, is completely Buddhist in 
its design and iconography and shows no sign of Hinduism.44  A little 
further away, however, is the Nan tha-gan, or “the tank of the palace 
people,” which is guarded by two sets of huge “dreadful looking bhilus in 
sitting posture.”45 Since the bhilus or bhillas, are the demons who 
gather human victims for Hindu gods and goddesses,46 we can see the 
adoption of further aspects of Hinduism by the Arakanese. Animism was 
not neglected either, with a good example being the nat-shrine built to 
house the female nat, Ma Pru.47 Interestingly, all four of these examples, 
the Shithaungparã, the Andaw pagoda, the Nan tha-gan, and the Ma Pru 
shrine were built roughly in the same thirty-year period and represent 
the diversity of religious models adopted by the Arakanese.  
As in other Southeast Asian civilizations, this syncretic approach 
to religion by Arakan reflected a centuries-long process of adaptation and 
change. Theravada Buddhism, for example, was present from before the 
tenth century, yet for many centuries Arakan was more closely 
associated with Islamic India than with Sri Lanka.48 But I think that it 
is necessary to provide another example of how the Arakanese adopted 
various foreign religious models in a syncretic manner. In C.E. 1595, the 
poet Ugga Byan, who was the royal tutor to Prince Min Khamaung, wrote 
a poem, the only work of his which is extant. Ugga Byan wrote this poem 
in the Arakanese poetic style of Ra-tu, or seasonal, which was a style 
that the Arakanese had borrowed from both India and Burma. In this 
poem, Ugga Byan speaks through the mouth of Min Khamaung’s favorite 
wife, and describes her feelings, season by season, as she longs for Min 
                                                          
42 Forchhammer, op. cit., 24. 
43 Ibid 
44 Ibid., 24-5. 
45 San Baw U, “My Rambles,” Journal of the Burma Research Society 11 (1921): 168. 
46 A. Berriedale Keith, A History of Sanskrit Literature, (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1920): 285. 
47 San Baw U, “My Rambles,” Journal of the Burma Research Society 16 (1926): 37. 
48 Hall, Burma, 57;Further, this Arakanese willingness to absorb foreign religious 
models into a syncretic system may account for Juan Gonsalez De Mendoza’s sixteenth 
century observation that  the Spanish knew  little of the Arakanese, but they did know 
that the Arakanese were “very apt to receive the holie gospell.” See Juan Gonsalez De 
Mendoza (1586), The History of the Great and Mighty Kingdom of China and the Situation 
Thereof, Volume II, translated by R. Parke and edited by George T. Staunton, with an 
introduction by R. H. Major, (New York: Burt Franklin, n.d.): 321-2. 
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Khamaung’s return during a journey to Pegu. To illustrate my point that 
Arakanese culture had adopted various foreign religious and cultural 
models in a syncretic manner, I will examine a few lines: 
  
Plucking now here, now there a precious 
flower. 
With these I mounted the Pagoda steps  
And laid them at the knees of the Exalted.49  
All these they offer to pagodas and images: 
Some observe also the Five and the Eight 
Precepts, 
Doing much charity as befits a Buddhist.50  
 
These two selections indicate the important role that Buddhism was 
playing in Arakanese society. But at the same time, the poem indicates 
the influence of Hinduism: 
 
See the Rain-king marshall his thunder 
clouds 
And make his lightnings flicker; see the Sun-
king, 
In his rich coat of a thousand scarlet flames, 
Drive out and set his horses at a gallop 
In the circuit of Mount Meru; on the summit 
The King of Heaven sits, smiling at this, 
Until, an amber rod in his left hand, 
His right upon a sword, he shouts again. 
At once the Rain-king summons back at the 
clouds, 
Darkens the sky, darts lightning everywhere, 
And a shower rushing down settles the 
dust.51  
 
These references to Indra indicate the importance that Hinduism was 
playing in Arakanese society as well. But I think that it is interesting that 
only Indra, and not other Hindu gods such as Vishnu or Çiva, is spoken 
of in the poem. Although Vishnu is certainly in evidence in the 
iconography of the royal buildings, as in Ayudhya and Angkor, I think 
                                                          
49 First stanza, lines 11-13. See Maurice Collis, “An Arakanese Poem of the 16th 
Century,” Journal of the Burma Research Society 13 (1923): 224. 
50 Seventh stanza, lines 5-7. Ibid., 226. 
51 Third stanza, lines 11-21. Ibid, 224-225. 
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that Ugga Byan’s neglect in failing to mention Vishnu or Çiva might show 
that  Indra may have entered popular culture for his value as both the 
God of Rain and the symbol of kingship. This would tie together the two 
things which directed Arakanese society the most: kingship and water 
(they primarily saw themselves as a maritime people). Indeed, Indra is 
spoken of in this poem for his role in nature, rain, as much as he is as a 
king. But Ugga Byan was a royal tutor, and his environment was the 
royal court and not an Arakanese village: perhaps Indra played a more 
important role in his surroundings than he did for Arakanese as a whole. 
Other sections of the poem mention aspects of Arakanese life 
which I think show that Ugga Byan was also in touch with Arakanese 
culture and society outside of the royal court; the poem also relates a 
strong animist tradition. As we read: 
 
Why do the Nats who inhabit the Six Regions 
Allow so cruel a cold to chill us here? 
Night after night I have complained to them, 
Till I am weary of complaining; they do not 
hear, 
Wherefore I raise my hands in the form of a 
bud, 
Wherefore appeal over the Nats to Buddha,52  
 
This selection certainly indicates the important influence of animism in 
Arakanese culture and society. We also read of water festivals, and other 
indications of animist influence. But at the same time, we can see in this 
selection a clearer indication of the syncretism of the Arakanese way of 
looking at religion and the world: animism and Buddhism are seen 
together in the same context. That is, the Arakanese have adopted 
Buddhism, and Hinduism for that matter, and blended them with 
indigenous animism, creating a religious and culture syncretism which 
provides them with as many models as possible to express their feelings 
and to reassure themselves of safety in a world which threatens their 
survival and yet a world from which they have drawn many useful things 
which allow them to protect their state and society. This is not to say, 
however, that the Arakanese were unique in their defensive syncretism; 
Indeed, many Southeast Asian societies have adopted similar outlooks, 
but it is possible that this defensive syncretism was more strongly 
marked in Arakan than elsewhere. In any case, for the purposes of this 
case study, this general societal outlook can be kept in mind. 
The most important example of how the Arakanese people used 
outside influences in a syncretic manner and in this way adapted and 
                                                          
52 Stanza 10, lines 7-12, Ibid., 227. 
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maintained their independence is the Mahamuni shrine. This was the 
national shrine of Arakanese society and it was of great symbolic 
importance for the chief themes of Arakanese society and national 
survival. The Candasara image, or Mahamuni image (the “Great 
Wanderer image”),53  is supposedly that of Godama Buddha: the 
Arakanese claim that the shrine was built in B.C.E. 545 and even Asoka 
is said to have visited this image twenty-three centuries ago.54 But the 
”throne,”55 on which the image of Godama Buddha sat inside the 
Mahamuni shrine, was built on top of the base which was lined with 
twelve thousand “magical figures” engraved on copper plates: these 
engravings were placed here “with a view to calling in the aid of the 
spirits to make [Arakan] dominant over its neighbouring states.”56 U San 
Tha Aung, however, argues that these spirits are engraved on the base of 
the pagoda to show that the Buddha was superior to all other deities and 
religions. His view, although much of it guess-work due to the poor 
condition of the images, is that the spirits represent “Devas, Yaksas, 
Gandharvas, Asuras, Garudas, Kinnaras, Mahoragas, and Nagas.”57   
In any case, the Candasara image, provides an important 
example of the multiplicity of religious models available to the Arakanese, 
and probably indicates a high degree of Arakanese religious syncretism. 
That Arakanese religious syncretism, despite San Tha Aung’s perhaps 
hasty argument that the shrine displays non-Buddhist religious themes 
to show Buddhist dominance, is more clearly in evidence when the 
legends of the shrine are taken into account: the Mahamuni thamein 
(history of the Mahamuni shrine) and the Sappadanapakarana (an 
ancient Arakanese manuscript), for example, give clear indications of 
Arakanese religious syncretism: 
 
[I]t behoves me [Godama] that in this country, which is more 
excellent than the rest of the 84,000 countries, and which has been 
the scene of my various transmigrations, should leave my image 
                                                          
53 I would like to thank Dr. Collins for explaining to me the significance and 
meaning of “muni” which mean religious pilgrim or wanderer. 
54 The image was crafted on the orders of King Sanda Thuriya of the Daññawadi 
Dynasty out of “nine kinds of pure metals.” See San Baw U, “My Rambles,” Journal of the 
Burma Research Society 11 (1921): 165. 
55 U San Tha Aung, The Buddhist Art of Ancient Arakan (An Eastern Border State 
Beyond Ancient India, East of Vanga and Samatata), (Rangoon: Government Press, 1979): 
112. 
56 Chan Htwan Oung, “The Mahamuni Shrine in Arakan.” Journal of the Burma 
Research Society  2 (1912): 262-263. 
57  San Tha Aung, op. cit., 114-5. 
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and hair, which, I am fully convinced, will be held in veneration by 
men, nats, and Brahmins, during the 5,000 years subsequent to 
my Nirvana.58  
  
This legendary history includes reference to nats and Hindu priests, 
which indicates the more widely-shared religious syncretism used for 
political legitimation throughout Burma:  nats, Brahmins, and the 
Buddha were wedded together symbolically; Kyanzittha, for example, 
who was the Buddhist king of Pagan, installed nats in the Shwezigon, 
which Luce has called the “most ‘national’ of all Burma’s pagodas.”59 
Similarly, the Mahamuni shrine is Arakan’s most “national” pagoda, and 
perhaps the combination of nats and the Buddha is indicative of a 
Burma-wide syncretism of religious models of political legitimation. But 
there is something else which indicates a more ambitious syncretic 
approach to religious models by the Arakanese: within the Mahamuni 
shrine, Arakan’s “national” symbol, there is a sacred hole which is 
dedicated to the worship of Vasundhara, the “Earth Goddess.”60  
The Mahamuni shrine also represented Arakan’s resilience 
against attempts by the outside world to dominate Arakan in a very real 
sense as well: almost every legendary or historical invader of Arakan 
tried to remove the Mahamuni shrine, and the Candasara, but either 
failed or was cursed as a result.  In C.E. 81, the king of Tharekhettara 
(Prome) supposedly remained in Arakan for three years after his 
successful invasion, waiting for his engineers to find some way of 
removing the shrine; eventually it was decided to simply remove its 
treasure, which is said to have resulted in the fragmentation of 
Tharekhettara society in C.E. 94. The Shans who melted down the 
copper image house above the Mahamuni shrine in the late tenth 
century were driven out by the Arakanese and their new Shan king, 
brother of the invading king, who had become a “naturalized Arakanese.” 
Anawratha, who supposedly invaded Arakan in C.E. 1018, was unable to 
remove the Mahamuni shrine, and his attempts to deface it were undone 
by  the Arakanese,61 although some accounts argue that Anawratha was 
                                                          
58 Translated by Forchhammer, op. cit., 4. 
59 Cited in  S. J. Tambiah, op. cit.,  110. 
60 Do We, “Maha Razawin,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal (1920-21): 
61-2, cited in Pamela Gutman, “The Ancient Coinage of Southeast Asia,” Journal of the 
Siam Society 66, pt. 1 (January, 1978): 20f. 
61  Chan Htwan Oung, “The Mahamuni Shrine in Arakan,”  263-5; Forchhammer, 
op. cit., 6. 
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merely trying to rebuild the Mahamuni shrine.62  Kyanzitta and 
Alaungsittu, in C.E. 1096, were able to build their own edifices at the 
shrine, but the Arakanese had no love for these additions to the 
shrine:63 King Min Than, “being prompted by national hatred towards 
the Burmans, destroyed the shrine built by them and erected a new 
one.”64 Another disaster struck the shrine in C.E. 1098, when the Pyus 
and Mons totally destroyed the Mahamuni shrine; it was not until C.E. 
1153, when the Arakanese king,  Dasaraja, had the Mahamuni shrine 
rebuilt.  Yet again, the shrine was destroyed, by the Shans for the second 
time, in C.E. 1354, and rebuilt again in C.E. 1393, by the Arakanese 
king, Sinda.65  
The Arakanese thus saw the Mahamuni shrine, which combined 
elements of Buddhism with local animism, as symbolic of their struggle 
with the outside world. This importance continued even when the capital 
of Arakan was moved to Mrauk-U by the Min Zawmun in C.E. 1430: “he 
constructed a road from this city to Mahamuni; he inaugurated 
periodical pilgrimages to the sacred shrine, which he put in thorough 
repairs; the numerous tanks along the road are ascribed to him.”66 
Further, the Mahamuni shrine continued to play a vital role in the 
symbolic legitimation of Arakanese kingship: As part of their “coronation 
ritual,” Arakanese kings deposited fifty coins commemorating their reign 
into a sacred hole in the Mahamuni shrine.67 Significantly, the first 
successful removal of the Candasara image by the Burmese in C.E. 1784 
marked the permanent end of Arakanese independence and the 
destruction of Arakanese society. As Forchhammer explains: 
 
Until the removal of the Candasara image, the Mahamuni pagoda 
was the most sacred shrine in Indo-China; the entire religious 
history of Buddhistic Arakan centres round this ‘younger brother’ 
of Gotama; the loss of this relic sank deeper into the hearts of the 
                                                          
62 Forchhammer believes that Anawratha even built an entrance hall to the 
Mahamuni shrine. See Forchhammer, op. cit., 6. 
63 Chan Htwan Oung, op. cit., 263-5. 
64 Forchhammer, op. cit., 6. 
65 Ibid 
66 Ibid 
67 Do We, Maha Razawin, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal (1920-21): 
61-2, cited in Pamela Gutman, “The Ancient Coinage of Southeast Asia,” Journal of the 
Siam Society 66, pt. 1 (January, 1978): 20f. 
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people than the loss of their liberty  and the extinction of their royal 
house. ‘It will be brought back again’ the Arakanese fondly hope.68  
 
 
The Arakanese isolated themselves inland, but, at the same time, 
they selected an easily defensible position for their capital, the center of 
their civilization, which was also on the crossroads of important overland 
trade routes. This allowed them to resist invasions but at the same time 
allowed them to select foreign models which they wanted to use to 
express their own views and culture. We can see this in the Arakanese 
use of the foreign Buddhist and Hindu models, alongside their own 
indigenous animism. I will now look at the importance of this syncretic 
approach to foreign models in the legitimation of Arakanese kingship. 
 
 Southeast Asian Legitimation of Kingship 
 
I have already mentioned how the Arakanese used a variety of foreign 
religious models and blended them with their own: this syncretism was 
also reflected in Arakanese royal regalia and legitimation of kingship. In 
many Southeast Asian kingdoms, the central monarch presided over a 
political system in which concentric rings of decreasing royal influence 
extended from the political center, often referred to as a “mandala state” 
or a “galactic polity.”69 The Southeast Asian kingdom, for example, was 
a symbolic construct of five or nine points:70 there was a political center 
ruled by the central monarch, around which orbited a ring of smaller 
political centers (they were symbolically four, each with its own 
concentric rings of small localized political centers), ruled by subrulers 
under the central monarch’s direct control. Further out, often in recently 
captured territories, there was an outer-ring of political centers 
(symbolically four in number as well) left under the control of foreign 
vassals of hazy loyalties.71 The Southeast Asian state thus appeared like 
a galaxy: “we have before us a galactic picture of a central planet 
surrounded by differentiated satellites, which are more or less 
‘autonomous’ entities held in orbit and within the sphere of influence of 
the center.”72 Scholars describe it as a system in which the vassal-rulers 
of the population centers in the outer rings often had multiple loyalties to 
                                                          
68 Forchhammer, op. cit., 6. 
69 For a good discussion of the galactic polity, see Tambiah, op. cit., chapter 7, 
passim. 
70 Ibid., 103-4. 
71 Ibid., 112. 
72 Ibid. 
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other political centers which created a “patchwork of often overlapping 
mandalas, or ‘circles of kings’.”73 Physical, and often cultural distance of 
the outer population centers from the political center of the central 
monarch made it easy for subkings to switch allegiances quickly.  Since 
each subcenter replicated the central royal court in its own political 
center, each subcenter was theoretically a potential political center in its 
own right, and could become the political center of a new kingdom. As 
Wolters explains: the “mandala perimeters continued to replicate court 
situations at the centre. Centres of spiritual authority and political power 
shifted endlessly.”74  
Two things seemed to have held the mandala or galactic polity 
together: ideologies of royal-religious legitimation and the redistribution 
of wealth by the supreme king to his subrulers. That is, the subrulers 
were tied to the king theoretically, due to the king’s role as a dhamaraja, 
a chakravartan, or as maharaja, and the subrulers were tied to the king 
as a “father” who could provide them with wealth. One means of 
legitimation of kingship was not enough, and although a king may have 
been legitimate theoretically, if that king could not provide wealth to his 
subjects, they might easily transfer loyalty to others who could. Religious 
legitimation often accounted for this by maintaining this tie between 
wealth and royal legitimation on the theoretical level: a Buddhist king, 
for example, could only be legitimate if he maintained the economic 
prosperity of his kingdom, as one of the three main criteria for Buddhist 
royal legitimation.75 Likewise, a ruler who could provide the necessary 
redistribution of wealth to his subjects might find it difficult to maintain 
his rule in the face of stiff competition from other wealthy men in his 
kingdom; the king needed royal-religious legitimation to decrease the 
number of competitors76 and to maintain the support of the very 
powerful Buddhist sangha. 
As Arakanese royal legitimation depended upon both religious 
legitimation and the redistribution of wealth throughout the kingdom as 
well as on the security of an isolated Arakan, Arakanese kings were 
continually looking for new models of religious legitimation and new 
opportunities for to acquire wealth for redistribution. I will look at the 
                                                          
73 O. W. Wolters, History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives. 
(Singapore: Institute Southeast Asian Studies, 1982): 16. 
74 Ibid., 17. 
75 I have discussed these three criteria, the other two being the safety of the sangha 
and the safety of the kingdom from foreign enemies in my paper at the Midwest 
Conference on Asian Affairs. Charney, “Buddhist Kingship,” passim. 
76 Richard A. O’Connor, A Theory of Indigenous Southeast Asian Urbanism, Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies. Research Notes and Discussion Papers, no. 38 (1983): 18. 
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way in which Arakanese kings adopted foreign models of religious 
legitimation of kingship and then I will examine the attempt by 
Arakanese kings to increase their economic opportunities. 
 
Arakanese Kingship: Theoretical Legitimation 
 
Many foreign religious models of royal legitimation were adopted by 
Arakanese society through the centuries, as the Arakanese kings looked 
for the most effective means of keeping their kingdom together and many 
elements were combined in a syncretic fashion. The Arakanese king, for 
example, was identified as a Buddhist dhamaraja, as a Hindu maharaja, 
and as an Islamic sultan all at the same time. One indication of this is 
that the Arakanese king called himself by more than three different 
names, each reflecting a different religion and a different model of 
legitimacy of kingship. Three sixteenth century lingas of the Arakanese 
kings, each five feet high, bore the king’s different identifications. One of 
these, for example, bore the title “King of Persia.” In Arakanese 
chronicles, the Arakanese king is often called “Thura-tan,” or sultan.77 
The Arakanese kings also claimed to be the protectors of the Buddhist 
sangha and took measures to ensure that in battle, the Buddhist monks 
would have a safe place to hide from invading armies. King Min Bin built 
Buddhist temples “after the fashion of the great Asoka,” the first great 
Buddhist king.78   
The Arakanese kings also depended heavily upon the spiritual 
value of nat-worship. While one group of nats was important at the level 
of the households of the general Arakanese populace, another set of 
Arakanese nats were valued solely for political guidance. Before the 
Arakanese king would embark on any important military or 
governmental undertaking, for example, he had to win the support of this 
second set of nats. One of the most important of these nats was Wunti, 
from whom the Arakanese kings had sought guidance since the eleventh 
century. Wunti was consulted, for example, before King Pai Pyu drove 
out the Shans in the tenth century. Later, as I will explain, King Min 
Palaung consulted Wunti and the Arakanese believed that she had killed 
Bayinnaung when his forces had invaded Arakan.79  
Arakanese kings often tried to translate their theoretical, religious 
powers into real powers which could be utilized against those people who 
threatened the king’s position on the throne. Arakanese kings, for 
                                                          
77 San Baw U, “My Rambles,” Journal of the Burma Research Society 11 (1921): 168. 
78 San Baw U, “My Rambles,” Journal of the Burma Research Society 16 (1926): 37. 
79 San Shwe Bu, “Wunti Nat,” Journal of the Burma Research Society  9 (1919): 52-
53. 
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example, practiced a cosmological, Brahmanic science called Yadaya , 
which combined “black magic” with astrology to supposedly be invoked 
only as a “defensive weapon.”80 According to this “science” the universe 
was simply being a combination of mathematical equations and 
astrology. As Maurice Collis explains: 
 
An invading army advancing towards...Mrauk-U would be an 
expression in the world of [a] form of higher  mathematics. The 
most root way of dealing with the invasion, therefore, would be by 
the interposition of a neutralizing equation. If the enemy was equal 
to + x, the interposition of - x would cause him to disappear. Here 
the science of Ya-da-yá came in. It indicated what was the 
neutralizing equation, under what circumstances of time and 
orientation it could be placed in position and how it could be...let 
off against the advancing foe.81  
 
As Collis further explains an incident in which an upstart used Yadaya 
against an early seventeenth century Arakanese king: 
 
He began work by making a calculation showing the astrological 
relationship between his horoscope and the King’s. That gave him 
the datum for all his future operations...The horoscopic comparison 
showed Kuthala in what, astrologically speaking, he fell short of the 
King in power. Ya-da-yá supplied the means of correcting, the 
adverse measurements in his favour. He accordingly inscribed on 
certain stone squares the calculation, which was necessary to alter 
his chart into one superior to the King’s, i.e., to change the 
measurements by which he was now controlled into other figures, 
which would give him mastery over the cyphers which were the 
astrological expression of Thiri-thudhamma. Taking the inscribed 
squares, he buried them at certain angles round the palace. Ya-da-
yá determined the angles and the method by which the calculations 
on the slabs were caused to react against the King. In this way 
Thiri-thudhamma was invested in a mathematical net. His 
                                                          
80 The science was also seen as a means of protection of the Arakanese in general. 
For example, at the Mahamuni shrine, the symbol of the Arakanese kingdom, there was 
the Yadaya bell, which, if struck “under certain circumstances of time, place, and 
direction,” would produce a “devastating” sound which would save the user from 
attackers. See Maurice Collis, “The Strange Murder of King Thirithudhamma,” Journal of 
the Burma Research Society 13 , no. 3 (1923): 238-9; The Yadaya bell, however, was a 
later addition, as it was cast by King Naradhipati in 1734 C.E.. See Forchhammer, op. 
cit., 7.  
81Ibid. 
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measurements were tampered with; the chart, which made him 
what he was, the King of a country, began to change, until it 
became possible to calculate at what point of time he would cease 
to exist at that place...in order to assist the operation of the squares 
[Kuthala] composed certain verses, written in such a rhythm and 
composed of such an arrangement of letters, each of which 
represented a number, that when uttered at a calculated time, 
place and angle, they set up vibrations assistant to the calculations 
on the squares.82  One aspect of this science, which an established 
king could use against foreign kings, was the construction of stone 
figures to contain the spirits of foreign kings to “bring them under 
his subjection:” one stone figure, for example, was said to have 
contained the spirit of the king of Pagan.83  
 
The Yadaya bell, an eighteenth century (C.E. 1734) addition to 
the Mahamuni shrine,  indicates the powers that Yadaya gave to the 
Arakanese king against foreign enemies. It was cast and placed at the 
shrine by King Naradhipati, with inscriptions of mantras (“sacred 
formulas”) in various languages (but all in Burmese script), “which, when 
pronoun[c]ed under certain ceremonies, would effect the destruction of 
any enemy against whom the mandra is directed.”84 These mantras were 
largely designed for the destruction of foreign enemies. Forchhammer 
has translated the following version included in the 
Sarvasthanapakarana: 
 
To prevent the inroads of enemies from foreign towns and villages, 
let offerings of flowers, parched corn, and lamps be made night and 
day at the Thitthaungnu, Mwedawngayat, and the Myotiparathit 
pagodas...To cause the rulers of the towns and villages in the four 
cardinal directions to be panic-stricken, let a pagoda, provided with 
four archways (facing the four cardinal points), be constructed over 
the Gôndaw dhat...and let the Yattara bell be hung and struck at 
the eastern archway, and the enemies from the east will be panic-
stricken and quit by flight...[and so on]...If the king desires the 
destruction of Maunggôt (Mogul Empire), let a pagoda be erected 
at... Mingauk; on its western side let a tank be dug; let the 
nagataing be of prano... wood placed upside down, and plant 
shashauk...trees at the corners of the tank. And Maunggôt will be 
destroyed...If the destruction of the Kulas (Western foreigners) is 
                                                          
82 Ibid., 239-240. 
83 San Baw U, “My Rambles,” Journal of the Burma Research Society 11 (1921): 168. 
84 Forchhammer, op. cit., 7. 
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wished for, let a pagoda be built either at the entrance of the lesser 
Kulatan cave...on its western side let a tank be dug; let the 
nagataing be of kula (?) wood placed upside down; and at its four 
corners let pebabwé trees be planted. By these means all the Kulas 
will be destroyed...If the king desires the destruction of Thanlyin 
(Syriam), let a pagoda be erected on a level of 4 cubits on the top of 
either the Thanlwin hill or the Thanlwin taung. On its south-
western side let a tank be dug; let the nagataing be of thavinthit 
wood (Karun oil tree) placed upside down and at its four corners 
plant yinhnaung trees...And Thanlyin will be destroyed...(and so 
on).85  
 
Clearly, Yadaya was thought of as a powerful supernatural tool in the 
hands of the arakanese kings against both foreign and domestic enemies. 
Indeed, as Forchhammer explains, the “kings of Arakan, firmly believing 
in the promises of the bell, erected pagodas and dug tanks on the spots 
pointed out by the inscription.”86   
Further, Arakanese kings believed in taran, a theory which held 
that tragic events were preceded by reverberations. These reverberations 
could only be sensed by mediums, who were unusually sensitive people 
such as “children, lunatics and actors.” As Maurice Collis explains: 
 
[T]he method adopted by the King was called ‘hearing 
taran.’According to the Theory of taran, if an event is on the way, 
its reverberation will first reach the minds of mediums. Such 
persons will be aware of it before its arrival into the upper 
consciousness and they will inadvertently say something which will 
indicate its existence and nature. The method of hearing taran was, 
therefore, to send a reliable person to stroll in the streets and listen 
to the casual remarks made by the kind of people who might be 
mediums.87  
 
The king, as well, if his life was in danger, would see this when he looked 
into a mirror.88  Thus, it should be clear that a variety of spiritual tools 
were available for the Arakanese kings to aid them in governing their 
kingdom and Arakanese society. 
 
Arakanese Kingship: Economic Legitimation & New Opportunities 
                                                          
85 Ibid., 10-11. 
86 Ibid., 12. 
87 Collis, “The Strange Murder of King Thirithudhamma,” 240. 
88 Ibid 
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The legitimacy of Arakanese kings also depended upon the ability to 
increase wealth for redistribution to subrulers. But at the beginning of 
the sixteenth century, economic opportunities were limited. Arakan was 
a vassal of Bengal and, although the Arakanese were noted for their 
seamanship, Arakan was said to have no large ports.89 Indeed, the 
Arakanese capital, Mrauk-U, was sixty miles upriver of the Arakanese 
estuary, which seems to me to indicate that Arakan’s traditional 
seafaring orientation was being constrained by its Bengalese overlords, 
who maintained a virtual monopoly on the trade of this area.90 Arakan 
also had to provide the Bengalese king with whatever he wanted: 
 
[T]he kings of Aracan...are bound to furnish him, when he goes out 
to war, with a certain number of men, elephants, and horses. They 
also pay him tribute for such harbours as they have in their 
territories.91  
 
Arakan had thus come to depend on land trade-routes. These land-based 
trade-routes had been the key to Arakan’s defensive strategy and had 
also served as the vehicle by which Arakan could pick and choose the 
foreign models which it wanted. I will try to show that the gradual 
collapse of the land-based markets, as well as the fall of Bengal to civil 
war, and thus a decrease in Bengalese control of the Bay of Bengal trade, 
contributed to new economic opportunities for the Arakanese kings in 
the maritime trade of the Bay of Bengal. The economic basis of 
Arakanese society will be looked at  to determine what, if any, economic 
developments may have have made it possible for Arakanese kings to 
change from isolated monarchs  to military conquerors determined to 
make their presence felt beyond Arakanese shores. 
Arakan was traditionally a secondary hub of trade in the Bay of 
Bengal. Peguan, Bengalese, and Kling92  traders brought their goods by 
sea to Mrauk-U, but this trade was relatively small. There was probably a 
large trade with Southern India, which is indicated by the Arakanese use 
of South Indian “merit-winning” dipams, or lamps. These lamps, which 
are shaped like human statuettes, indicate that the trade with Southern 
                                                          
89 Ibid 
90 François Pyrard, The Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval to the East Indies, the 
Maldives, the Moluccas and Brazil, vol. I, translated into English from the third French 
edition of 1619, and edited by Albert Gray with the assistance of H. C. P. Bell, (London: 
Hakluyt Society, 1887-89): 327. 
91 Ibid 
92 Traders from the Coromandel coast of India. 
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India was long-term. One of these lamps, for example, a pre-eleventh 
century specimen found at the site of Old Wesali, is inscribed with 
Arakanese script,93  indicating that the lamps had reached a stage at 
which the Arakanese had adopted them into their culture, rather than 
collecting them as oddities.  
The export trade of Arakan must also have been under royal 
control, from which the Arakanese kings seem to have received some 
personal profit. Van Leur, for example, has cited Arakanese trade as a 
good example of “royal interference in trade.” Van Leur supported his 
claim with the orders given to a Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde 
Oost-Indische Compagnie, here after V.O.C.) trading mission to Arakan 
on 15 June 1628: 
 
having come well in Arakan (you) shall deliver our accompanying 
missive and presents to the king there with the requisite 
compliments, and with all kinds of services and offices try to obtain 
His Majesty’s favour and assistance as much as possible in the 
collection of a good quantity of rice.94  
 
Clearly the V.O.C. leaders thought that appealing to the Arakanese king 
for trading privileges required compensatory payment, something that 
was not above V.O.C. employees, who themselves were notorious for 
secretly siphoning off company profits. The importance of this 
observation is that Arakanese trade was considered to fall under the 
Arakanese king’s monopoly on trade and for the Dutch, and earlier the 
Portuguese, to trade in Arakan, they had to “purchase” a share of the 
market from the royal house. 
Arakanese kings not only increased their economic legitimation 
through trade, but aided their religious legitimation. The Arakanese 
kings, for example, utilized maritime trade for  religious buildings which 
served to strengthen the religious aura, and thus theoretical legitimation, 
of Arakanese kingship: while the overwhelming preponderance of 
Arakanese housing at Mrauk-U was made of bamboo, the religious 
structures were made of  stone from Ramree, an island some one 
hundred miles from Mrauk-U.95 To a limited extent, Arakanese 
                                                          
93 San Shwe Bu, “Brass Figure-Lamp Found at Old Wesali, Arakan,” Journal of the 
Burma Research Society 10 (1920): 64-66. 
94 Colenbrander, Coen, V, 307, cf.. 309, cited in Van Leur, op. cit., 351, n. 44. 
95 Collis, “The City of Golden Mrauk-U,” 246. 
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merchants and Arakanese goods were also present in the trading 
emporium of Malacca.96  
Arakanese kings must have benefited from the Gangetic river-
trade through their possession of islands in the Sunderbunds (at the 
Gangetic rivermouth). This can be seen by looking at Sundiva island, 
which, though under the control of Bengal, must have functioned in a 
similar manner, economically, as those islands under the Arakanese 
king’s control. Sundiva island possessed a diverse economy: it not only 
served as a refitting station for riverine traffic, but was a source of many 
trade goods as well. As Caesar Frederici noted in the mid-sixteenth 
century: 
 
[Sundiva is] the fertilest Island in all the world...there we 
determined to stay 40 dayes to refresh us. And when the people of 
the Island saw the ship...presently they made a place of bazar or a 
market, with shops right over against the ship with all maner of 
provision of victuals to eate, which they brought downe in great 
abundance, and sold it so good cheape, that we were amazed at the 
cheapenesse thereof. I bought many salted kine there...for halfe a 
Larine a piece, which Larine may be 12. shillings sixe  pence, being 
very good and fat; and 4. wolde hogges ready dressed for a Larine; 
great fat hennes for a Bizze a piece...Also a sack of fine rice for a 
thing of nothing, and consequently all other things for humaine 
sustenance were there in such aboundance, that it is a thing 
incredible but to them that have seen it.97  
 
Further, Sundiva island was the major source of salt for much of the Bay 
of Bengal, exporting two hundred boatloads of salt each year.98 But it is 
clear that trade at this level could not sustain all of Arakan and it is 
possible that this trade was only made possible by the mid-sixteenth 
century due to developments that removed Bengalese domination of 
Arakan’s maritime trade, which I will explain later. 
Despite the low level of maritime trade during the period of 
Bengalese domination of the Bay of Bengal, Arakanese must have 
profited from a very large internal trading network, as well as large trade-
                                                          
96 Tomé Pires, The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires: An Account of the East, From the Red 
Sea to Japan, Written in Malacca and India in 1512-1515, (London: Hakluyt Society, 
1944): 268, 272-3. 
97 Caesar Frederici, “The Voyage of Master Cesar Frederick into the east India, and 
beyonde the Indies, Anno 1563,” in Richard Hakluyt (ed.) The Principal Navigations and 
Voyages Traffiques & Discoveries of the English Nation, volume 3, (London: J.M. Dent and 
Sons, 1927): 259. 
98 J. J. Campos, History of the Portuguese in Bengal, (Calcutta: 1919): 67. 
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routes overland to Burma and China. The capital of Arakan, Mrauk-U, 
for example, was a large metropolis, fourteen miles in circumference, 
with a population of 160,000, not including foreign traders.99 Nicolo di 
Conti, traveling in the Bay of Bengal in the first half of the fourteenth 
century, noted that Mrauk-U was a very large city that took him six days 
to reach by river from the coast.100   Within Arakan, it is probable that 
there was a large trade in horses, as Tomé Pires seems to imply. Further, 
traders came to Arakan for silver, as well as for the “three or four kinds 
of cotton cloth” which Arakan produced in great abundance  so that 
there was more cloth “there than in other places.”101 In the mountain 
ranges around Arakan, the hill peoples made musk from goats, which 
was then carried to Ava, and thence to Lower Burma.102 Indeed, Ava 
depended heavily upon the trade routes through Arakan to Bengal.103 
The trade with Ava was coupled with the trade-route along the Lemro 
river, which connected Arakanese kings with the large Southern Chinese 
trading world.104   Barbosa, writing at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century, tells us that Arakan imported elephants from Pegu, and implies 
that the Arakanese were rich, probably from trade: the Arakanese wore 
silk as well as cotton garments, and they possessed many “ornaments of  
gold and silver.”105  
The Arakanese royal house probably obtained a large amount of 
its wealth from the  exportation of finished rubies:  the Arakanese 
imported “highly coloured rubies” from the kingdom of Capelãguã, which 
were then polished by skilled Arakanese craftsmen, and re-exported.106 
                                                          
99 This figure comes from the estimate of Father Manrique in the first third of the 
seventeenth century, which is probably indicative of Mrauk-U’s population in the mid-
sixteenth century. See Maurice Collis, “The City of Golden Mrauk-U,” 245,  for Manrique’s 
estimate. 
100 J.S. Furnivall, “Europeans in Burma of the Fifteenth Century,” Journal of the 
Burma Research Society  29 (1939): 237. 
101 Pires, op. cit.,  95-6. 
102 Letter from Tomé Pires to King Manuel of Portugal, From Cochin, India, 27 
January 1516. In  Pires, op. cit.,  516. 
103 Kenneth R. Hall, Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia, 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985): 198. 
104 San Baw U, “My Rambles,” Journal of the Burma Research Society  13 (1923): 
101. 
105 Duarte Barbosa, A Description of the Coasts of East Africa and Malabar in the 
Beginning of the Sixteenth Century, translated from Spanish, with notes and preface by 
Henry E. J. Stanley, (London: Hakluyt Society): 182-3. 
106 Letter from Tomé Pires to King Manuel of Portugal, From Cochin, India, 27 
January 1516. In Pires, op. cit.,  516. 
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The ruby trade must have been very important to Arakan’s economy, for 
Tomé Pires claims that they were “the chief thing in the kingdom of 
Arakan.”107 This ruby trade may have been only a recent development, 
perhaps of the late fourteenth or early fifteenth century: Harvey argues 
that if there had been a large ruby trade, di Conti would have mentioned 
it, but he did not.108  Large-scale trade with Burma is also suggested by 
Arakan’s unit of currency: the cãça made of different combinations of tin, 
copper, and lead,109 suggests major importation of base metals. Another 
unit of currency in Lower Burma, the white  cowries from the Maldive 
islands were valid in Arakan, as they were in Martaban, but not in the 
rest of Pegu,110 suggesting strong maritime trade from the rich 
transpeninsular trade with the portages on the isthmus of Kra.  
Arakan also possessed rich, wet soil, much of it in the two great 
alluvial plains of the Kaladan and Lemro rivers,  north of Mrauk-U, ideal 
for wet-rice cultivation.111 Not only was Arakan self-sufficient in rice, 
but it was capable of producing enough to make rice an important export 
commodity. This potential for a profitable rice export would be realized 
during the steady growth of a “considerable export trade in rice” 
throughout the seventeenth century.112  
The Arakanese kings thus possessed the potential for controlling 
great and profitable export trade, as well as a good port at Mrauk-U, and 
a unique position on the trade routes between India, Bengal, and Pegu. 
But the Arakanese kings were not able to exploit this potential, which 
leads to the question of what was restricting Arakanese trade growth and 
thus the potential for increased legitimation of Arakanese kingship. 
Indeed, Arakan’s great wealth in natural resources led many European 
visitors to question Arakan’s seeming disinterest in international trade. 
John Huyghen Van Linschoten, who visited Arakan  in the mid-sixteenth 
century, commented: 
 
                                                          
107 Pires, op. cit., , 96. 
108 Furnivall, “Europeans in Burma of the Fifteenth Century,” 239. 
109 Pires, op. cit.,  98-99. 
110 Ibid., 100. 
111 Anthony Reid mentions that “numerous smaller rivers of Arakan,” produced 
“rich rice harvests,” Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680, vol. 
I, The Lands Below the Winds, (New Haven, Connecticutt: Yale University Press, 1988): 
11. 
112 D.G.E. Hall, Burma,155. Indeed, Arthur Phayre in the nineteenth century 
brought this growth to fruition by “turning the swamps of Arakan into the granary of the 
Bay.” Laurie, W. F. B. Sketches of Distinguished Anglo-Indians, 1887, pg. 136, cited in 
D.G.E. Hall, Burma, 114. 
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these kingdoms of Aracan and Pegu are very rich and fruitful of all 
things, besides Gold and precious stones, as Rubies, Espinels, 
Saffires, Iacinthes, Emeraldes, Granates, and such like...Likewise 
they make harde ware, which is carried throughout the world: 
There are greater number of Elephants in these countries, than in 
any other place [of] the Orientall countries.113  
 
Juan Gonsalez De Mendoza, as well, writing of Arakan in the latter part 
of the sixteenth century, commented that while Arakan was “verie 
plentifull of prouision,” it had little prepared for export.114 I think it is 
probable that Bengal was either openly restricting Arakanese trade or 
that the Arakanese were hesitant to develop their trade potential for fear 
of being perceived as a threat by powerful Bengal. Arakanese kings may 
have seen self-imposed neglect of maritime trade as one more defense 
technique, by not making themselves an economic threat to their 
neighbors. 
Royal  control of Arakanese maritime trade was probably 
threatened or actively suppressed by the king of Bengal. But another 
factor emerged: the Arakanese kings may have lost their control of 
overland trade in the early sixteenth century. Furnivall suggests, for 
example, that European visitors may have observed a temporary lull in 
trade when they noted, as Duarte Barbossa did, that Arakan had no port 
and when they implied that trade was unimportant in Arakan. Furnivall 
further suggests that the lull in trade may have been due to the “decline 
of Ava,”115 which was one of Arakan’s main trading partners on its 
overland routes. Ava failed in the fifteenth century, to bring the ports of 
the western Irrawaddy basin under its control, and as it became cut off 
from maritime commerce by Lower Burma kingdoms, Ava’s economy was 
ruined by “the growth of tax-free religious lands.”116 Arakanese royal 
trade thus lost one of its most important land-based markets. 
Bengal was divided in a civil war between the Mughal leaders 
Humayon and Shere Shah. For most of Min Bin’s reign (1531-1553), 
eastern Bengal was thus  opened to attack from the Arakanese if they 
chose to do so, and, as I will explain later, they did.117  I think that the 
                                                          
113 Jan Huygen van Linschoten, The Voyage of Jan Huyghen van Linschoten to the 
East Indies, vol. I, edited by Arthur Coke Burnell, (New York: Burt Franklin, n.d.): 97-8. 
114 Mendoza, op. cit., 321-2. 
115 J.S. Furnivall, “Europeans in Burma,” Journal of the Burma Research Society  
31, pt. 1 (1941): 36. 
116 For a more thorough discussion of this problem see Victor Lieberman, 
“Europeans, Trade, and the Unification of Burma,” 207-8. 
117 Collis & Sna Shwe Bu, “Arakan’s Place in the Civilization of the Bay,” 42. 
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significance of Bengalese division, however, was not that Bengal was 
open to Arakanese intervention. Rather, I think that the division of 
Bengalese political and military power was also felt in the Bengalese 
domination of the Bay of Bengal trade. The Bengalese grip on Arakanese 
trade probably lessened, and the decline of Bengalese markets probably 
increased trade at Mrauk-U, at the same time that Arakanese landbased 
traderoutes had collapsed. 
With the removal of the Bengalese restriction on trade, new 
opportunities for economic legitimation gradually opened up to the 
Arakanese kings. The Arakanese kings, whose export trade had been 
dwindling for generations, gradually began to trade with the world. These 
kings, leaders of a society whose outlook was characterized by flexibility 
in adapting to new political and economic opportunities, probably moved 
to take advantage of the new economic opportunities offered by maritime 
trade in the Bay of Bengal more quickly than one might expect. By 1567, 
for example, “small ships” were sent annually to Cochin before the 
Portuguese fleet made its return trip to Lisbon.118 Now, moderate 
maritime trade also came to Arakan from Golconda. As Antony Schorer 
observed in the early seventeenth century: 
 
Ships sail every year to the coast of Bengal, Arakan, Pegu, and 
Tenasserim, carrying a variety of cotton cloths, glass, iron, cotton 
yarn (red and white), tobacco, and certain shells which are used 
instead of coins in Bengal and Arakan; they carry also some spice 
and sandalwood. The return cargoes consist of rice, butter, oil, 
gingelly seed, sugar, a variety of woven cloths, some fine 
embroidered quilts, rubies, sapphires, lac, pitch, benzoin, China 
root, gold, tin, eagle-wood, sappan-wood, which is used for dyeing 
red, large jars called Martabans, and a drink called nipa. These 
goods are brought to the whole Coast, as far as Cochin.119  
 
William Methwold’s observation from the early seventeenth century more 
clearly delineates the nature of Arakan’s maritime trade with Golconda: 
 
In September the ships for Achyne, Arrecan, Pegu, and Tannassery 
set all sayle; for it is to be understood that, alongst this and all 
other coasts of India, the windes blow constantly trade, six moneths 
one way and sixe moneths another...To Arrecan they send store of 
                                                          
118 Frederici, op. cit., 257. 
119 Antony Schorer, “Brief Relation of the Trade of the Coromandel Coast, especially 
at the Factory at Masulipatam, where I resided in the service of the Hon’ble Company in 
the seventh Year,” in W. H. Moreland (ed.), Relations of Golconda in the Early Seventeenth 
Century, (London: Hakluyt Society, 1931):59. 
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tobacco, some iron, and few sorts of painted clothes, and returne 
from thence some gold and gumme lacke, but most part rice, which 
they sell about Pallecat and that coast of Narsinga.120  
 
Further, by the mid-sixteenth century, Arakan was already exporting 
rice, as part of the growing trade with the Portuguese trading stations in 
Asia. As Caesar Frederici observed in 1563: 
 
From the great port of Chatigan [Chittagong] they cary for the 
Indies great store of rice, very great quantitie of Bombast cloth of 
every sort, Sugar, corne, and money, with other marchandize.121  
 
But the new economic opportunities of the first half of the 
sixteenth century should not be confused as indicating the total 
elimination of restrictions on trade -- it did not. Indeed, the Portuguese 
replaced Bengalese control of trade with the Portuguese pass system, in 
which any ship trading in the Bay of Bengal had to buy a Portuguese 
pass or face destruction at sea; by 1537, the Portuguese “commanded 
the whole sea-board from Orissa to Chittagong.”122 Rather, the 
Portuguese trading system should be seen as a new system rather than a 
free system. That is, the Bengalese wanted to maintain their ports as the 
sole sources of trade goods at the expense of Arakanese exports and thus 
Bengalese control of Bay of Bengal trade meant to Arakan, the 
suppression of indigenous commodity exports. The Portuguese, however, 
wanted competition of sources of trade goods, to lower the prices at 
which Portuguese traders bought goods, while providing Portuguese 
traders with increased numbers of markets at which they could sell their 
own trade goods (which increased both demand and profit). The 
Portuguese system, then, encouraged Arakanese exports as opposed to 
the Bengalese ‘system’ which suppressed Arakanese exports with which 
Bengalese exports competed. This must have revolutionized the 
Arakanese trading system, since the Arakanese kings were now free, 
despite the cost of the Portuguese passes, to trade as they wished. 
Further, the Portuguese system provided, as will be explained in the 
following chapter, another reason for Arakanese kings to seek a friendly 
relationship with the Portuguese. 
                                                          
120 William Methwold, “Relations of the Kingdome of Golchonda, and Other 
Neighboring Nations within the Gulfe of Bengala, Arreccan, Pegu, Tannassery, etc., and 
the English Trade in Those Parts,” In W. H. Moreland (ed.), Relations of Golconda in the 
Early Seventeenth Century, (London: Hakluyt Society, 1931): 37-8. 
121 Frederici, op. cit., 260. 
122 Campos, op. cit., 112.123 Hall, A History of Southeast Asia, 414. 
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Economic opportunities for the Arakanese monarchy changed 
significantly during the first-half of the sixteenth century. The civil war in 
Bengal removed the previous Bengalese suppression of Arakanese 
maritime trade, while the decreasing availability of land-based trade 
sources forced Arakanese kings to look elsewhere for foreign trade. Thus, 
economically, Arakanese kings had every reason to want to increase their 
influence in the outside world. With Burma and the east under 
inhospitable rulers and the west in decay, Arakanese kings made the 
natural choice of securing markets for Arakan in the west on a 
permanent basis. 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
The Arakanese had many reasons to be afraid of the outside world since 
they were pressed between the two giants of Pegu and Bengal. But the 
Arakanese could depend upon the safe geographical location for their 
society, nestled in between mountain ranges and swampland. The 
Arakanese kings selected and maintained an inland capital as the center 
of their state and they preferred relatively safe land-route trade over 
vulnerable maritime trade. What little maritime trade the Arakanese 
royal house did control, however, was constrained by the Bengalese. This 
was not a problem, however, so long as Arakan’s land-based trade 
connections remained open and profitable. 
In the relative safety of this situation, the Arakanese found it 
advantageous to maintain their syncretic way of looking at the world. 
While countries like Vietnam or Thailand were open to conquest by 
China and Angkor, respectively, Arakan kings remained independent, 
with a few brief periods of foreign control. This meant that Arakan was 
relatively free to select foreign political and social models to reflect ideas 
and developments which they were experiencing, but for which they 
needed forms of expression. Thus, the Arakanese adopted a variety of 
foreign models, which were blended with indigenous systems. For this 
thesis, however, the significance of this observation is not what the 
Arakanese did in the past, but the uses to which the Arakanese kings 
put their syncretism in dealing with the Portuguese later in the sixteenth 
century, which will be the focus of the following chapters. 
At this point it should be clear that Arakanese kings began to 
shift their policies from political isolation to one prepared to take 
advantage of the outside world, no longer from the safety of the mountain 
valleys, but on foreign ground. The decline of land-based trade routes 
forced Arakanese kings to look at maritime trade as their new, primary 
link to the outside world and new economic opportunities for kingly 
legitimation. The decline of Bengalese domination of the Bay of Bengal 
trade made this shift  easier, but the Arakanese royal house probably 
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would have pursued a policy of extending its influence in this trade 
anyway, though probably to a lesser degree. With the Bay of Bengal 
available to growing royal Arakanese interest in maritime trade, 
Arakanese kings completed the shift and changed from petty monarchs 
satisfied with political isolation to kings bent on empire and new 
economic opportunities. The Arakanese also were prepared to apply their 
traditional borrowing of foreign models to the new challenges, political 
and economic, which were ahead. And it was at this juncture that  the 
Portuguese entered the Bay of Bengal. 
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Chapter II 
The Portuguese and Arakanese Relationship, 1517-1600 
 
When Minbin died in 1553...His sea-power...was the terror of the 
Ganges region, and his country was on the threshold of the greatest 
period of her history. But her somewhat spectacular rise was hardly 
due to the genius of her rulers. It coincides with a period of 
weakness in Bengal...for Minbin leased to the feringhi who took 
service under his flag the port of Dianga... 
D.G.E. Hall123 
 
After 1532 the coast, though poor and largely uninhabited, was 
liable to pillage by (Portuguese). It would have been a disastrous 
period for Arakan, with the aggressive Tabinshweti on the throne of 
Pegu, had not king Minbin...been capable. He strengthened the 
massive stone walls of Mrohaung and dug a deep moat for the tidal 
waters; and when the Burmese invad[ed]...he opened the sluices of 
his great reservoirs and flooded them out. He retained Ramu and 
Chittagong in spite of raids there by the Tippera tribes while he was 
engaged with Tabinshweti... 
G. E. Harvey124   
 
 
These quotations present different interpretations of Arakan’s 
development into a major power in the sixteenth century. Hall seems to 
give credit to outsiders and very little credit to the Arakanese themselves. 
Harvey, however, seems to credit the genius of the Arakanese king, Min 
Bin. Thus, several important questions should be asked: was Arakan’s 
change from an inward-looking country to an expansive empire due to 
outside (Portuguese) influence, a change in the political climate of Burma 
and Bengal, or to a change in the world-view of the Arakanese 
themselves? Further, by what means did the Arakanese adapt 
themselves to these changes? 
The Arakanese world-view at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century, as expressed in the first chapter, will play an important role in 
answering these questions: the development of the relationship between 
the Portuguese and the Arakanese during the sixteenth century will be 
looked at in the context of this Arakanese perspective. The period covered 
in this chapter includes the first meeting of the Portuguese and the 
Arakanese in 1517 until Min Yazagyi’s establishment of Arakanese power 
at Syriam in 1600. I will focus mostly on the real effect of Portuguese 
influences and how the Arakanese used, or were used by, the 
                                                          
124 Harvey, History of Burma, 140. 
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Portuguese. An important part of this focus will be determining who was 
the dominant party in the relationship. 
 
First Contacts With the Portuguese 
 
Arakan’s first official contact with the growing Portuguese presence in 
Southeast Asia after 1500 occurred when Don João da Silveira125 
arrived at the Mrauk-U in 1518.126  D’Albuquerque’s successor, 
Governor Lopo Soares de Albergaria, sent Silveira to gain the concession 
of a port facility with which the Portuguese could conduct trading 
activities.127  The kingdom of Arakan at this time was ruled by Min Yaza 
(r. 1501-1523) of the Mrauk-U Dynasty. It should be stressed that 
Arakan’s self-imposed isolation did not mean that Arakan was small or 
weak: it was not. As explained earlier in this thesis, Arakan was pressed 
between the two empires of Bengal and Pegu, and Arakan carefully 
defended itself in a way that protected Arakan from attack while at the 
same time allowing it to sample what it chose of foreign cultures.128 
Geography was favorable to Arakan’s defense, since the protection of the 
Arakan Yoma mountain range, with only two passes, the An and 
Taungup, often prohibited passage to large armies from the east.129 
Arakan was a fairly large and important state by both Southeast 
Asian and European standards: Arakan had twelve large cities, each 
ruled by a governor appointed by the king,130 and in each of these cities 
the king had a “first-rate” palace.131  The Arakanese king, in his main 
teak palace, amidst great wealth, lived in the impressive capital city of 
Mrauk-U: it “was an eastern Venice, like modern Bangkok, a city of 
                                                          
125 Silveira was the nephew of Governor Lopo Vaz de Sampayo. See Campos, op. cit., 
27f. 
126 It should be noted that other informal contacts had been made earlier by petty 
Portuguese traders who happened upon Arakan. Indeed, at Chittagong, Silveira was 
greeted by a fellow Portuguese, João Coelho. Coelho was sent in 1513, by the Fernão 
Peres d’Andrade expedition, after a fire caused by a mishandled candle gutted their 
largest ship and forced them to go to Melaka. See Campos, op. cit., 26-7. 
127 Collis & San Shwe Bu, “Arakan’s Place in the Civilization of the Bay,” 41; 
Campos, op. cit., 27. 
128 Lach, op. cit.,  551. 
129 Indeed, this mountain range also proved to be insurmountable to British armies 
in 1825, which planned to invade Burma from Arakan. See D.G.E. Hall, Burma, 57, 104. 
130 Lach, op. cit., 551. 
131 Duarte Barbosa, A Description of the Coasts of East Africa and Malabar in the 
Beginning of the SIxteenth Century, translated from an early Spanish manuscript with 
notes and preface by Henry E. J. Stanley, (London: the Hakluyt Society, 1970): 182. 
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lagoons and canals.”132 Indeed, Min Yaza must have been very 
impressive to the visiting Portuguese; as Duarte Barbosa observed in the 
early sixteenth century: 
 
This king is very rich in money, and powerful from the number of 
his men at arms: he is often at war with his neighbors, and some of 
them obey him against their wills, and render him tribute. He lives 
in great luxury, and posseses very good houses in all the towns 
where he resides, which have got many pools of water, green and 
shady gardens, and good trees.133  
 
But these Portuguese must have also been surprised by some aspects of 
Arakanese court life, which is indicated by another selection from Duarte 
Barbosa’s account: 
 
In twelve towns of his kingdom he has twelve...palaces in which he 
has many women brought up; that is, in each of these cities he has 
a governor who each year takes twelve girls born in that year...of 
the highest rank and the prettiest to be found; and he has them 
carefully brought up...to the age of twelve years...At the end of the 
year the governor conducts to the king...twelve damsels of the age 
of twelve years. The king orders them to be well dresed and to have 
the name of each one written on their clothes, and...[they are] sent 
up to a terrace in the sun...they perspire so much...that their 
clothes become damp [then] the damp garments which they have 
thrown off are all carried to the king, who smells them, and those 
[girls whose clothes] do not smell bad he keeps for himself, and [the 
others] he makes a present of to those of his courtiers who are then 
present.134  
 
Visitors to the Arakanese Court were still surprised in the seventeenth 
century, such as William Methwold: 
 
The King is by religion a Gentile, but such a one as holdeth all 
meates and drinks indifferent; he marrieth constantly his owne 
sister, and giveth for reason the first mens practice in the infancy of 
the world, affirming that no religion can deny that Adams sons 
married Adams daughters.135  
                                                          
132 Hall, Burma, 58. 
133  Barbosa, op. cit., 182. 
134 Ibid., 182-3. 
135 Methwold, op. cit., 42. 
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Although the Arakanese king was normally tributary to Bengal, 
his submission to Bengalese overlordship should not be exaggerated. 
Indeed, the Arakanese in general were known for their rebelliousness 
against their Bengalese overlords.136 As Tomé Pires observed: the king 
of Arakan “is warlike and he is always at war” with Bengal.137 
Min Yaza treated Silveira with great interest when he sailed 
upriver to the Mrauk-U seeking trade concessions. Silveira came from 
Chittagong, where, during the winter of 1517-8, he was treated rudely by 
the Bengalese vizier.138 The Arakanese, realizing that the Portuguese 
might be used by the Arakanese to regain their former strength at sea in 
the Bay of Bengal, quickly made friendly overtures to Silveira, sending 
him an ambassador and a ruby ring as a gift. This first meeting, 
however, did not bring any new opportunities to the Arakanese; Silveira 
had difficulty understanding why the Arakanese were so eager to be 
friendly to him after the Bengalese vizier at Chittagong treated him so 
badly. Silveira thus suspected treachery, despite the attempts of Min 
Yaza’s emissary to “reassure Silveira that he would be received 
amicably.” Silveira related his version of these events to the Portuguese 
government and for the time being, the Arakanese, despite their genuine 
                                                          
136 A good example of how strongly the Arakanese valued their independence, is the 
great rebellion against Burmese rule, which was established in 1784. Hall sums up the 
Arakanese struggle for independence well: “When they annexed Arakan, however, the 
Burmese had bitten off more than they could chew. Revolt after revolt broke out, and as 
their rule became more and more repressive, with the hateful practice of deportation as 
its chief remedy against disorder, thousands of Arakanese fled over the border into the 
Chittagong jungles...The[y] attempt[ed] to reconquer their country from bases in the 
unadministered tracts behind the British frontier.” See Hall, Burma, 94. 
137 Pires, op. cit., 89. 
138 Silveira had tried to send a Portuguese representative to the Bengalese court to 
ask permission to set up a Portuguese factory. The vizier of Chittagong’s relative, 
Gromalle, lost several of his trade vessels in the Maldives when Silveira had decided to 
engage in a bit of piracy. Silveira forced a pilot of the Bengalese, and his son, into his 
service, but at Chittagong, the boy told the vizier what had happened, and the vizier 
made preparations to capture Silveira. Coelho, however, was on good relations with the 
Bengalese and offered to mediate between Silveira and the vizier. Silveira, however, 
refused. When Silveira ran out of food, he tried to seize a Bengalese ship carrying rice, 
and the Bengalese retaliated, routing Silveira’s fleet. Due to the monsoons, Silveira 
remained in the eastern part of the Bay of Bengal, attacking Bengalese shipping and 
forced the vizier of Chittagong to make peace with him. Although the vizier gave food to 
Silveira’s men, the vizier launched another attack, forcing Silveira to find another port to 
trade in. See Campos, op. cit., 30. 
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overtures to the Portuguese, were regarded as treacherous and 
dishonest.139  
The Portuguese misunderstanding of the Arakanese led the 
Portuguese to treat Arakan as an enemy rather than as a potential ally. 
Throughout the remainder of Min Yaza’s reign, and the reigns of three of 
his successors,  Gadzabadi (r. 1523-1525), Min Tsauo (1525), and 
Thatsata (r. 1525-1531), Arakan was subject to periodic attacks on its 
seacoast by Portuguese raiders. Goa ordered these attacks as revenge for 
the raids of Arakanese “pirates” on Indian shipping. These Portuguese 
raids targeting the Arakanese were based on misinformation, since the 
‘pirates’ often turned out to be Afghans rather than Arakanese. Further, 
Portuguese “freebooters” made unofficial, piratical, attacks on the 
Arakanese coast in order to ransack the towns and remove anything of 
value which they could find.140  
Despite the Portuguese attacks, Thatsata’s successor, Min Bin, or 
Sirisuriyacandramahadhammaraja,141 (r. 1531-1553),  began to 
reassert Arakanese power against its traditional enemies. Min Bin’s first 
target was Bengal, which was divided by civil war and in no position to 
offer any meaningful resistance. Over a century earlier, Arakan had 
surrendered twelve of its northern states to Bengalese control, and had 
submitted to Bengalese overlordship. Now, however, Min Bin was 
determined to end Arakanese vassalage and win back its lost provinces. 
In 1531, after less than a year on the Arakanese throne, Min Bin 
declared war on the Bengalese court at Gaur. Arakanese troops were 
sent by three routes to Bengal: by the Kaladin river, along the coast, and 
by sea.142  Min Bin’s armies successfully occupied the coastal city of 
Ramu and then took the Bengalese port of Chittagong.143 At Kantha in 
Chittaung, the Arakanese captured a Bengalese force of ten thousand 
under the Bengalese crown prince, Moorad Singh. The Arakanese then 
marched on Dacca, forcing the Bengalese to agree to negotiations. In 
these negotiations, Min Bin went to Gaur and, symbolic of Arakan’s new 
importance and Min Bin’s new status as a successful conqueror, Min Bin 
took a princess of the Bengalese royal family, Pesita, as his new 
queen,144 although Arakan seems to have surrendered Chittagong back 
to Bengalese control.  
                                                          
139 Lach, op. cit., 551. 
140 Ibid., 550. 
141 Forchhammer, op. cit., 15. 
142 San Baw U, “My Rambles,” Journal of the Burma Research Society 16 (1926) : 41. 
143 S. M. Ali, “Arakan Rule in Chittagong,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of 
Pakistan 12, no. 3 (December, 1967): 337. 
144 San Baw U, “My Rambles,” Journal of the Burma Research Society 16 (1926) : 41. 
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Portuguese Attack, 1534 
 
By the new peace treaty with Bengal, Arakan’s northern borders were 
secure and, in the east, Burma seemed to pose no immediate threat. 
Chittagong, taken temporarily by Min Bin in 1531, was an extremely 
attractive target for Arakanese expansion, due to its increasing value as a 
an important port in the Bay of Bengal trade system. Despite Silveira’s 
miserable handling of his mission to Chittagong in 1517, the Portuguese 
continued to send a trading ship to Chittagong each year. By 1531, 
Chittagong was already a major port of call for Portuguese traders. When 
Damiâo Bernaldes, the Portuguese trader turned pirate, arrived there in 
1531 or 1532, there were seventeen Portuguese trade vessels in 
Chittagong’s harbor.145   
The trade at Chittagong became so important that in 1533, the 
viceroy of Goa, Nunno de Cunna, sent Martim Afonso de Mello to the 
Bengalese court at Gaur. Martim Afonso de Mello was to present the 
Bengalese ruler, Mahmud Shah, with gifts and the request that Mahmud 
Shah give the Portuguese permission to establish a trading station at 
Chittagong.146 Mahmud Shah was suspicious and he had Martim 
Afonso de Mello and fifty-three other Portuguese thrown into prison.147 
Antonio de Silva Meneses was sent from Goa in 1534, to win the release 
of the Portuguese. Meneses’ messenger, Jorge Alcocorado, however, took 
longer then Meneses thought was necessary and Meneses burned 
various Bengalese coastal installations, including Chittagong.148  
Although Arakan was not involved in the imprisonment of the 
Portuguese under de Mello, Arakan was attacked as well. The Portuguese 
still held to Silveira’s belief that Arakan was a weak, petty state: this 
Portuguese misunderstanding of both Arakanese intentions and their 
                                                          
145 Campos, op. cit., 30; R.S. Whiteway, The Rise of Portuguese Power in India 1497-
1550, (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1969): 232-3. 
146 Thomas Astley (ed.), A New General Collection of Voyages and Travels Consisting 
of the Most Esteemed Relations which Have been Hitherto published in any language: 
Comprehending everything Remarkable in its Kind in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, 
vol. I, (London: Thomas Astley, 1745-7): 84. 
147 Affonso de Mello was captured under unusual circumstances. As Whiteway 
explains: “Martim Afonso and his captains [made] their presence at a banquet. They were 
so confident as to go with their swords only. During the banquet, which was in a 
courtyard surrounded by walls...The doors were closed, and the Portuguese caught like 
‘fowls in a coop.’ The walls were lined with archers who fired among them and killed 
several... There was no other course for them to adopt [but to surrender].” See Whiteway, 
op. cit., 233-4. 
148 Astley, op. cit., 84; Campos, op. cit., 34-5. 
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abilities soon led the Portuguese to make a blunder on a great scale. The 
Portuguese sent a fleet of warships upriver to Mrauk-U to conquer 
Silveira’s tiny, untrustworthy, kingdom of Arakan. In what is described 
as an “ingenious” defense, the Portuguese were completely defeated. Min 
Bin, fresh to the throne of Arakan, wisely left the direction of the 
Arakanese defense to his prime minister, Maha Pyinnya-gyaw,149 who 
was a “great Arakanese statesman and a naval genius.” Maha Pyinnya-
gyaw realized that the Arakanese fleet, which was designed to simply 
support land-based defenses, was in no position to fight the Portuguese 
warfleet which was heavily armed with cannon. Maha Pyinnya-gyaw  had 
informants gather intelligence on the strength of the Portuguese fleet as 
it sailed upriver. When he knew how strong the enemy was he had a fleet 
of bamboo-rafts built. Maha Pyinnya-gyaw then filled the rafts with 
“dummy soldiers” and explosives. As the Portuguese fleet got close to 
Mrauk-U, there was no sign of Arakanese opposition. But at night, and 
the tide had lowered the level of the river to hinder the movement of the 
Portuguese fleet, Maha Pyinnya-gyaw set his plans into action: 
 
When the rafts got near the enemies’ ships, they were mistaken for 
reinforcements, and the enemy directed his fire on them. By a 
certain arrangement the fuses were set fire to, causing a thousand 
bonfires and at the same time millions of tiny explosions from the 
bamboo-rafts amidst the noise and din of battle. The whole river 
then became ablaze...Some of the invaders’ gunboats...were 
actually set on fire, and the crews of others caught among the 
blazing bamboo-rafts perished of heat.150  
 
The Portuguese realized that they were outwitted and quickly retreated 
downriver and back to India.151 This event was so important to the 
Arakanese, that a son who was born to Min Bin close to this time was 
named Palaung, the Arakanese name for Portuguese, “to mark the 
victory.”152 Later, when this prince became king, he was known as Min 
                                                          
149 Maha-pyiññya-gyaw is his popular name, which means “Renowned Wisdom.” 
His real name was Anada-theha. See San Baw U, “My Rambles,” Journal of the Burma 
Research Society 16 (1926): 40. 
150 San Baw U, “My Rambles,” Journal of the Burma Research Society 11 (1921): 
164-165. 
151 Ibid., 165. 
152 The Arakanese name for the Portuguese, Palaung, is said by San Baw U, to 
“probably” be related to the general name by which Portuguese were known in mainland 
Southeast Asia, “feringhis.” See San Baw U, “My Rambles,” Journal of the Burma 
Research Society 11 (1921): 164-5. 
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Palaung.153 This victory over the Portuguese, coupled with their earlier 
victory in Bengal, justified a new stage in kingship for Min Bin. To reflect 
his new prestige as a victor on both land and sea, Min Bin had himself 
crowned emperor at the Shithaung pagoda.154 
 
Arakan Restructures Its Forces 
 
The Arakanese, however, continued to make overtures of friendship to 
the Portuguese during the reign of Min Bin and the Portuguese were 
increasingly hired as mercenaries. Although Min Bin was the king of 
Arakan when the Portuguese had attempted to conquer Arakan in 1534 
he realized that the Portuguese represented a new foreign model that 
Arakan might find some use for. Min Bin had much experience in 
warfare: before becoming king, he was a military commander and 
crushed several rebellions of the Saks against their Arakanese overlords. 
Later, as the governor of Sandoway, he  developed a keen understanding 
of the Arakanese government, seeing both its strengths and its 
weaknesses. Thus, when Min Bin became king, he was prepared to make 
both administrative changes and military reforms and was searching for 
new foreign models to help guide him: he saw the Portuguese as the new 
model he would adapt to the Arakanese model.  Min Bin was also 
fortunate, he had many capable Arakanese leaders on whom he could 
depend to help him in his reforms: 
 
When he ascended the throne...the Arakanese nation was at the 
height of its power and glory. He found himself amidst wise 
ministers and councillors backed up by a powerful army; and above 
all, his prime minister...Maha-pyinnya-gyaw (Renowned Wisdom) 
who was at the helm of state.155  
 
Thus, Min Bin felt that he had enough capable Arakanese support to 
make use of the Portuguese model without becoming dangerously 
dependent upon Portuguese support. 
At the same time, Min Bin’s decision to hire Portuguese 
mercenaries may tell us two things about the character of Arakan’s 
developing interest in dominating the outside world. In his article, 
“Europeans, Trade, and the Unification of Burma, c. 1540-1620,” Victor 
Lieberman noted that two factors were involved in Pegu’s employment of 
Portuguese mercenaries in the mid-sixteenth century: (1) “Commercial 
                                                          
153 Ibid. 
154 San Baw U, “My Rambles,” Journal of the Burma Research Society 16 (1926): 41. 
155 Ibid., 40. 
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profits” from increased trade made this employment possible; and (2) 
Mercenaries were a stabilizing force since, although levies were raised 
outside of the sovereign’s center of political power were of uncertain 
loyalty, “mercenaries joined central forces directly loyal to the crown.”156 
Lieberman’s observations about Pegu and its mercenaries may be 
applicable to Arakan as well. First, Min Bin’s decision to hire Portuguese 
mercenaries may reflect increased maritime commercial links with the 
Portuguese trading world (as well as increasing profits from this trade). 
Second, although Min Bin made sure that the Arakanese element in his 
armed forces was dominant, perhaps he also used Portuguese 
mercenaries to counterbalance regional forces and thus guarantee his 
personal control over his armed forces. The Portuguese mercenaries may 
then be seen as a tool used by the Arakanese to secure control of the 
outside world while at the same time serving as a tool of the royal house 
for the monarch’s safety against internal, regional threats.  
Min Bin used Portuguese help to turn the capital of Arakan into 
the “strongest fortified city of the Bay:” The Portuguese laid out the walls 
of the city and constructed the surrounding moats.157 But it should not 
be thought that the Portuguese had turned an inconsequential city into a 
great port capable of conducting ocean-going trade: Mrauk-U already had 
these capabilities. All the Portuguese brought to the capital were new 
styles of defense, which had yet to be tested. The Arakanese had already 
had a secure and capable port before the Portuguese arrived: 
 
Geographically speaking, the situation of Mrauk-U is peculiar. It 
lies sixty miles from the coast, but the largest ocean-going ships of 
that period could reach it through a network of deep creeks by 
which it is surrounded. This gave it the advantages of a port, 
without the attending risk of surprise by an enemy fleet. A large 
rice growing area immediately enveloped it. From behind, an old 
road ran over the mountains of Burma proper, while on the north-
west there was easy communication with India. It was a natural 
focus for trade on the easterly shore of the Bay of Bengal.158  
 
This description of Mrauk-U indicates that the best advantages that the 
Arakanese capital had, both in trade and defense, already existed before 
the Portuguese even arrived; the strength of the capital came from 
Arakanese foresight rather than as the gift of the Portuguese in 
                                                          
156 Victor Lieberman, “Europeans, Trade, and the Unification of Burma, c. 1540-
1620,” Oriens Extremus 27, no. 2 (1980): 207. 
157 Collis & San Shwe Bu, “Arakan’s Place in the Civilization of the Bay,” 41. 
158 Maurice Collis, “The City of Mrauk-U,” Journal of the Burma Research Society 13 
(1923): 244. 
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Arakanese employ. Further, the Arakanese purposefully did not build 
their city in the traditional “circular” pattern usually followed by their 
neighbors (such as the plan of the city of Mandalay), or even the plan of 
Portuguese fortresses, in which a city was  surrounded by rectangular 
walls. Instead, the Arakanese set up a virtual maze of defense-works, 
rivers with false outlets, and a myriad of lakes and canals, “calculated to 
baffle the enemy.”159  
Although the Portuguese constructed the moats, they were 
designed, and traditionally used, by the Arakanese. These moats, for 
example, were unique to Arakan, and were of extremely ingenious design 
in terms of defense-purposes. The moats were extremely deep and were 
designed to accommodate tidal waters. Huge reservoirs of water were 
connected to these moats as well, but were blocked off by sluices. The 
purpose of this design was to thwart besieging armies: 
 
These were so built with dams and sluices that if an enemy had 
succeeded in breaking through the eastern moats and penetrating 
into the city, the waters would have been let loose, flooding the 
town and drowning the invaders. The King with his army could take 
refuge on the citadel safely above the flood.160  
 
Further, the Arakanese took measures to protect the Buddhist 
monks and other noncombatants. In the case of the Buddhist monks, 
four huge pagodas, the Dukkanthein, the Lemyekhna, the Andaw, and 
the Shittaungparã, were built to serve as the “last retreat for the 
ecclesiastics:” 
 
Into them all the monks in Mrauk-U could flee. Each stood on a 
mound at least forty feet above the mean level of the city and so out 
of danger of inundation from the reservoirs. In the first instance, 
therefore, these temples were the priest’s citadel. The Dukkan-thein 
had only one door; its walls were twelve feet thick of solid stone; 
once the priests were within, not even cannon could have dislodged 
them.161  
 
Specifically, the Shittaungparã was designed as a redoubt for the 
Arakanese royal family and royal bodyguard as well. The “temple 
premises can hold a large garrison” and besides the walls of the pagoda 
                                                          
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid.,  246. 
161 Collis, “The City of Mrauk-U,” 247; for a more thorough discussion of the 
Dukkanthein pagoda, see Forchhammer, op. cit., 26-31. 
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being fifteen feet thick, the roof of the pagoda was strengthened further 
by up to ten foot layers of brick. As Forchhammer points out, Min bin 
had the threat of western cannon in mind.162 As a whole, these defenses 
were designed by the  Arakanese themselves to protect non-combatants; 
such considerations were not even followed by the Portuguese 
themselves in the construction of their own fortresses elsewhere. 
Further, Min Bin was also using traditional Arakanese religious defenses 
to strengthen the Shittaung-parã, and other pagodas throughout his 
kingdom, when he installed in them “numerous” copies of the Candasara 
image in 1536.163  
 The Portuguese forged “modern” cannon for the Arakanese army 
and they also mounted them on the city walls of Mrauk-U.164 The 
importance of the Portuguese influence in this case, however, should not 
be overrated: Portuguese guns were only marginally superior to those 
which the Arakanese and other mainland Southeast Asian rulers already 
had.165 There is no reason to assume, for example, that the guns which 
the Portuguese brought to Arakan were any better than the guns which 
the Portuguese brought to Ava and Pegu. In case of the guns brought to 
Ava and Pegu, they were not the “massive siege guns such as rendered 
medieval stone walls and old-style castles untenable after about 
1450”166 elsewhere. Rather the guns brought by the Portuguese were 
extremely small, and their most effective use was in their placement on 
hills or towers and fired at the defenders inside besieged fortresses. 
Although the Portuguese guns were less likely to burst (and were less 
accurate),167 than the guns that the Avan, Peguan, and probably 
Arakanese rulers already had, this can be better attributed to the age of 
the guns rather than to superior Portuguese design or the skill of the 
gunners. Indeed, in both Burma and in Arakan, the majority of the 
gunners who handled the Portuguese guns were not Portuguese but 
Indian,168  or from the local populations. 
Min Bin also used Portuguese help in developing a new 
Arakanese army. The Portuguese were used as Arakanese army officers. 
The Portuguese were given the duty of training Arakanese troops. Min 
                                                          
162 Forchhammer, op. cit., 20. 
163 Ibid., 7. 
164 Collis & San Shwe Bu, “Arakan’s Place in the Civilization of the Bay,” 41. 
165 Lieberman, “Europeans, Trade, and the Unification of Burma, c. 1540-1620,” 
211. 
166 Ibid 
167 Ibid 
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Bin also built a new mercenary army with foreign and domestic 
troops,169 including a regiment of Portuguese palace guards.170 But, 
again, this was only one unit of guards among many others. Indian 
mercenaries or Arakanese made up the bulk of Min Bin’s palace guard. 
Min Bin’s use of the Portuguese in his palace guard was probably not 
due to their superior military skill, but rather to the prestige which the 
Portuguese had won for themselves as soldiers elsewhere: they were a 
status symbol of sorts. Since Avan, Peguan, and other leaders had 
contingents of Portuguese in their armies and in their palace guards, the 
Arakanese kings probably felt that if they were to be considered the 
equals of other kings  they too had to have Portuguese guard units. 
Perhaps the most important use to which the Portuguese were 
put by Min Bin, was in the construction of a new Arakanese navy.  While 
the crews of the Arakanese ships were mostly Arakanese, the ships were, 
for the most part, “guided and stiffened” by Portuguese shipmen. As 
Collis observes, “Min Bin in this way became master of a powerful 
modern weapon.”171 Soon, this Arakanese fleet consisted of over two 
hundred seagoing ships,172 and by the first decade of the seventeenth 
century, William Finch noted that the king of Arakan possessed “infinite 
numbers of small Barkes.”173 It should not be thought, however, that 
the Arakanese were new to naval warfare: indeed the Arakanese had 
been known for centuries for their sea-going abilities.174   
But Min Bin was not naive. The Arakanese realized that if they 
allowed themselves to become too dependent upon the Portuguese, they 
would give these foreigners an opportunity to become kingmakers in 
Arakan. The the Arakanese thus had good reason  to make sure that, at 
least in the Arakanese fleet, Arakanese remained firmly in control. Also, 
the Portuguese presence in the Arakanese army was countered by the 
presence of mercenaries from other lands as well, including Japanese, 
Afghans, and Burmese.175  
Significantly, one of the most important new developments in 
Arakan, during this period of intensive Portuguese influence, was not in 
                                                          
169 Collis & San Shwe Bu, “Arakan’s Place in the Civilization of the Bay,” 41. 
170 Maurice Collis, The Land of the Great Image: Being the Experiences of Friar 
Manrique in Arakan, (London: Readers Union, 1946): 88. 
171 Collis & San Shwe Bu, “Arakan’s Place in the Civilization of the Bay,” 41. 
172 Lach, op. cit., 552. 
173 William Finch, “Observations of William Finch, Merchant, taken out of his large 
Journall,” in Samuel Purchas (ed.), Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes, vol. 4, 
(New York: AMS Press, 1965): 71. 
174 Harvey, History of Burma, 140. 
175 Collis, The Land of the Great Image, 96. 
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the Arakanese armed forces, but in Arakanese jurisprudence. The great 
advisor to the Arakanese kings of this period was Maha Pyinnya-gyaw, 
who also had led the Arakanese forces against the first Portuguese 
invasion of Arakan. Maha Pyinnya-gyaw, who was later known as the 
lord of Chittagong, compiled Arakanese legal precedents into the Maha 
Pyinnya-gyaw pyatton, which “placed the interpretation of the Manu 
dhammathats  on a definitely Buddhist basis.” This work became of great 
importance, not only in Arakan, but throughout Burma.176 This 
achievement is important, because it shows us again that Arakanese 
were not only in command in their adaptation of cultural influences, but 
that they also consciously maintained and improved aspects of their 
traditional culture which they thought were important to keep. 
 
The Character of the Portuguese 
 
What type of people were the Portuguese who came to Arakan as traders 
and mercenaries? For one thing, these Portuguese can probably be best 
described as desperados than as adventurers, as Portuguese chroniclers 
are apt to describe them. These were men who were unhappy with the 
moralist restrictions of life in Goa, which were actually very minimal, or 
they were criminals escaping punishment. More than likely, these men 
were also members of the soldado class, who had either been mistreated 
by the government or believed they could do better in piracy than as 
government servants. It should be observed, however, that the 
Portuguese in government service engaged in piracy on a regular basis, 
and this was recognized by the government as a legitimate activity when 
the victim did not possess a Portuguese pass. Even so, the Portuguese 
who populated the rim of the Bay of Bengal were too independent for the 
government at Goa, which, from time to time, unsuccessfully tried to 
bring its exiles back under its control.177  The Portuguese who served in 
the Arakanese navy or who traded at Chittagong and Dianga, then, were 
by their nature rebellious and probably would forsake any obligation they 
might have to the Arakanese if an opportunity for greater profit arose. 
 
War With Tabinshweti 
 
                                                          
176 Harvey, History of Burma, 141. 
177 In the early 1540s, for example, the viceroy of Goa, Dom Garcia de Noronha, 
ordered Manuel de Gama to forcibly remove the entire Portuguese population of São 
Tomé to the west coast of India, under closer government scrutiny. The project failed 
when Gama died and eventually Goa gave up its attempts to extend official control over 
the Bay of Bengal Portuguese. See Winius, “The ‘Shadow Empire’,” 87-8. 
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Min Bin’s new army and navy soon received their first test. Tabinshweti 
of Toungoo was at work conquering one state of Burma after another in 
his effort to reassemble the Burmese empire. In 1542, he turned on the 
still-independent Prome. A Shan force which came to relieve the 
beleaguered city was crushed by Tabinshweti’s son, Bayinnaung. Soon, 
the king of Prome turned to Arakan, since his daughter had earlier 
married Min Bin. Min Bin was probably eager to save Prome from 
Tabinshweti for two reasons: (1) If Prome fell, Arakan would most likely 
be Tabinshweti’s next target, and (2) This was a good opportunity for Min 
Bin to test his new army and navy. 
Further, Min Bin was under the impression that his new forces 
and his new defenses were indestructible and that he had no reason to 
worry about opening up a new period of warfare between Arakan and 
Burma. As Caesar Frederici noted: 
 
[T]he greatest enemie [the King of Arakan] hath is the King of Pegu: 
which king of Pegu deviseth night and day how to make this 
king...his subject, but by no meanes hee is able to doe it: because 
the king of Pegu hath no power nor armie by Sea. And this 
king...may arme two hundreth Galleyes or Fusts by Sea, and by 
land he hath certaine sluses with the which when the king of Pegu 
pretendeth any harme towards him, hee may at his pleasure 
drowne a great part of the Countrey. So that by this meanes hee 
cutteth off the way whereby the king of Pegu should come with his 
power to hurt him.178  
 
Min Bin divided his forces and sent an army overland through the 
Padaung pass. Bayinnaung, however, forged a letter from the king of 
Prome to Min Bin and sent it to the approaching Arakanese army. When 
Min Bin’s army entered the pass, Bayinnaung  ambushed it and routed 
the Arakanese force. Min Bin’s navy, entering the Irrawaddy river, was 
informed at Bassein of the defeat of the Arakanese army. The Arakanese 
returned home and Prome fell several months afterwards.179  
Min Bin’s army and navy thus suffered a temporary setback, but 
Min Bin’s new defenses soon received their first test as well: in 1544, 
Tabinshweti began a three year assault on Arakan in revenge for their 
attack earlier, and to remove a threat to Toungoo’s power. The Burmese 
army first attacked Sandoway in the south. The governor of Sandoway, 
Min Bin’s cousin Aung Hla, commanded a great defense and 
                                                          
178 Frederici, op. cit., 260. 
179 Harvey, History of Burma, 157. 
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Tabinshweti’s armies suffered an initial defeat.180 The Arakanese army 
could not take advantage of this victory, because troops were needed 
elsewhere: the Tippera tribes began raiding Chittagong and Ramu.181 
Although the Arakanese repulsed the raja of Tippera at Ramu and 
recaptured Chittagong,182 the Burmese attempted to invade Arakan a 
second time, in 1545, with Tabinshweti personally leading his troops. 
The Arakanese defeated the Burmese at Sandoway again, and the 
Arakanese army counterattacked and “turned it into a rout.”183   
In 1546, Tabinshweti attacked Arakan for a third time. Now, 
however, Tabinshweti attacked Arakan from two directions. His main 
army, under Bayinnaung, marched through the Kyangin pass “clearing a 
track as they went.” This force consisted of mainly Burmans from Upper 
Burma.184 Tabinshweti personally led his secondary force, mostly of 
Mons, but supplemented a strong Portuguese mercenary contingent and 
two Portuguese ships under Diogo Soarez de Mello. Tabinshweti was able 
to land at Sandoway, since the governor, who was Min Bin’s uncle, 
agreed to support Tabinshweti if Tabinshweti would make him the new 
ruler of Arakan.185 North of Sandoway, Tabinshweti’s forces joined 
Bayinnaung’s forces, and the combined army marched on Mrauk-U.186 
But the Arakanese cut off the Burmese food supply by burning the paddy 
crops behind them. The Arakanese lured sections of the Burmese army 
into little skirmishes, defeating the Burmese in each battle: first on the 
island of Pokre-gyun, then at Ranaung island, then at Daing-gyi 
island.187  At Mrauk-U, Tabinshweti was in for a surprise: when the 
Burmese army broke through the outer perimeter of the city walls, for 
example, the sluices were opened and the attackers were flooded out.188 
At Daing-gyi island, Tabinshweti was surrounded and captured. Min Bin 
was now truly a king of international standing. Although Min Bin freed 
Tabinshweti, Tabinshweti bought his freedom with “rich presents,” as 
                                                          
180 San Baw U, “My Rambles,” Journal of the Burma Research Society 16 (1926): 41. 
181 Harvey, History of Burma, 140. 
182 Phayre, History of Burma, 79-80. 
183 San Baw U, “My Rambles,”  Journal of the Burma Research Society 16 (1926): 41. 
184 Harvey, History of Burma, 158. 
185 Ibid; Phayre, however has a different view of of this incident: “His brother, 
discontented, had fled to Pegu, and like other royal refugees in the countries of 
Indochina, offered, if placed on the throne of Arakan, to hold it as a tributary.” See 
Phayre, History of Burma, 100. 
186 Harvey, History of Burma, 158. 
187 San Baw U, “My Rambles,”  Journal of the Burma Research Society 16 (1926): 41. 
188 Harvey, History of Burma, 140. 
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well as a princess from Min Bin’s old ally and Tabinshweti’s new vassal, 
Prome.189  
 
The Expansion of Arakanese Military Power 
 
Min Bin had successfully integrated Portuguese influences into a mainly 
Arakanese style of defensive strategy, for which the Arakanese 
remembered him as Min Bah Gri, or “the Great.”190 The reigns of Min 
Bin’s two sons who succeeded him, Dikha (r. 1553-1555) and then 
Sawhla (r. 1555-1564), whose reign is notable only  for his impressive 
temple-building program,191 form somewhat of a hiatus in the 
expansion of Arakanese military might. But the new Arakanese armed 
forces which Min Bin created with Portuguese help were put to even 
greater use by Min Bin’s grandson, Min Setya (r. 1564-1571). But first, 
Min Setya had other problems to contend with. While Arakan’s eastern 
borders were protected by the formidable Arakan Yoma mountain range, 
Arakan had no natural boundaries on its northwest border with Bengal 
to afford it similar protection. After the Bengalese empire fell, the Mughal 
Empire had taken over central and western Bengal. Min Setya’s 
territories in eastern Bengal thus continued to be threatened; Akbar, the 
Mughal ruler, considered all of Bengal to be within his domain.  Min 
Setya, however, felt that the regular Arakanese army was either not big 
enough or strong enough to adequately defend his western frontier from 
the Mughal threat. Instead, Min Setya established a new policy of 
arranging with independent Portuguese traders to guard his border.192 
This was a major departure for the Arakanese, since the Portuguese at 
Chittagong and on Sundiva island were often hostile to the Arakanese, 
once Arakan established control over Chittagong during the Bengalese 
collapse in the 1540s and 1550s.193  
The first independent Portuguese establishment used by Min 
Setya, as part of his new plan to have Portuguese traders participate in 
the defense of Arakan’s northwestern border, was the Portuguese  
settlement at Dianga. To win the friendship of the Portuguese settlement 
                                                          
189 San Baw U, “My Rambles,”  Journal of the Burma Research Society 16 (1926): 41. 
190 Ibid.,  40. 
191 Sawhla (Zawhla) built the Alayceti, the Myaukceti, the Dukkankyaung, the 
Taungkyaung, and the Kulamyokyaung. See Forchhammer, op. cit., 15. 
192 Collis & San Shwe Bu, “Arakan’s Place in the Civilization of the Bay,” 41. 
193 S.M. Ali argues that Chittagong was under Arakanese control at least by 1542, 
when it was ruled by the governor, Chandilah Raja. However, he mentions that 
Chittagong fell under the control of various invaders periodicaly throughout the 1550s. 
See Ali, op. cit., 338. 
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of Dianga, near  Chittagong, Min Setya sent an emissary in 1569, 
“proffering friendship.”194 Min Setya did this at a very good time, since 
the governor of Chittagong, Nusrat Khan, who had been giving Min Setya 
trouble, was fighting the Portuguese there as well and was killed by these 
Portuguese.195 As Caesar Frederici explained: 
 
The people are Moores, and the king a very good man of a Moore 
king, for if he had bin a tyrant as others be, he might have robbed 
us of all, because the Portugall captaine of Chatigan [Chittagong] 
was in arms against the Retor of that place, & every day there were 
some slaine, at which newes we rested there with no smal feare, 
keeping good watch and ward aboord every night...but the 
governour of the towne [on Sundiva Island said] we should feare 
nothing [since] although the Portugales of Chatigan had slaine the 
governour of that City...we were not culpable in that fact.196  
 
The Portuguese received Min Setya’s offer of an alliance by the time that 
Frederici arrived at Chittagong: 
 
[We] came to Chatigan the great port of Bengala, at the same time 
when the Portugales had made peace and taken a truce with the 
governours of the towne, with this condition that the chiefe 
Captaine of the Portugales  with his ship should depart without any 
lading; for there were then at that time 18 ships of Portugales great 
and small...[He] contented to depart...rather than hee should seeke 
to hinder so many of his friends as were there...In this time there 
came a messenger from the king of Rachim [Arakan] to this 
Portugal Captaine, who saide in behalfe of his king, that hee had 
heard of the courage and valure of him, desiring him gently that he 
would vouchsafe to come with the ship into his port [Mrauk-U], and 
comming thither he should be very wel intreated. This Portugal 
went thither and was very well satisfied of this King.197  
  
A great crisis was thus used to great advantage by Min Setya to foster a 
new relationship with the Portuguese traders at Chittagong. Indeed, in 
this manner Arakan showed how it could deal with various Portuguese 
and attract them into their service. But Min Setya probably realized that 
                                                          
194 Lach, op. cit., 552. 
195 Ali, op. cit., 339. 
196 Frederici, op. cit., 259. 
197 Ibid., 260. 
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these tactics would not be successful in all cases and he seemed 
determined to establish a more permanent relationship. 
In exchange for their help in guarding his border, Min Setya 
provided these Portuguese with trade concessions.198 Further, the 
Portuguese at Dianga were not simply traders, but raided the Bengalese 
coast for slaves, which they now sold to the King of Arakan,199  whose 
growing wealth and power demanded the control of ever-increasing 
numbers of people. The Portuguese at Dianga were tied to the Arakanese 
king in an arrangement surprisingly reminiscent of feudal Europe: 
 
[T]he Magh kings...grant[ed] the best of them the rank of Captain 
and conferring on them Bilatas, or revenue-producing lands, on the 
understanding that they maintained a certain force of their 
countrymen and also Gelias...They are usually propelled by thirty-
eight rowers who live on the Bilatas or estates of those Captains, 
under the obligation of serving whenever called upon.200  
 
 
But Min Setya keenly observed that these Portuguese might not fulfill the 
agreement or might take advantage of it to attack him. Min Setya thus 
was careful to select a loyal relative as the new governor at Chittagong (to 
replace the one killed by the Portuguese), in order to  “watch the 
Portuguese and see that they played fair.”201 An Arakanese contingent 
of troops was always present, as well. These Arakanese troops served a 
tour of duty for an entire year before they would be replaced by another 
Arakanese detachment, with one hundred ships and new supplies of 
gunpowder and cannon-balls.202  The Portuguese were also inclined to 
help Arakan against the Mughals for the glory which it afforded. As 
Father Manrique justified it: 
                                                          
198 Collis and San Shwe Bu, “Arakan’s Place in the Civilization of the Bay,” 42. 
199 Hall, A History of Southeast Asia, 270. 
200 Fray Sebastien Manrique, Travels of Fray Sebastien Manrique 1629-1643, 2 
vols., translated from the Itinerario de las Missiones Orientales, with a introduction and 
notes, by C. Eckford Luard, with assistance by Father H. Hosten, (Oxford: Hakluyt 
Society, 1927): vol. I, 285. 
201 The government of the  twelve northern Arakanese states which Min Bin had 
taken from Bengal was  left to twelve local rajas who were tributary to the myoza of 
Chittagong, possession of the Chittagong Myo was thus a strong and dangerously 
autonomous position. Thus, the Arakanese king had to be sure of the loyalty of the 
Chittagong myoza for reasons which were beyond keeping an eye on the Portuguese at 
Dianga. See Collis & Bu, “Arakan’s Place in the Civilization of the Bay,” 42. 
202 Harvey, History of Burma, 141. 
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[T]he Portuguese in defending the frontier of Arakan against the 
Mughal were, in effect, continuing the agelong crusade against the 
Moslem infidel, which had been the glory of Portugal for so many 
centuries and had inspired da Gama in his voyages eastward.203  
 
It should also be noted that Chittagong, despite the trade privileges given 
to the Portuguese traders resident there, was as much an economic asset 
as it was a linchpin in Arakan’s northwestern defense system: the 
Arakanese taxed imports, exports, fishing, salt, and fruit;  royal 
monopolies were held on teak and minerals; and numerous fees entered 
royal coffers for the construction of irrigation, bridges, and temples.204  
 
Arakan and the Expected Burmese Invasion, 1581205  
 
The Arakanese, however, did not see their new army or navy or the 
Portuguese help they received as the only way in which they could solve 
their problems. Again, Arakanese society was syncretic and the 
Arakanese maintained traditional beliefs alongside new ones. One 
                                                          
203 As summarized by Collis in The Land of the Great Image, 90. 
204 Ali, op. cit., 341. 
205 An interesting story of this attempted invasion involves Gonçalo Vaz de 
Camoens. Vaz had been ordered by the viceroy of Goa to take two ships at the port of 
Mazulapatan in 1581. The first ship, belonging to the Sultan of Aceh, had advanced 
warning of the impending attack and fled. The other, belonging to Bayinnaung,  fled and 
Vaz and four ships followed it. A skirmish with Malabar pirates off the coast of Pegu, 
however, led to the loss of Francis Serram’s ship and Frenando de Lima’s galliot. The two 
remaining Portuguese ships caught Bayinnang’s ship entering the mouth of the Negrais 
river and in a two day battle captured her and her crew. The ship sank soon after, but 
not before the Portuguese had taken on much of her cargo. Interestingly however, they 
happened upon the Peguan invasion fleet of 1300 ships sailing for the attack on 
Sandoway.  Nan-dá-bayin tried to capture the Portuguese ships and a naval engagement 
ensued. Some of the Peguan ships were rendered inoperative and others were boarded, 
with many prisoners and eighteen cannon taken by the Portuguese.  Vaz’s force then 
“making all the Sail they could and plying their Oars,” fled to Mrauk-U before the Peguan 
force could overcome them. The Min Phalaung was extremely happy at the news of the 
Portuguese victory against his prospective invaders, and his pleasure was enhanced 
when Vaz made him a present of the Mons that the Portuguese had captured. In return, 
Min Phalaung released some Portuguese “he had long kept in prison.” See Fariah y 
Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 269-70. 
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example of this is Bayinnaung’s planned invasion of Arakan during the 
reign of King Min Palaung (r. 1571-1593).206  
Bayinnaung saw the growing power of Arakan as a threat to his 
position in Burma and decided to destroy Arakan before it became too 
strong for him to oppose. Realizing the difficulty which had prevented the 
success of previous invasions of Arakan, Bayinnaung supposedly sent 
ambassadors to Akbar at the Mughal Court in 1579,207 who had 
conquered Bengal three years before.208 King Min Palaung heard of this 
embassy and tried to finish the fortifications begun by Min Bin.209 In 
addition, Min Palaung decided to utilize the power of the nats, “in order 
to make the requisite preparations to defend his country.” Min Palaung 
went to the Temple of Wunti and asked for her guidance. San Shwe Bu 
has carefully explained what Min Palaung believed was Wunti’s response: 
 
She replied that it was unnecessary for a powerful King like 
himself to go to all that trouble and expense of raising an army, but 
that, when nations were at war, the opposing deities...first engaged 
themselves in conflict and decided the fate of contending armies 
beforehand... 
With her numerous followers, she arrived at the palace of 
Bueng Naung at about midnight. She not only found the whole 
palace wrapped in slumber...she entered the Royal Chamber, and, 
standing at the head of the bed for a moment, she raised her five 
fingers above the recumbent King... 
On the following morning, five large carbuncles appeared 
round the neck of the Burmese King, from the effects of which he 
subsequently died...210   
 
Shortly after Bayinnaung’s advance forces had occupied Sandoway, he 
died.211 Thus, the Arakanese believed that they were saved by Min 
Palaung’s timely consultation with Wunti, showing that the Arakanese 
                                                          
206 Min Palaung did not engage in any large temple-building programs, although he 
built the Ratanapôn pagoda and “repaired” the Urittaung and Mahati pagodas. See 
Forchhammer, op. cit., 15-6; 26. 
207 San Shwe Bu, “Wunti,” 53; Collis, “The City of Golden Mrauk-U,” 244; I have 
said that the mission was “supposedly” sent to Akbar’s cort, because Hall has made a 
good argument that the mission was probably sent to the “Viceroy of Bengal.” See Hall, A 
History of Southeast Asia, 295. 
208 Van Leur, op. cit., 171. 
209 San Shwe Bu, “Wunti,” 53; Collis, “The City of Golden Mrauk-U,” 244. 
210 San Shwe Bu, “Wunti,” 53. 
211 Harvey, History of Burma, 174. 
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merely viewed their help from the Portuguese as simply one of many 
recourses to solving their problems, and not as a singular deliverance 
from any sort of indigenous “backwardness.” 
 
War With Tippera, 1585 
 
Arakan was also gaining a very good reputation among the Portuguese in 
the Bay of Bengal region due to the good relations it had with its 
Portuguese mercenaries. This attraction of Arakan for Portuguese 
mercenaries was clearly evident in the invasion of Arakan by the king of 
Tippera, Amar Manikya in 1585. Manikya sent his son Rajdharnarayan 
and a large invasion force, including a contingent of Portuguese 
mercenaries. Taking Chittagong, the invasion force proceeded to Ramu, 
and took several Arakanese army camps en route. The Portuguese, 
perhaps questioning the value of working for the king of Tippera, 
compared to Arakanese employment, switched sides and surrendered the 
Tipperan camps to the Arakanese. The Arakanese then encircled the 
Tipperan force and although the Tipperans broke out and began a quick 
retreat back to Chittagong, the Arakanese followed in pursuit and 
“decimated them mercilessly.”212 The Portuguese mercenaries then 
helped the Arakanese retake Chittagong.213  
 
 
 
Sundiva  
 
The Arakanese succeeded in employing Portuguese mercenaries in its 
armies and navy, so that by 1598, there were over twenty-five hundred 
Portuguese in Arakan.214  But while the Arakanese made mutual 
defense pacts with the Portuguese traders at Dianga, other independent 
Portuguese traders often caused trouble for the Arakanese king. The case 
in which a Portuguese trader in Chittagong had killed the Arakanese 
governor has already been mentioned, but a better example can be found 
in the events in the last decade of the sixteenth century at Chittagong 
and Sundiva island. Although we are not clear on the causes, we know 
that in 1590, the Portuguese at Chittagong fought the Arakanese there, 
under their new governor, Min Nala,215  and captured the fortress of 
Chittagong. Antonio de Souza Godinho, who had led the attack, soon 
                                                          
212 Ali, op. cit., 39. 
213 Ibid 
214 Campos, op. cit, 104. 
215 Min Nala was the son of the Arakanese king, Min Palaung. See Ali, op. cit., 340. 
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forced the island of Sundiva to be “tributary” to the Portuguese 
establishment at Chittagong. While the Arakanese and the Portuguese 
traders at Chittagong did make peace, the island of Sundiva remained in 
hazy submission to the Chittagong Portuguese.216  
 
Conclusion 
 
What was the true nature of the relationship between the Portuguese and 
the Arakanese? Further, how had the world-view of the Arakanese 
changed and what role did their relationship with the Portuguese play in 
the adaptation of the Arakanese to the changing political climate of the 
Bengal-Burmese region? 
Some authors view the relationship between the Portuguese 
mercenaries and the indigenous rulers of the Burmese region as 
something that was determined solely by the Portuguese. The 
Portuguese, they argue, entered the region and through superior 
weaponry and skill, outfought and outwitted the local rulers. This view is 
held by   Portuguese historians such as Bocarro, Fariah y Sousa, and 
Mousinho. Danvers and Harvey share this view as well. The accounts of 
these historians often border on the ridiculous: scores of Portuguese are 
said to have defeated tens of thousands of indigenous troops on land and 
a handful of Portuguese galleys was claimed to have defeated thousands 
of indigenous ships. In these accounts, no credit is given to indigenous 
help, although we know from both Portuguese and indigenous sources 
that De Brito and Gonçalves, for example, depended upon the help of 
thousands of indigenous troops. 
Other authors have argued that the local rulers took advantage of 
the Portuguese and used their superior weaponry and and skills for their 
own purposes. One example of this point of view, is Victor Lieberman’s 
argument in “Europeans, Trade, and the Unification of Burma, c. 1540-
1620,” regarding the effect of Portuguese mercenaries in Burma in the 
sixteenth century.  Lieberman argues that superior Portuguese military 
weaponry and skill was a key factor in the struggle between Ava, Pegu, 
and the Shan states for dominance in the Irrawaddy basin. Although 
Lieberman notes that Portuguese superiority should not be 
overestimated, Lieberman sees the ability of a ruler to make use of 
Portuguese weapons and mercenaries as pivotal in their ability to win 
wars against other rulers. This view is similar to the view that the 
Portuguese came into the Burmese region as superior warriors in their 
relationship with local rulers, but this view instead concedes that the 
                                                          
216 Campos, op. cit., 67. 
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local rulers were at least equal partners in their relationship with the 
Portuguese.217   
My own view is that neither view is completely correct. I do not 
think that in the Arakanese case that Portuguese weaponry or seafaring 
skills were adopted simply for their superiority. Indeed, the Arakanese 
seem to have made a point of maintaining their own techniques both at 
sea and on land. Portuguese were used to train Arakanese troops and to 
guide Arakanese ships, but I think that this Portuguese technology and 
skills were only applied in a few minor cases. Arakanese, for example, 
remained in control of their ships, both as commanders and as the 
crews, and the Portuguese were only a few among many different 
nationalities of mercenaries hired to supplement and not to replace 
Arakanese military forces or leadership. The primary reason that the 
Portuguese were used, it seems to me, is that they were the status 
symbol for indigenous Southeast Asian rulers of that time. All of the 
kingdoms of the Burmese region had Portuguese mercenaries, and they 
seemed to have become popular due to Portuguese military exploits 
elsewhere, usually at the expense of unarmed or poorly-armed Indian 
ocean fleets. While Portuguese were used to drill indigenous troops and 
to build walls for fortresses, the Arakanese troops continued to fight in 
traditional ways and the walls of the fortresses built by the Portuguese 
were no more effective than the traditional walls. 
On the other hand, the Portuguese in Arakan seem to have been 
outwitted by the Arakanese rather than vice-versa. In exchange for trade 
concessions that were mutually beneficial to both parties, the Portuguese 
at Chittagong took on the responsibility of guarding Arakan’s western 
frontier against Arakan’s biggest threat, the Mughal empire. Further, 
Arakan’s use of Portuguese mercenaries presented a tremendous drain 
on the already low number of Portuguese troops available to the Estado 
da India. This drain, which, when we consider all of the Portuguese 
mercenaries in the employ of mainland Southeast Asian rulers, must 
have represented well-over a thousand men, was tremendous when we 
remember that at its height, the Estado da India had less than ten 
thousand men at its disposal throughout Asia, from Madagascar to 
Japan.218  
                                                          
217 Lieberman, “Europeans, Trade, and the Unification of Burma,” passim. 
218 Charles Ralph Boxer explains that “it is doubtful is there was ever as many as 
10,000 able-bodied Europeans and Eurasians available for military and naval service 
between Moçambique and Macao.” See Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415-
1825, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969): 53.219 J. Talboys Wheeler, A Short History of 
India and of the Frontier States of Afghanistan, Nipal, and Burma, (London: MacMillan & 
Co. 1880): 503. 
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It is also important to note that the Arakanese were responsible 
for their changing view of the world around them. The threat posed by 
the Mughal empire and the growing Peguan empire seems to have been 
responsible for “shaking” the Arakanese out of their former inward-
looking perspective. The Arakanese realized that they had to change or 
they would be conquered by one or the other of their powerful neighbors. 
It is also clear that the Arakanese were responsible for reaching out to 
the Portuguese. The Portuguese, for example, after Silveira’s 
misunderstanding of Arakanese intentions, might never have been seen 
in Arakan again if it had not been for Min Bin’s efforts and offers of 
friendship and employment. At least at this stage in the relationship 
between the Arakanese and the Portuguese, it is clear that the Arakanese 
were dominant in this relationship and the development of Arakanese 
imperial might was almost totally an Arakanese conception and creation. 
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Chapter III 
Collapse of the Burmese World, 1590-1602 
 
This richly favoured country [Burma] has been exposed from a 
remote period to cruel oppressions and bloody wars. It was 
anciently parcelled out, like India, amongst petty kings, who waged 
frequent wars on each other. There was constant rivalry between 
the Burmese people of Ava on the upper valley of the Irawadi and 
the Talains of Pegu on the lower valley. Other kings warred against 
each other in like manner; whilst ever and anon an invading army 
from China or Siam swept over the whole country, and deluged the 
land with blood. Sometimes there were insurrections under a rebel 
prince or schismatic monk, followed by sack and massacre without 
a parallel in recorded history. except amongst Tatar nations, To this 
day the whole region of Pegu and Ava bears the marks of these 
desolating contests; and vast tracts of culturable lands lie utterly 
waste from sheer want of population. 
 
J. Talboys Wheeler219  
 
The History of the different Kings that reigned in Burma, during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries...is a round of wars and 
revolts, of treacheries and murders. Its chief interest is derived from 
the appearance of Europeans upon the scene. Two adventurers, a 
Portuguese and a Spaniard, played important parts in Burma 
during the early years of the seventeenth century. The story of their 
lives is worth telling. It shows how easily lawless Europeans could 
establish a rule over timid Asiatics by a display of reckless audacity. 
 
Albert Fytche220  
 
Several questions can be drawn from these quotations. Why, for 
example, was Pegu the target of Arakanese expansion at the end of the 
sixteenth century?  Was Pegu suffering a short-term period of anarchy or 
was this its natural condition? Why were the Mons willing to accept 
foreigners as their kings? What was the Mon requirement for kingship 
and how had the former regime lost legitimacy? 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
220 Albert Fytche, Burma Past and Present with Personal Reminiscences of the 
Country, 2 vols., (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., `1878): vol. I, 50-51. 
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The Great Coastal Empire: Arakanese Expansion Eastwards 
 
Having secured their frontier in the west against the Mughal threat, the 
Arakanese under Min Yazagyi, or Naradhipati, (r. 1593-1612)221 decided 
to use their new military might to expand their empire eastwards at the 
expense of an old enemy: Pegu. This was a very opportune time for 
Arakan to attack Pegu, since it was now in anarchy. In an attempt to 
maintain the vastly overextended empire created by his father, Nan-dá-
bayin (r. 1581-1599), the King of Pegu, had waged an endless series of 
bloody wars against rebel provinces. Since Nan-dá-bayin directly 
controlled only Lower Burma, Lower Burma provided the most resources 
for Nan-dá-bayin’s campaigns.222 The surrounding Mons soon raised 
revolts against Nan-dá-bayin, one of which in 1594 led to Ayudhya’s 
capture of Pegu’s possessions on the Kra isthmus.223  Mons also left 
Burma altogether and many of them fled to Arakan.224 Nan-dá-bayin’s 
other vassals throughout Burma began to break away as well, and soon 
the “supreme king was abandoned by all who might have supported 
him.”225 One of these rebellious vassals, the Toungoo bayin, refused to 
send any more agricultural produce to Pegu after 1596.226 Further, the 
Toungoo bayin took advantage of Nan-dá-bayin ’s decreasing credibility 
as a just ruler of Lower Burma to set himself up as the legitimate ruler, 
“promi[sing] Life, Liberty and Estates to all that would come over to 
him.”227 This was not an entirely radical turn of events, since Mon 
monks had previously suggested to the Chiengmai bayin that if he 
overthrew Nan-dá-bayin, and set himself up as the Great King, it “would 
be an entirely legitimate act.”228  
The Toungoo bayin  realized, however, that he still had to 
decisively crush Nan-dá-bayin, who mustered most of his remaining 
levies for the defense of his capital at Pegu, if he wanted to make himself 
the new legitimate ruler of Burma. The  Toungoo bayin was not in a 
position to raise the strength necessary to do so and to protect his own 
kingdom from the other rebel provinces; he desperately needed an ally. 
At the same time, however, he did not want to ally himself with another 
                                                          
221 Also known as Salim Shah I. See Luard’s notes in Manrique, op. cit., vol. I, xxiii. 
222 Lieberman, “Europeans, Trade, and the Unification of Burma,” 217. 
223 Lieberman, Burmese Administrative Cycles, 43. 
224 Harvey, History of Burma, 180. 
225 Phayre, History of Burma, 122. 
226 Lieberman, Burmese Administrative Cycles, 43. 
227 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 121. 
228 Lieberman, Burmese Administrative Cycles, 42. 
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Burmese bayin who might turn around and crush him after they 
destroyed Pegu. Thus the Toungoo bayin looked abroad for help. Again, 
however, the foreign state likely to help Toungoo in crushing Pegu was 
Ayudhya, but if the  growing power of Naresuan’s Ayudhya were brought 
into Burma, it would be very difficult to get them out after Pegu was 
crushed. Indeed, Naresuan had the “apparent intention of converting 
Nan-dá-bayin into a vassal of Ayudhya in reverse of the traditional 
relation.”229 The  Toungoo bayin’s ally, then, had to be found elsewhere. 
The Toungoo bayin now looked at Arakan. In the short space of 
two or three generations, Arakan had grown from an inward-looking, 
petty state on the fringe of the mainland Southeast Asian world, to a 
powerful state with a great navy and a large army. The Arakanese also 
seemed to orient her imperial designs towards Bengal, on the border of 
which most of Arakan’s Portuguese mercenaries and her best armies 
were concentrated. The Toungoo bayin believed that he found the ideal 
ally for his planned imperial venture: (1) Arakan had a powerful fleet 
which could blockade Pegu and (2) Arakan would not be likely to 
threaten the Toungoo bayin’s “own aspirations” of becoming to “Great 
King of Burma.” The Toungoo bayin thus sent emissaries to propose an 
alliance with Arakan with the idea of a joint attack on Pegu.230  
The Toungoo bayin probably did not know that Min Yazagyi had 
made several attempts to establish some claim to the wealth of Pegu and 
to involve himself in Pegu’s affairs. One attempt had even come close to 
success: Min Yazagyi had sent ambassadors to request the hand in 
marriage of Nan-dá-bayin’s daughter in the late 1590s, at a time when 
Nan-dá-bayin needed as many allies as possible to stave off his 
destruction at the hands of his rebel bayins. Nan-dá-bayin gave the 
Arakanese delegation an audience and the Mon advisors of Nan-dá-bayin 
seem to have been very impressed. After the audience, the Mon advisors 
in council with Nan-dá-bayin made a strong case for obtaining the help 
of Arakan to offset the problems of destruction and depopulation which 
were making Lower Burma an inadequate resource base for Nan-dá-
bayin: an alliance with Arakan would bring the support of Arakan’s 
considerable maritime strength, which could command the riverine 
communication and transportation system of Lower Burma.With Min 
Yazagyi’s help, the Mon advisors argued, Nan-dá-bayin could slowly 
rebuild his empire. Nan-dá-bayin, however, was “indignant” to the 
thought of marrying his daughter to the ruler of the Arakanese upstarts. 
After responded to his advisors angrily: “I do not think that I should give 
                                                          
229  Ibid., 43. 
230 Ibid; Nai Thien (tr.), “Intercourse Between Burma and Siam As Recorded in 
Hmannan Yazawindawgyi,” Journal of the Siam Society 8 (1911): 54. 
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my daughter to a dog.” Nan-dá-bayin then ordered the Arakanese 
delegation to return immediately to Arakan.231  
The Toungoo negotiation team arrived at a good time:  Min Yazagyi 
had just received his delegation to Pegu and was infuriated by Nan-dá-
bayin’s response. Min Yazagyi wanted revenge and realized that he had 
to act quickly in order to take advantage of the anarchous situation in 
Pegu.232  Min Yazagyi thus decided that the proposed alliance with the 
Toungoo bayin was a good vehicle for his revenge and or the realization 
of his imperial designs upon Lower Burma. In order to aid Toungoo in 
the capture of Nan-dá-bayin’s capital of Pegu, Min Yazagyi came with his 
son, Min Khamaung, and  a large Arakanese fleet of six hundred jalias to 
invade Lower Burma.233 If we can trust the Mon history of Syriam 
translated by Furnivall, the Arakanese forces first attacked Nan-dá-
bayin’s western-most port of Bassein. Nan-dá-bayin responded by 
sending six “war boats” to Bassein, as well as three “war boats” to 
Syriam, and ordered a royal granary to be built at Bassein, presumably 
in preparation for the expected siege. Other preparations were ordered 
for the defense of Bassein as well: the “city...had to supply cocoanuts, 
earth, oil, iron, timber and cord for binding...[w]hen the royal war boats 
became unserviceable the oarsmen and watchmen had to help one 
another to repair them.”234 Presumably, the Arakanese won the siege 
and took the port, for Min Yazagyi and his son soon went to Syriam, from 
which the remaining Arakanese force would proceed upriver to Pegu. The 
Toungoo bayin  likewise sent an army by land, joined the Arakanese 
force at Pegu, which the two forces then besieged by the beginning of 
1598.235 The siege lines were formed quickly, with the Arakanese to the 
                                                          
231 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 121-2. 
232 Ibid., vol. I, 122. 
233 Ibid., vol. I, 121-2. 
234 J.S. Furnivall (ed. & tr.), “The History of Syriam--Syriam ya-zawin,” Journal of 
the Burma Research Society, pt. 3 (1915): 142-3. 
235 Lieberman has provided a different date for the siege, 1598, for which he does 
not seem to be too confident. But the Hmannan Yazawindawgyi mentions Arakanese 
troops and Toungoo forces marching on Pegu in the spring of 1597 and indicates that 
Pegu was under siege by 1598. See Na Thien’s translation (54). I have chosen to accept 
1597/8 as the date of the siege for a number of other reasons. First, I think that this is 
the most logical year for the siege by my understanding of the sequence of events before 
and after the siege for which we do have dates. Second, a number of sources imply dates 
for the siege, such as Boves letter written on 28 March, 1600, which mentions the siege 
of Pegu as a recent event. See Nicolas Pimenta, “Jesuit Observations of India,” in Samuel 
Purchas (ed.), Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes, (New York: AMS Press, 
1965): 216; Phayre, History of Burma, 122-123. 
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south of Pegu, the king of Toungoo to the east, and Nat-Shin-Naung, the 
upayaza (heir-apparent) of Toungoo to the north of Pegu.236  
 Nan-dá-bayin  attempted to organize a defense, but it was 
hopeless; “fifteen years of incessant military recruitment, famine, and 
social dislocation” drained Nan-dá-bayin’s territories of their 
resources.237 Further, while Nan-dá-bayin still possessed numerous 
European artillery, 150 pieces of which were of Portuguese origin, they 
were ineffective “without strong conventional support forces.”238 The 
Arakanese and Toungoo forces tightened their siege lines around Pegu 
until Nan-dá-bayin could only count on supplies of rice and other goods 
brought in by Portuguese ships which had been sent from Goa by the 
viceroy, the Conde da Vidigueira, under the command of Dom Pedro 
Manuel. Min Khamaung intercepted Dom Pedro Manuel’s ships on 
several occasions, but did not seize their supplies or punish the 
Portuguese captains, probably because he did not want to alienate Goa 
from the Arakanese cause. But after Dom Pedro Manuel’s persistence led 
to a skirmish between Min Khamaung’s ship and a Portuguese vessel, a 
battle ensued, damaging many Arakanese vessels  and leaving the 
Portuguese bottled up in Pegu.239  
The siege continued for some time and political problems back in 
Mrauk-U forced Min Yazagyi to quit the siege with a large part of his 
forces for the rest of the winter of 1598-1599, with the promise that he 
would return in the summer of 1599. Min Khamaung, however, was left 
in command of a large number of Arakanese ships to help the king of 
Toungoo. Before Min Yazagyi could return, however, the defense of Pegu 
was quickly falling apart. The upayaza of Pegu, Minyé Kyawzwa, lost ten 
of his popular officers to desertion to the Toungoos and Arakanese and 
he soon followed them in 1599.240 Hearing of his son’s desertion, Nan-
dá-bayin decided to surrender as well and asked only that he be allowed 
to join the sangha.241 Although the human and agricultural resources 
of Pegu were spent, much material wealth remained for plunder. The 
Toungoo bayin, for example, used twelve caravans of seven hundred 
                                                          
236 Nai Thien, op. cit., 54-5. 
237 Lieberman, “Europeans, Trade, and the Unification of Burma,” 217; Bocarro, op. 
cit., vol. I, 122. 
238 Lieberman, Burmese Administrative Cycles, 43. 
239 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 123-4. 
240 The Hmannan Yazawindawgyi records that Minyé-kyawzwa was murdered at 
Toungoo shortly after by the Toungoo upayaza, Nat-Shin-Naung, and his mother. See Nai 
Thien, op. cit., 55. 
241 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 124. 
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elephants and horses to carry the treasure,242  but he still could not 
remove all of the gold and the jewels. The Toungoo force left Pegu to 
Arakanese occupation under Min Khamaung. Min Khamaung then joined 
in gathering the plunder and removed “above Three Millions, and a great 
Train of large Cannon.”243 
 
Naresuan’s Invasion244  
 
Naresuan launched an attack against Pegu in order to capture Ayudhya’s 
great enemy, Nan-dá-bayin. The approach of the Ayudhyan army was 
reported to the king of Toungoo, who called a council of his ministers to 
decide what they should do. Some of his advisors thought that it would 
be better to remain at Pegu, where the Arakanese forces would be of 
immense value in their defense. Other advisors, however, thought that it 
would be better to go to Toungoo, and that the Arakanese forces should 
remain at Pegu and “attack the Siamese as opportunity offered.”245 The 
king of Toungoo decided against remaining at Pegu and his forces left for 
Toungoo in March 1600.246 But the Arakanese occupation force under 
Min Khamaung remained at the fallen capital of Nan-dá-bayin. The 
defenses of Pegu were now  in no position to withstand another siege, 
and the Arakanese occupation force was not strong enough to face the 
massive armies under the veteran military leader and now king, 
Naresuan. Min Khamaung thus had his forces burn the rest of Pegu so 
they would leave nothing to the Ayudhyans: “they consigned to the 
flames all the big and splendid buildings, edifices and monasteries, 
starting with the golden palace itself.” The Arakanese forces then took 
refuge in the forests.247  
Naresuan, finding Pegu burned to the ground, then proceeded to 
Toungoo to take Nan-dá-bayin into his custody. The king of Toungoo had 
                                                          
242 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 121; Bocarro, however,  says that moving the 
spoils from Pegu to Toungoo took one thousand ships and one thousand wagons five 
months of continuous transportation, even though Toungoo was only five days journey 
from Pegu. See Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 125. 
243 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 121. 
244 At this point, I will begin to refer to the various Burmese bayins as kings, since 
their relationship with the ‘Great King’ at Pegu as bayins was ended when the ‘Great 
King,’ Nan-dá-bayin, was overthrown. Now the various Burmese bayins were independent 
kings. 
245 Nai Thien, op. cit., 57. 
246 The king of Toungoo was also careful to bring the Buddha’s tooth relic and the 
tripitaka back to Toungoo. Nai Thien, op. cit., 57. 
247 Nai Thien, op. cit., 57. 
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prepared for this possibility and he strengthened the defenses of Toungoo 
and mounted artillery on the walls.248  Meanwhile, the Ayudhyan army 
marched up along the banks of the Sittang river to Toungoo and from 
outside of the walls of the city, Naresuan demanded that the king of 
Toungoo hand Nan-dá-bayin over to him. Naresuan explained that he 
wanted to worship Nan-dá-bayin, since he had recently joined the 
Buddhist sangha. The king of Toungoo refused to surrender Nan-dá-
bayin, claiming that he wanted to worship Nan-dá-bayin in the same 
way, forcing Naresuan to besiege Toungoo. While Naresuan made Kywé-
magu-kyun-gyaung his base of operations, he ordered the Ayudhyan 
army besieging Toungoo to dig a channel, the Yodaya, to the Paunglaung 
river to drain Toungoo’s moat.249 Further, the Ayudhyan army 
“mounted guns on ramparts built by them, and shelled the city every 
day.” The Toungoo defenses, however, proved to be too strong to allow an 
Ayudhyan victory.250  
Min Khamaung’s forces, however, came to Toungoo’s aid. Since 
Naresuan supplied his forces with “[m]unitions and supplies” brought up 
the Sittang river on boats, Min Khamaung attacked and captured these 
ships. While Toungoo repulsed repeated Ayudhyan assaults on their city, 
the Ayudhyan officers hesitated in informing Naresuan of the supply 
problem and he soon found that his army was “eating all kinds of 
unclean meat, and had come even to the flesh of their own men.”251 
After a month without supplies, Naresuan was forced to withdraw with 
extremely heavy casualties in May 1600. As the Ayudhyan army 
retreated back down along the banks of the Sittang River, Naresuan 
became the brunt of guerrilla attacks by the Arakanese, similar to those 
which Naresuan used to defeat three Burmese invasions of Ayudhya 
several years earlier. The Arakanese ambushed Ayudhyan units near 
Pegu, quickening the pace of Naresuan’s retreat and his losses. When 
Naresuan reached Martaban where the Arakanese ambushes ceased.252  
Naresuan set up a Mon as the governor, with the title of Binnya Dala, 
who was tributary to Ayudhya.253  
                                                          
248 Ibid., 56. 
249 Harvey, op. cit., 183; Nai Thien, op. cit., 57. 
250 Nai Thien, op. cit., 57. 
251 Mousinho, MacGregor trans., “A Brief Account of the Kingdom of Pegu,” Journal 
of the Burma Research Society 16, no. 2 (1916): 112. 
252 Harvey, History of Burma, 183; Mousinho, MacGregor trans., op. cit., 112. 
253 Phayre, History of Burma, 123; Nai Thien, op. cit., 57; The Chulasakaraj 686-966 
mentions Naresuan’s failed siege of Toungoo briefly: “In the 11th month, when the sun 
was standing between Virgo and Libra, on Wednesday the 10th of the 4th waxing moon, 
the King reached Tong U, and he established his army about 30 sen from Tong U. After 
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Nan-dá-bayin would die not at the hands of Naresuan, but by the 
hands of his own sister, the queen of Toungoo. When Nan-dá-bayin was 
brought to Toungoo, the king of Toungoo had “presented” Nan-dá-bayin  
to his wife, Nan-dá-bayin ’s sister, but she had him killed in November 
1600: 
 
[I]t was thought [that she] would comfort [him, but] used him 
Reproachfully, and afterwards seeing the King her Husband inclined 
to Mercy, caused him to be beaten to Death.254  
 
The unifying king of Burma was dead and now his legacy opened up 
Lower Burma to whoever wished to attempt to build his own empire: 
lower Burma was fractured into a number of rival states in a near-
anarchic political climate: 
 
Thus the great empire of united Pegu and Burma, which a 
generation before had excited the wonder of European travellers. 
was utterly broken up’ and the wide delta of the Irawâdi, with a soil 
fertile as Egypt, and in a geographical position commanding the 
outlet of a great natural highway, was abandoned by those who 
might claim to represent the ancient rulers, and left to be parcelled 
out by petty local chiefs, and European adventurers.255  
 
Arakanese Establishment at Syriam 
 
Min Yazagyi soon disagreed with the king of Toungoo because he felt that 
he was cheated in the division of spoils in Pegu. As Boves commented in 
March, 1600, it appeared that the king of Toungoo completely ignored 
the earlier agreement which he made with Min Yazagyi: 
 
After [the King of Toungoo had gone] to the Tower where the Kings 
treasure was kept, which was so much that scarcely sixe hundred 
Elephants and as many Horses were sufficient to carrie away the 
Gold and Gemmes onely. For I say nothing of the Silver and other 
Metals, as things of no price. The King of Arracan then absent, 
hear[d] that the King of Tangu against his agreement with him had 
                                                                                                                                                               
the army had been there for two months, a famine broke out and many people died for 
want of food. On Wednesday the 6th of the 6th waning moon the army of the King 
returned to Ayuddhya.” See O. Frankfurter, “Events in Ayuddhya From Chulasakaraj 
686-966., a Translation.” Journal of the Siam Society 6 (1909): 18. 
254 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 121; Nai Thien, op. cit., 58. 
255 Phayre, History of Burma, 123. 
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taken all this treasure for himselfe, and dismissed the Armie 
without his Knowledge.256  
 
Min Yazagyi determined to take what he thought was rightfully 
his. In addition, Min Yazagyi had no intention of abandoning Syriam,257 
which his forces passed during their attack against Nan-dá-bayin a year 
earlier. Syriam, to Min Yazagyi, represented something which the 
Arakanese wanted for some time. The Arakanese capital served as an 
adequate and easily defensible port, but Pegu was previously the chief 
port-of-call for international traders. Since Syriam was located 
geographically in a position to dominate the trading potentials of Pegu, 
the good natural harbor of Syriam, provided Arakan with the ability to 
expand its international trade opportunities. Further, Syriam could serve 
as a foothold, from which Min Yazagyi could expand Arakanese power 
throughout the Burmese region and further down the coast towards 
Tavoy and Tenasserim. Since Min Yazagyi’s forces in Pegu were depleted 
by the recent fighting with Naresuan and were in no condition to enforce 
Min Yazagyi’s claims against Toungoo: Min Yazagyi  gathered his army 
and navy and his Portuguese mercenaries under the command of Philip 
de Brito and sailed for the late king of Pegu’s fortress, Macao, on the 
Pegu river (not to be confused with Macao in China).258  
 
De Brito is Placed in Command at Syriam  
 
Min Yazagyi’s force stopped at Syriam before it went on to the rubble of 
Nan-dá-bayin’s fortress of Macao. The condition of the the surrounding 
country indicated the extent of the damage that Nan-dá-bayin’s 
continual wars had done to Lower Burma: 
 
It is a lamentable spectacle to see the bankes of the Rivers set with 
infinite fruit-bearing trees, now overwhelmed with ruines of gilded 
                                                          
256 Pimenta, op. cit., 216.  
257 Fytche explains that Syriam is “a corruption of the Burmese word Than-hlyeng.” 
Another name for Syriam is the Pali “Khoddha-dippa.” See Fytche, op. cit., 52f; Danvers 
refers to Syriam as Sirião. See F. C. Danvers, Report to the Secretary of State For India 
Council on the Portuguese Records Relating to the East Indies, Contained in the Archivo Da 
Torre Do Tombo, and the Public Libraries at Lisbon and Evora, (Amsterdam: N. Israel. 
1892. 1966): 20. 
258 In the sixteenth century, the city of Macao on the Pegu river, somewhere between 
Syriam and the city of Pegu, was an important trading center in Lower Burma. It was 
visited by most of the early Portuguese travelers in Burma, and it was also the location of 
Nan-dá-bayin’s fortress and treasure house. For information on the major references to 
Macao, see Yule & Burnell, Hobson-Jobson, 402. 
 
 
 
SOAS BULLETIN OF BURMA RESEARCH 
 
SBBR 3.2 (AUTUMN 2005):974-1145 
 
1047
Temples, and noble edifices; the wayes and fields full of skulls and 
bones of wretched Peguans, killed or famished and cast into the 
River, in such numbers that the multitude of carkasses prohibiteth 
the way and passage of any ship; to omit the burnings and 
massacres committed by this the cruellist of Tyrants that ever 
breathed.259  
 
Pegu’s desolate and disunified condition allowed Min Yazagyi to “easily 
ma[k]e himselfe Master of the Towne and Countrey.”260 Min Yazagyi 
then placed De Brito and his Portuguese contingent at Syriam to secure 
the port while the rest of the Arakanese force attacked Toungoo.261  The 
king of Toungoo, however, sent ambassadors offering to begin 
negotiations to settle the dispute between Arakan and Toungoo.262  
While Min Yazagyi also allowed the Portuguese to conduct trade 
there, Min Yazagyi still expected a share of the profits of this venture. 
Min Yazagyi also feared that if he left Mons in charge of Syriam, they 
might easily switch loyalties to the Thai, who made overtures under 
Naresuan to extend Ayudhyan protection over the now anarchous 
Peguan region.263 Leaving Portuguese mercenaries in charge of such a 
strategic location was nothing new to the king of Arakan, since this was 
a policy which he followed to maintain his border with Bengal.264 In any 
case, Min Yazagyi left De Brito in charge of Syriam with three thousand 
Arakanese and three frigates, and one hundred smaller vessels, “thinking 
that the Portuguese were skillful in the use of firearms, big and small, 
and so the Mons would be afraid and not give any trouble.”265 De Brito 
convinced Min Yazagyi of the necessity of erecting a feitoria (customs 
house or factory) at the river-mouth to collect revenues. De Brito 
planned, however, to build a fort there and seize the area for the 
Portuguese.266 
 One man who was to become extremely important to De Brito’s 
enterprise was Salvador Ribeyro de Sousa. Ribeyro was a Portuguese and 
                                                          
259  Pimenta, op. cit., 216.   
260 Verhoeff, op. cit., 327. 
261 Damrong Rajanubhab, Prince “Our Wars,” translated by U Aung Thein, Journal 
of the Burma Research Society 40, no. 2 (1957 ): 205. 
262 Verhoeff, op. cit., 327. 
263 Damrong., op. cit.,  205. 
264 Lieberman, “Europeans, Trade, and the Unification of Burma, c. 1540-1620,” 
218. 
265 Damrong, op. cit., 205; Nai Thien, op. cit., 65. 
266 Faria y Sousa, op. cit.,  vol. III, 127. 
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served for some time as a captain in the Arakanese army.267  Ribeyro 
arrived at the port of Syriam due to adverse weather conditions and 
found Min Yazagyi in possession of the port and accompanied by De 
Brito’s Portuguese mercenaries. De Brito felt that he could trust Ribeyro 
and had Ribeyro take on the responsibility of building the fortress, while 
De Brito went on a mission for Min Yazagyi.  
 
Negotiations With Toungoo 
 
Min Yazagyi thus reinforced the Arakanese presence in Lower Burma. 
But Min Yazagyi was also not hasty and he decided that he would seek a 
peaceful solution to his disagreement with the king of Toungoo. Thus, 
Min Yazagyi ordered De Brito to go to Toungoo as his ambassador and 
negotiate with the king of Toungoo for the rest of his share of the booty of 
Pegu.268  
The king of Toungoo was inclined not to resist Min Yazagyi’s 
demands for several reasons. One reason was that Min Yazagyi’s new 
force was present just south of Toungoo, ready to assault Toungoo if 
negotiations did not go the way Min Yazagyi wanted them to. Another 
reason was that Naresuan was still a potential threat to Toungoo, and he 
had only been beaten back into Ayudhya with Arakanese help. Further, 
the king of Chiengmai had now begun attacking Toungoo, “to despoile 
him of his spoiles.”269 After nearly six months of negotiations,270  the 
king of Toungoo agreed to recompense Min Yazagyi and send Min Yazagyi 
the things that he wanted. Min Yazagyi was given the white elephant, 
half of the captured artillery, and any Mons that he wanted to take.The 
daughter of Nan-dá-bayin, who was the king of Toungoo’s niece, was also 
sent to Min Yazagyi for marriage.271  
Min Yazagyi accepted the king of Toungoo’s offer. To bring these 
goods back, Min Yazagyi sent a huge fleet upriver, consisting of 600 
jalias (small ships), with biers and gilded windowpanes, under the 
command of Philip de Brito and the Arakanese corangary (admiral). Once 
the fleet had reached Toungoo, the king of Toungoo turned over his niece 
                                                          
267 Danvers, op. cit.,  20. 
268 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 126 
269 Pimenta, op. cit., 217.  
270 Mousinho, MacGregor trans., op. cit., 114. 
271 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 126; Pieter Willemszoon Verhoeff saw both the princess 
and the elephant when he visited Arakan in 1608. See Peter Floris (Pieter Willemszoon 
Verhoeff), Peter Floris: His Voyage to the East Indies in the Globe 1611-1615, edited and 
translated by W. H. Moreland, Hakluyt Society, 1931, (Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus 
Reprint Ltd., 1967): 54., 327. 
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to De Brito, but he now expressed reluctance for her marriage to Min 
Yazagyi. It seems that he felt that Min Yazagyi was only a lucky man, 
who only obtained a large realm by chance, whereas the king of 
Toungoo’s niece was the widow of the great emperor of Pegu. The king of 
Toungoo, however, realized that the Arakanese were too strong for him to 
oppose at the moment and he kept his promises.272 In addition, Min 
Yazagyi, following the traditional practice of Southeast Asian warfare, as 
well as reflecting Arakan’s growing power and its concomitant need for 
an increased population, deported large numbers of Mons for 
resettlement in Arakan.273  
 
Min Yazagyi Returns to Arakan 
 
Min Yazagyi had established a secure Arakanese position at Syriam, but 
he now returned to Arakan to ensure the strength of the Arakanese 
position on the western frontier in Bengal. Min Yazagyi decided to leave 
De Brito in charge of a Portuguese detachment at Syriam. But Min 
Yazagyi was wary of leaving the Portuguese alone at such a vital position 
on his new expanded eastern flank at Pegu. Min Yazagyi thus left a much 
larger Muslim mercenary force there as well, under the command of a 
local Mon lord, Binnya Dala. Interestingly, De Brito was very worried 
about the presence of these other mercenaries. Min Yazagyi was told by 
the Portuguese that “once they (the Muslims) had got a footing they were 
ill to throw out.” Min Yazagyi responded that these troops posed no 
threat to either him or to the Portuguese. To put an end to the 
Portuguese protests, Min Yazagyi pointed out that his local 
representatives were there to monitor the situation and would evict the 
Muslims if they showed any signs of revolt.274 The Portuguese, however, 
whether out of fear for their safety or as part of some plan to strengthen 
their own position against their Arakanese overlords, began to firmly 
entrench themselves by building fortifications.275  
 
Events at Sundiva, 1602 
 
It was mentioned in the last chapter, the Portuguese trader, Antonio de 
Souza Godinho, forced the island of Sundiva into a tributary relationship 
with the Portuguese traders at Chittagong in 1590. But Sundiva 
remained a virtual non-man’s land, with Portuguese authority in some 
                                                          
272 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 126-127. 
273 Hall, A History of Southeast Asia, 300. 
274 Mousinho, MacGregor trans., op. cit., 114-115. 
275 Ibid. 
 
 
 
ARAKAN, MIN YAZAGYI, AND THE PORTUGUESE 
 
SBBR 3.2 (AUTUMN 2005):974-1145 
 
1050 
places, and Mughal control, as well as a Mughal fort, elsewhere.276  
Further, Kedar Rai, the Bengalese lord at Sripur who had been 
dispossessed of Sundiva island by the Mughals, still maintained his 
claim to the island’s income. Kedar Rai, a Hindu, ruled in the name of 
his father Chand Rai, one of the twelve Bara Bhuyas of southeastern 
Bengal who maintained their independence despite the Mughal conquest 
of the rest of the region.277  He had only taken Sundiva island recently 
and he must have watched events at Sundiva carefully waiting for an 
opportunity to reassert his control. 
In 1602, the Mughals were defeated and Sundiva was brought 
under complete Portuguese control by Domingos Carvalho, one of Kedar 
Rai’s Portuguese employees. The Sundivanese, however, rebelled against 
the Portuguese soon after and were besieged in the former Mughal 
fortress. Carvalho was forced to ask the Portuguese at Chittagong and 
Dianga for help. Manuel de Mattos, the leader of the Portuguese at 
Dianga, led four hundred men in support of Carvalho, who made an 
assault from the shore and drove the islanders into the countryside. 
Since Carvalho and Mattos had together defeated the islanders, they 
each took half of the island to govern.278  Carvalho wrote to the 
Portuguese government offering Sundiva as a new Portuguese 
possession.279 The viceroy accepted and he had expectations that 
Carvalho and Mattos would attempt to bring the large number of 
scattered and autonomous Portuguese in Bengala back into the service 
of the Estado da India.280  The Portuguese king, as a reward, presented 
to them the Order of Christ as well as making them Fidalgos da Casa 
Real.281   
                                                          
276 Campos, op. cit., 67-8. 
277 Shumbhoo Chunder Dev, “The Bara Bhuyas of Bengal,” Calcutta Review 111, no. 
221 (July, 1900): 119. 
278 Fernão Guerreiro, Relação Anual das Coisas Que Fizeram os Padres Da 
Companhia de Jesus Nas Suas Missões do Japão, China, Cataio, Tidore, Ternate, Ambóino, 
Pegu, Bengala, Bisnagá, Maduré, Costa da Pescaria, Manar, Ceilão, Travancor, Malabar, 
Sodomala, Goa, Salcete, Lahor, Diu, Etiopia a alta ou Preste João, Monomotapa, Angola, 
Guiné, Serra Leoa, Cabo Verde e Brasil nos Anos de 1600 a 1609 e do Processo da 
Conversão e Cristandade daquelas Partes: Tirada das Cartas que os Missionários de lá 
Escreveram, edited and with a preface by Artur Viegas. (Coimbra, Portugal: University of 
Coimbra, 1930): vol. I, 286.  
279 Campos, op. cit., 67-8. 
280 Documento 5, 2 March 1605, letter from the king of Portugal to the viceroy of 
India, Dom Martin Affonso de Castro, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. I, 25. 
281 Campos, op. cit., 67-8. 
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Min Yazagyi, however, was furious that the Portuguese traders 
had taken Sundiva. The stated reason was that the Portuguese at 
Chittagong and Dianga had benefited for years, in land grants and 
forgiven rent worth over thirty thousand cruzados, from being in the 
service of the Arakanese royal house; the Portuguese, however, took 
Sundiva, to which Arakan seems to have also had some claim, without 
his knowledge or permission.282  The most important reason for Min 
Yazagyi’s anger, however, seems to be that Min Yazagyi felt that he could 
leave Philip de Brito in possession of a powerful fort in the east because 
there was also stationed there a rival mercenary contingent; but the 
Portuguese who now occupied Sundiva were relatively unchallenged and 
had no reason to follow the orders of the king of Arakan. To have such a 
potential threat to the security of his northwestern border was too much 
for Min Yazagyi to accept.283  Min Yazagyi was also influenced to a large 
extent by his Moslem advisors in his court, “who wished nothing more 
than to see the Portuguese name and Christianity in all the Orient 
extinguished.”284 Angry at the Portuguese, and fearful of being stuck 
between two different Portuguese strongholds,285  Min Yazagyi now sent 
a force of 150 jalias “in which there some catures and other great ships, 
with many falcões and cameletes.”286   Further, Kedar Rai made an 
alliance with Min Yazagyi and sent 100 cosses,287  (“light boats suitable 
for fighting on the rivers and not at sea.”) against Sundiva as well.288  
The Portuguese traders throughout northern Arakan sensed that a 
general reprisal against the Portuguese was about to take place. The 
Portuguese traders at Caranja and Dianga loaded up their ships with 
their trade goods and fled. Although Min Yazagyi’s uncle, the governor of 
Chittagong, reassured the Portuguese there that they were under no 
danger, the Chittagong Portuguese gathered things and began to flee as 
well.289  Manuel de Mattos’ foist and several other poorly fitted out jalias 
were not able to escape from Dianga before the Arakanese fleet blocked 
them in port in November 1602. Mattos’ ship soon  found itself alone in 
                                                          
282  Guerreiro, translation of the author, op. cit., vol. I, 286. 
283 Campos, op. cit., 67-8. 
284 “os quais nenhuma coisa mais desejam que ver extinguido o nome português e 
cristão em todo Oriente.” Guerreiro, translation of the author, op. cit., vol. I, 286. 
285 Ibid. 
286 Guerreiro, translation of the author, op. cit., vol. I, 286; cameletes and falcões are 
two different varieties of small cannon. 
287 Guerreiro, translation of the author, op. cit., vol. I, 286. 
288 Campos, op. cit., 69. 
289 Guerreiro, translation of the author, op. cit., vol. I, 286-7. 
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the middle of the Arakanese fleet, but in the heavy fighting that followed 
Mattos’ ship inflicted a great number of Arakanese deaths. The 
Portuguese lost one dead and seven lightly wounded, including Mattos. 
The Arakanese, however, offset their losses in men by the capture of four 
Portuguese vessels, with all the people and goods that were in them, thus 
making it appear that the Arakanese won the fight.290  
The Arakanese, however, forgot about the remaining Portuguese 
after what they felt was a great Arakanese victory. For the next two days, 
until November 10, the Arakanese crews spent their time “plundering the 
vast booty of the naus” or on shore eating and drinking well into each 
night. The preoccupied Arakanese did not notice the arrival of Carvalho 
and a relief force from Sundiva. With  Mattos’ force, the combined force 
of the Portuguese amounted to fifty ships, including “two foists, four 
caturs, three batéis,” and forty-one jalias. A surprise attack at eight a.m., 
caught the Arakanese naval force of 149 ships off-guard. Many of the 
Arakanese were killed, including the governor of Chittagong, Sinabadi, 
who was also Min Yazagyi’s brother-in-law. Those Arakanese who were 
not killed jumped off their ships and swam ashore. The Portuguese also 
captured all the Arakanese ships as well as guns, rockets, and artillery, 
including twelve “peças, cameletes and falcões.”291  
The Arakanese at Chittagong, now feared a Portuguese reprisal. 
Much of the population fled, carrying their most valuable possessions. 
Sinabadi’s widow fled on an elephant. But the Portuguese did not follow 
up their victory and missed a great opportunity to seize undefended 
Chittagong. Min Yazagyi, however, still furious, took revenge on those 
Portuguese who had not yet left Arakan. Portuguese houses in the 
Portuguese trading stations were sacked and all Portuguese men, 
women, and children were thrown into prison.  Portuguese Jesuit and 
Dominican missionaries were also harassed. Francisco Fernandes, of the 
Company of Jesus, for example, was stripped, blinded, shackled, and 
then thrown into prison where he died on November 14.292  Min 
Yazagyi, however, soon must have realized that he had overreacted and 
that his kingdom was placed in great danger by his hasty actions. He 
signed a peace treaty with the Portuguese and attempted to make 
amends by having the church and the residence of the Dominicans, 
which he ordered destroyed, rebuilt with Arakanese funds. Min Yazagyi 
also asked the missionaries to remain in Arakan.293  
                                                          
290 Ibid., 287. 
291 Ibid 
292 Ibid., 288. 
293 Campos, op. cit., 70. 
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But Min Yazagyi only made peace with the Portuguese in Arakan 
and he determined to wipe out the autonomous Portuguese on strategic 
Sundiva. Carvalho, with sixteen ships, soon faced a huge Arakanese 
naval force. Carvalho, however, was victorious, putting 130 Arakanese 
ships out of action. Min Yazagyi was now even more furious than he was 
at his first defeat at Sundiva. This time, however, Min Yazagyi took out 
his anger against his admirals and captains. His captains, for example, 
were made to wear “women’s clothes as they behaved so effeminately.” 
Carvalho’s fleet, however, had suffered much damage and he realized 
that he could not withstand any more attacks by the Arakanese. The 
Portuguese and Christian islanders gathered their possessions and set 
up trade in other Bengalese ports. Even the four fathers of the Jesuit 
mission on Sundiva, led by Father Blasio Nunes, abandoned their 
church and reestablished themselves in Bengal. Min Yazagyi, however, 
was soon to meet Carvalho again, since a petty king of Chandican, eager 
to win the support of Min Yazagyi, beheaded Carvalho and sent the head 
to Mrauk-U.294  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
There are many views of why Lower Burma was such an easy target for 
Portuguese intervention. Phayre and Harvey seem to feel that De Brito 
had exploited the weakness of Lower Burma to seize control against the 
will of the Mons. Lieberman, however, seems to argue that while De Brito 
had taken advantage of Lower Burma’s disorganized state, his state fit 
into the traditional model of a coastal polity of Burma. Both views, in 
other words, seem to agree that the weakness of Lower Burma was taken 
advantage of by De Brito, but De Brito’s role is seen differently: for 
Phayre and Harvey,295  De Brito is an outsider in the eyes of the Mons; 
but Lieberman seems to imply that De Brito could potentially become an 
indigenous-style coastal ruler with indigenous Mon support if he could 
overcome his “political isolation” and abandon “his self-conscious 
patronage of Christianity.”296  Lieberman is probably correct and I have 
adopted his perspective: I have argued that De Brito was seen by the 
Mons as potentially a legitimate ruler if only he could provide stability to 
Lower Burma and organized government conducive to both the survival 
                                                          
294 Ibid., 73. 
295 Harvey, History of Burma, 185-189, passim; Phayre, History of Burma, 124-129, 
passim. 
296 Lieberman, op. cit., 204, 218. 
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of the people as well as the continued survival of the Buddhist 
sangha.297  
Nan-dá-bayin was not viewed by the Mons as a Mon leader, but 
rather as a Buddhist king. If the Mons would accept Thai, Burman, or 
even Arakanese leadership, why not Portuguese leadership? In the 
anarchy which now enveloped Lower Burma, the Mons were willing to be 
satisfied if some of the requirements for leadership were met and 
reserved some requirements for later when stability and safety had been 
achieved. De Brito, for example, may not have been Buddhist, but 
perhaps the Mons could accept him if he was the leader who could 
provide organized government and provide for the safe continuance of the 
Buddhist religion. Indeed, De Brito at this time only held Syriam and he 
would still have to prove whether or not he could provide for stability 
throughout Lower Burma and thus achieve legitimacy. But it seems clear 
that De Brito was seen as a possibility by the Mons. Nan-dá-bayin , a 
Mon, had failed to live up to the requirements of Buddhist kingship, now 
the Mons were willing to give someone, anyone, a chance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
297 Charney, op. cit., passim.298 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III,  127. 
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Chapter IV 
The First Portuguese Revolt Against Arakan, 1603 
 
Xilimixa King of Arracam, who had possessed himself of the Crown 
of Pegu, to express his Gratitude to the Portugueses that served 
him, gave them the Port of Siriam, at the mouth of the River of the 
same Name...This Grant was obtained of the King for the 
Portugueses by Philip de Brito & Nicote, who most ingratefully 
proved false to that Prince, that had raised him from a vile Collier to 
his Favour and Esteem. 
 
Fariah y Sousa298  
 
De Brito had conceived the not altogether unstatesmanlike project 
of building up in Lower Burma a province of the Portuguese Empire. 
He seems to have been of the stuff of empire-builders...de Brito 
managed to maintain his hold upon Syriam for thirteen years from 
1600 to 1613, and to confine all Burma’s sea-borne commerce to 
that port alone. 
D.G.E. Hall299 
 
These quotations indicate a controversy regarding the activities of 
the  Portuguese mercenaries in Arakan’s pay at Syriam. How were the 
Portuguese at Syriam able to rebel against their Arakanese overlords? 
Why, at the height of Arakanese power, did Arakan suffer it greatest 
setback? After the steady growth of the Arakanese empire for a half-
century, how were a handful of Portuguese mercenaries able to remove 
Arakanese overlordship? 
In order to answer these questions, the Portuguese revolt at 
Syriam and how Min Yazagyi reacted to it should be examined. It is 
important to determine whether De Brito was able to do this because of 
problems in Min Yazagyi’s plans for expanding the Arakanese empire or 
because of other factors beyond Min Yazagyi’s control. 
 
Min Yazagyi the Conqueror 
 
Before examining the Portuguese revolt at Syriam, however, it is 
necessary to first look at how Min Yazagyi was reacting to his conquests. 
The Arakanese had come a long way, from the isolated inland state of 
Min Bin to the new expansive empire of Min Yazagyi. The Arakanese 
successfully adapted the Portuguese model to the Arakanese style of 
                                                          
299 D.G.E. Hall, “English Relations with Burma 1587-1686,” Journal of the Burma 
Research Society 17, 1 (1927): 9. 
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warfare and military technology and now possessed large numbers of 
Portuguese mercenaries whom the Arakanese now used to garrison both 
their western and their eastern frontiers. Min Yazagyi was in no rush to 
pursue further conquests; he now wanted to relax and enjoy the fruits of 
his conquests, especially his new Mon queen.300  
Shin-nhoung was more than just a woman to Min Yazagyi. She 
was the representative of the First Toungoo Dynasty that had  threatened 
Arakan for almost a century and had almost succeeded in conquering 
Mrauk-U in the mid-sixteenth century. Min Yazagyi perhaps saw her in 
the same way that the Arakanese kings before him viewed the stone 
figures that supposedly contained the spirits of the kings of their 
enemies: her submission to Min Yazagyi was a submission of all First 
Toungoo kings to his power. At the same time, however, Shin-nhoung 
also represented world recognition of Min Yazagyi’s new status as a 
Buddhist world-conqueror, a chakravartan. That she brought Min 
Yazagyi new prestige among the neighboring kings was shown by the 
king of Toungoo’s near-refusal of her to Min Yazagyi, since Shin-nhoung, 
and what she represented, was too good for the lowly Arakanese king. 
Min Yazagyi’s success in winning her, however, thus seemed to make 
Min Yazagyi’s greatness clear to everyone. 
Min Yazagyi thus went to great lengths to please his new royal 
symbol. When Shin-nhoung was about to arrive at Mrauk-U, she refused 
to enter the city along the same path as Arakanese “commoners” did.301 
Min Yazagyi responded by having a thirty-foot deep passage dug through 
Sanga-doung Hill.302 He also said nothing when Shin-nhoung ordered 
“huge celebrations that had never been seen before in his kingdom,”303 
which must have presented a great strain on the treasury of the 
Arakanese state, but at the same time reinforced Min Yazagyi’s belief in 
his new-found greatness. Later when Shin-nhoung began to miss her 
homeland of Pegu, Min Yazagyi had a scaled-down version of the Shwe-
maw-daw Pagoda of Pegu built to allay her sadness. Shin-nhoung 
continued to express discontent at being in Mrauk-U, so Min Yazagyi had 
                                                          
300 To be fair to Min Yazagyi, he was not totally negligent of some of his traditional 
kingly duties: repaired some of the pagodas of his predecessors, such as the Andaw, 
Sandaw, and Nandaw cetis at Sandoway, and even built a new pagoda, the Parabo 
pagoda. See Forchhammer, op. cit., 16. 
301 She also made a fuss about her treatment relative to Min Yazagyi’s chief queen, 
who was at his honored right hand, while Shin-nhoung was at Min Yazagyi’s left. See 
Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 187. 
302  San Baw U, “My Rambles,” Journal of the Burma Research Society 11 (1921): 
165-166. 
303 Bocarro, op. cit., vol I,  127. 
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a huge pleasure  park, the Mvin-mho-daung, built. This park was 
enormous and probably required an enormous amount of labor to build: 
 
Mvin-mho-daung represent[ed] Mount Meru, surrounded by four 
large islands, and seven circular ranges of mountains  varied in 
heights lower and lower until the last and the lowest one reaches 
the edges of the five great oceans, into which the waters of the five 
hundred rivers flow unceasingly. To this pleasure ground the King, 
his queen and Royal Household often used to repair and bathed in 
the cool and crystal waters of its lakes.304  
 
Min Yazagyi also indulged in other luxuries. A good example is 
that of Min Yazagyi’s treasured pleasure boat, which was kept on the 
river next to Mrauk-U. As Fariah y Sousa has described it: 
 
[It was] a ship which he kept in that Port for to take his Pleasure. It 
was of a vast bigness, and wonderful Workmanship, with several 
Apartments like a Palace, all covered with Gold and Ivory, and yet 
the curiosity of the Work surpassed all the rest.305  
 
This boat was certainly a status symbol, or a piece of royal regalia, which 
probably enhanced the royal aura of Min Yazagyi and thus helped the 
perception of his legitimacy. But this ship also represents Min Yazagyi’s 
overwhelming preoccupation with himself at the expense of the good 
governance and leadership of his kingdom. 
As Min Yazagyi began to involve himself more in the glory of his 
own personage, he also began to let the actual governance of his 
kingdom slip out of his hands and into the hands of his ministers and 
members of the royal family. This was dangerous: the advisors who 
surrounded him were not the same capable ministers who guided Min 
Bin and his other predecessors. Indeed, after Min Yazagyi returned from 
his conquest of Pegu, his prime minister, Maha Pyinnya-gyaw, who had 
guided Min Bin and succeeding kings in their reconstruction of the 
Arakanese military, died.306 Maha Pyinnya-gyaw had played a large part 
in the quick build-up of Arakanese strength and without him a vacuum 
                                                          
304 San Baw U, “My Rambles,” Journal of the Burma Research Society 11 (1921): 
165-166. 
305 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 161. 
306 Maha Pyinnya-gyaw was buried at Cape Negrais and a pagoda was built above 
his grave “in proof of the high esteem and respect shewn for him, and to commemorate 
his successful operations in Hanthawaddy.” The exact location of this pagoda on Cape 
Negrais became known as Pagoda Point. See San Baw U, “My Rambles,” Journal of the 
Burma Research Society 11 (1921): 167. 
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of authority developed under Min Yazagyi, which could not easily be filled 
adequately. Since Min Yazagyi now left his state to the control of his 
ministers, these ministers and members of the royal family engaged in 
court intrigues and plots to seize power were hatched by many in the 
Arakanese administration. 
One example of the erosion of Arakanese solidarity under the king 
could be found within the royal family itself. As I mentioned in the first 
chapter of this thesis, the poet Ugga Byan was the tutor of the royal 
prince Min Khamaung. These two men were not content to simply live at 
the palace in a relaxed state of luxury and sexual debauchery: 
 
The prince, Min-Kamaung, was wild and he found in his tutor a 
boon companion. They had a band of youthful supporters, Nga Ru, 
Nga Piu, Nga Gru, ten of them, and they lived that life of erudition 
and of the imagination wedded to fighting, brawling, feats of arms 
and of endurance, the tradition of which is familiar to us from a 
study of the European Renaissance.307  
 
A few years before Min Yazagyi invaded Pegu, Ugga Byan, Prince Min-
Kamaung, and their ten supporters had tried to overthrow Min Yazagyi. 
The plot was discovered, however, and this band of royal rebels fled to 
Pegu. Ugga Byan’s poetry was popular  with the people, however, and so 
was Min Khamaung, so Min Yazagyi forgave them and allowed them to 
return to Mrauk-U. During the siege of Pegu, however, these men 
rebelled a second time and crossed the lines to join the defense of Pegu. 
When it was clear that Pegu would fall, however, this band of rebels “cut 
their way out again.” Min Yazagyi was so impressed by this “feat” that he 
again pardoned them.308  
Ugga Byan and Min Khamaung now saw that Min Yazagyi was 
losing control over his kingdom to his ministers and decided to raise a 
general rebellion against him. Their band went to Sandoway, Min Bin’s 
old myo, which was “full of Pagoda slaves, Mahomedan prisoners of war 
confined there to sweep out the three sacred shrines,” Andaw, Sandaw, 
and Nandaw.309 Other forces hostile to Min Yazagyi were present at 
Sandoway as well: thousands of Mons captured by Min Yazagyi during 
the Arakanese conquest of Lower Burma were resettled here, and one 
thousand of them previously escaped, but had been caught and 
returned.310  Freeing them, Ugga Byan and Min Khamaung led the rebel 
                                                          
307 Collis, “An Arakanese Poem of the 16th Century,” 221. 
308 Ibid., 221-2. 
309 Ibid.,  222. 
310 Harvey, History of Burma, 141. 
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army against Mrauk-U. Min Yazagyi was shaken out of his retirement 
from the duties of the state when he heard that his son and Ugga Byan, 
who he had two times before pardoned for rebellion, were ready to unseat 
him. Min Yazagyi gathered an army and crushed the rebel army.311  Min 
Yazagyi forgave his son, Min Khamaung, and instead of putting Ugga 
Byan to death, lopped off his hands and made him a slave to the 
Mahamuni shrine.312 Maurice Collis explains, however, that Ugga 
Byan’s punishment was much more tragic than it would immediately 
appear: 
 
It is difficult for us to understand the full significance of that 
punishment. It was the most complete social downfall that could 
overtake a man. For one who had strutted in King’s Courts, a poet 
and a hero, the equal of princes, it was death, and Ugga Byan 
accepted it as such.313  
 
Min Yazagyi then returned his undivided attention away from his 
kingdom and back to his queen.  
Min Yazagyi began to indulge in his “aura of greatness” and was 
beginning to lose touch with the kingdom that Min Bin and his other 
predecessors had so carefully built. Certainly Min Yazagyi was among the 
most powerful Arakanese kings, but he was not the most capable. 
Further, the kingdom of Arakan was slipping out of his hands, and 
without the great prime minister who held everything together from king 
to king for a half-century, everything was about ready to fall apart. 
Indeed, Min Yazagyi’s empire was now characterized by court intrigues in 
Mrauk-U and the defense of his eastern and western frontiers was left to 
autonomous groups of Portuguese mercenaries who were likely, if the 
opportunity arose, to overthrow Arakanese tutelage.  
 
Court Intrigues 
 
Many in Arakan saw Min Yazagyi’s growing disinterest in directly 
managing his empire and they probably saw the unsavoriness of the 
Portuguese whose power and influence began to grow unchecked by 
                                                          
311 It may be possible that Philip de Brito and his Portuguese, who formed part of 
the royal bodyguard, had played a major role in saving Min Yazagyi’s position on the 
throne. Guerreiro, for example, says vaguely that De Brito “twice restored him to his 
throne, when he had been driven from it by his rebellious subjects.” See Guerreiro, Payne 
trans., op. cit., 194. 
312 Collis, “An Arakanese Poem of the 16th Century,” 222; See Harvey, History of 
Burma, 141 for the condemnation of Ugga Byan to have his hands cut off. 
313 Collis, “An Arakanese Poem of the 16th Century,” 222. 
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royal restrictions. They were worried about leaving Syriam in the hands 
of Portuguese mercenaries and De Brito’s increasing wealth and power 
may have provoked jealousy on the part of not a few Arakanese courtiers. 
Min Yazagyi was advised by Arakanese courtiers and others to attack the 
Portuguese as soon as possible, before the Portuguese position at Syriam 
was too strong for Min Yazagyi to maintain his control over the important 
port.  One of those who tried to push Min Yazagyi against De Brito was a 
Min Yazagyi favorite, called Rume. Rume was aided in his efforts by 
Moslems present in the Arakanese court as well as by representatives of 
the king of Massulipatam ( a maritime state in Eastern India). The anti-
Portuguese faction at the Arakanese court grew after the king of 
Massulipatam’s representatives bribed important officials at the 
Arakanese court with “large presents.”314  
Min Yazagyi became interested in their advice when they told him 
that if the Portuguese were removed from Syriam and an Islamic 
community was established, a pro-Arakanese Islamic community of over 
twenty thousand Moslems could be established within two years. As a 
further enticement, it was suggested by these courtiers that this Islamic 
community would send an annual tribute of two “bares” to Min Yazagyi. 
The anti-De Brito faction at the Arakanese court also persuaded Min 
Yazagyi to believe that the material wealth of Pegu was too great to place 
into the trust of the Portuguese, who they claimed were “very difficult to 
dislodge from a place where they had taken root:” 
 
The country, they said, had lost its population, but not its mines of 
gold and silver and precious stones, and the rivers which enriched 
its soil still ran to the sea. His majesty should, therefore, consider 
well into whose hands he delivered this port. The Moors, he knew, 
would always be garibos, that is very submissive, with no other 
desire but to live under his protection.315  
 
The anti-De Brito faction made the argument that if Arakanese forces 
would retake Syriam, and then place it under Islamic local government, a 
valuable alliance with the king of Massulipatam could be maintained 
“forever.”316  
De Brito soon came to the Arakanese court to quiet the rumors of 
his plans to rebel against Min Yazagyi. De Brito claimed that the 
                                                          
314 Father Fernão Guerreiro, “The Mission to Pegu,” In Jahangir and the Jesuits With 
an Account of the Travels of Benedict Goes and The Mission to Pegu: From the Relations of 
Father Fernão Guerreiro, translated by C. H. Payne, (New York: Robert M. McBride & 
company, 1930): 195-196. 
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Moslems at Syriam were the real threat to Min Yazagyi’s power. De Brito 
explained that the Islamic power of Akbar the Great was ready to seize 
Arakanese possessions in Bengal and the Min Yazagyi depended upon 
Portuguese help to secure his kingdom. One the other hand, De Brito 
argued, if Min Yazagyi decided to attack the Portuguese at Syriam, he 
could not hope to win since the Portuguese were “lords of the sea.” While 
Min Yazagyi might kill the fifty Portuguese at Syriam, “a thousand would 
come to take their place; so that there would be perpetual warfare until 
he was destroyed.” De Brito’s argument was supported when the viceroy 
of Goa’s ambassador, Gaspar da Silva, arrived at the Arakanese court 
during De Brito’s visit. In order to further persuade Min Yazagyi of the 
necessities of remaining on good terms with the Portuguese, Da Silva 
made an open suggestion to De Brito that he should go to Goa and 
obtain a Portuguese fleet to fight Akbar in Bengal on Min Yazagyi’s 
behalf. 317  
Once De Brito and Da Silva had left, however, the anti-De Brito 
faction at the Arakanese court recommenced their claims that De Brito 
was about to rebel. This time, they pointed out that De Brito was 
constructing fortifications. Min Yazagyi was not entirely convinced, but to 
be safe, he sent messengers with a letter which ordered De Brito to “pull 
down all that he had built.” De Brito took advantage of the court politics 
in Arakan by playing the game as the king of Massulipatam was. De 
Brito first bribed Min Yazagyi’s messengers to tell Min Yazagyi that he 
could not hope to defeat the Portuguese position at Syriam. Second, De 
Brito bribed important members of the Arakanese government who were 
close to Min Yazagyi. De Brito also tried to win Min Yazagyi’s favor by 
sending him a present with a golden girdle, which together were worth 
thirty-two thousand cruzados.318  
 
Binnya Dala 
 
Min Yazagyi’s representative at Syriam, a Mon named Binnya Dala,319 
was suspicious of De Brito’s actions. Binnya Dala was the lord of the 
local town of Dala and had his own ambitions for local power, which 
made him extremely cautious in his dealings with the Portuguese 
mercenaries.320 Binnya Dala guessed correctly that De Brito and his 
Portuguese mercenary contingent had their own plans independent of 
                                                          
317 Ibid., 196. 
318 Ibid., 196-197. 
319 Binnya is the Mon title for “lord of the land.” See Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 
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Arakanese policy, and his fears were confirmed in his eyes by the 
Portuguese request that he and the Moslem mercenary contingent be 
removed from Syriam. He apparently felt that Min Yazagyi would not 
believe him, since Min Yazagyi did not seem inclined to waste his energy 
to investigate Binnya Dala’s warnings. Binnya Dala thus decided to 
secure his own position at Syriam independent of the Portuguese: he 
built a small fortress, with sentry-boxes, and refused to allow any 
Portuguese to enter it, with the sole exception of a single Dominican 
priest, Frei Belchior da Luz, whom Binnya Dala trusted.321  
De Brito saw his plans for taking control of Syriam away from the 
Arakanese endangered: he decided to get rid of Binnya Dala before 
Binnya Dala’s defense works were completely finished. De Brito gathered 
fifty Portuguese mercenaries322  and with three Portuguese officers, 
João d’Oliva, Paulo do Rego, and Salvador Ribeyro, planned to surprise 
Binnya Dala and take over Binnya Dala’s fortress. Binnya Dala, however, 
realized what the Portuguese were up to and decided to get them first. At 
night, with six hundred men led by large “flaming carts,” Binnya Dala 
encircled and then assaulted the Portuguese fortress and the San 
Dominican church. Binnya Dala’s attack was successful and the 
Portuguese were driven out of their feitoria (factory).323 A Portuguese 
counterattack on 27 February 1602, however, left thirty of Binnya Dala’s 
men dead. The Portuguese captured ninety more Moslems as well as 
twelve of Binnya Dala’s ships, twenty horses, and all of Binnya Dala’s 
supplies.324  The Portuguese forced Binnya Dala to retreat to the small 
island of Delá which was not too far distant. There, Binnya Dala erected 
another fortress with about one thousand of his men.325 
Min Yazagyi  was told of what  happened and belatedly decided to 
act: he prepared a large Arakanese fleet to relieve Binnya Dala. Further, 
Min Yazagyi planned to send this fleet under the leadership of Min 
Khamaung, who would be crowned as the new emperor of Pegu once the 
Portuguese had been thrown out of Syriam.326  Binnya Dala, however, 
had made the mistake of seizing the treasury of the Digão (Digan) Pagoda 
in order to buy supplies for his men. This mistake gave De Brito the 
evidence that he needed to convince Min Yazagyi that the skirmish was 
Binnya Dala’s fault. Philip de Brito went quickly to Mrauk-U with this 
                                                          
321 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 127-8; Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 128. 
322 Each to be paid a quartel of one hundred pardaos. See Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 
128. 
323 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 127-128; Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 129. 
324 Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 198; Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 129. 
325 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 127-128. 
326 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 130. 
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information informed Min Yazagyi as well as  repeating the earlier 
Portuguese demands for Binnya Dala’s removal. At the same time that 
De Brito was accusing Binnya Dala of being a “a robber that steals from 
the house of God”327  to Min Yazagyi, however, De Brito was preparing 
to send word to various Mon princes that this was the time to rebel, 
under Portuguese leadership, against Arakanese control.328 De Brito 
kept his true intentions secret, and he accepted Min Yazagyi’s suggestion 
that good relations  between the Portuguese and Binnya Dala should be 
resumed. To help the two parties negotiate, Min Yazagyi sent an escort of 
forty jalias with De Brito as well as several Arakanese princes to serve as 
intermediaries. Friendly relations between Binnya Dala and the 
Portuguese were resumed shortly after De Brito’s arrival at Syriam, 
although the Portuguese seem to be clearly established as the dominant 
party there.329 
For the next two years, from 1601 to 1603, the Portuguese feitoria 
at Syriam collected the duties from passing ships. A large share of these 
duties went directly to Min Yazagyi and substantially increased the 
supply of wealth for redistribution by Min Yazagyi to his subjects. De 
Brito collected duties on trade going up and done the river and sent them 
to Min Yazagyi. At the same time, however, De Brito engaged in private 
trade, the profits of which made him very wealthy.  Although De Brito 
only had fifty other Portuguese,330 his growing wealth soon attracted 
other Portuguese to Syriam, warranting De Brito’s invitation for 
representatives of the Society of Jesus to come to service the religious 
needs of the growing Portuguese population.331 The Arakanese military 
also benefited from using Syriam as a way-station, since the Portuguese 
feitoria not only possessed accommodations for the Portuguese 
mercenaries, foreign traders, and San Dominicans, but also 
accommodated Arakanese naval captains.332  
De Brito realized, however, that it would not be very long before 
Min Yazagyi’s advisers would be able to persuade him to attack Syriam 
directly. At the same time, De Brito felt that  the Portuguese had 
                                                          
327 “um Ladrão que roubou a casa do mesmo Deus,” See Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 130. 
328 Mousinho, MacGregor trans., op. cit., 115; Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 128-
129; Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 130. 
329 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 130. 
330 Harvey, History of Burma, 185. 
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332 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 130-1. 
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succeeded in erecting great defense works,333  and that he was now in a 
position to make himself an independent lord. De Brito sent 
representatives to local Mon myóza asking for alliances and peace pacts, 
while warning them not to ally themselves to Min Yazagyi, who was “the 
common enemy of all.” De Brito’s representatives were successful in 
obtaining promises for peace and mutual defense aid from the kings of 
Prome, Chiengmai,334 and several other smaller states. The 
representative sent to Ayudhya, however, met with failure: a Portuguese 
advisor at the Siamese court, Martim de Torres, warned the king of 
Ayudhya “to have nothing to do with Felippe de Brito.” While the king of 
Ayudhya made no promises of friendship to De Brito, he tried to avoid 
making De Brito an enemy: the Ayudhyans sent De Brito forty 
Portuguese, whom they held as captives.335 De Brito decided to go to 
Goa to convince the viceroy that further Portuguese help was needed, 
with the argument that this was an excellent opportunity for the 
Portuguese to take over the whole of Bengal as well.336  
 
Ribeyro Takes Control of Syriam 
 
Min Yazagyi, however, now knew that he had been tricked. He was 
informed of the Portuguese fortifications and that he had been wrong to 
trust the Portuguese, “as such a great fabric could no longer hide itself 
under the name of merchants’ warehouse.”  Min Yazagyi realized that he 
should have listened to the protests of the Moslems and requested that 
the king of Prome and Binnya Dala  defeat the Portuguese at Syriam. To 
support this effort, Min Yazagyi sent a fleet of fifty jalias “with orders to 
take the new fortress of Serião, and kill all the Portuguese that were in 
it.”337  Binnya Dala’s son-in-law, Binnya Lao, led a large army to crush 
the Portuguese and the king of Prome subsequently sent six thousand 
men in a fleet under the command of Binnya Dala to unseat the 
Portuguese.338  Min Yazagyi hoped that this would be done before Philip 
de Brito returned: he hoped that “when Philip de Brito returned from 
India with his new new collection of forces, they (the Arakanese) would 
                                                          
333 The Portuguese fortress at this time, however, was only “a stronghold of wood 
filled in with earth.” See Mousinho, Macgregor trans., op. cit.,  114. 
334 Various Portuguese accounts refer to Chiengmai as Jangoma. See Guerreiro, 
Payne trans., op. cit., 261f, note 10. 
335 Ibid., 199. 
336 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 128-129. 
337 “com ordem que tomassem a nova fortaleza de Serião, e matassem todos os 
portuguezes que n’ella estavam.” See Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 131. 
338 Mousinho, Macgregor trans., op. cit., 115. 
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thus be able to capture him and all those he brought with him more 
easily.”339  
De Brito had already left for Goa, according to his plan mentioned 
earlier. In his place, Salvador Ribeyro now commanded the Portuguese 
mercenaries at Syriam. Salvador Ribeyro blocked the Arakanese fleet’s 
path with three trading ships that were available at Syriam. The 
Portuguese were armed with “firearms, jars of powder, and fire-lances, 
for there were no cannon.” Ribeyro was determined to make a point of 
the coming skirmish: 
 
He decided that in this first encounter with the native foe it 
imported much to show by his valour the small account in which he 
held them, and that the Portuguese should attack fiercely and fight 
with generous mettle to maintain the reputation they held all over 
the East; a reputation which, acquired by astonishing exploits, had 
made them the terror of wide provinces and warlike peoples, 
Persians, Moguls, Tartars and others whose valour oft in ancient 
times checked the current of Roman victory, and today sufficiently 
embarresses the conquering Turk.340  
 
Ribeyro placed his ships at the narrowest part of the river to concentrate 
his firepower on the mass of enemy ships. He took the Arakanese by 
surprise: 
 
[They were] attacked with such fury and determination that defend 
themselves as they might, they were caught before they knew it, and 
under a deadly shower of bullets and powder jars obliged to take to 
inglorious flight. Some threw themselves into the water, others 
jumped ashore, while those farther off took to their oars for safety 
and returned the way they had come, but with very different 
speed.341  
 
The Portuguese destroyed forty Arakanese ships, killing many Arakanese 
and routing the rest of the Arakanese fleet. The Portuguese victory soon 
forced some of the indigenous population to question who was really in 
charge at Syriam: 
 
                                                          
339 “quando Philippe de Brito voltasse da India não todos os que comsigo trouxesse.” 
See Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 131. 
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The story soon reached the neighboring Kingdoms, and produced 
various effects on their Princes, every one of whom felt sick with the 
fear which the Portuguese arms engendered forseeing that the little 
flame might end in a conflagaration which would consume 
everything.342  
 
Ribeyro subsequently returned to the fort to prepare the defense-
works for later attacks. Twenty days later Binnya Lao attacked Syriam 
again with six thousand men. Since the Portuguese seemed invincible by 
sea, Binnya Lao determined to attack the Portuguese by land. He also 
convinced the king of Prome to join him in the attack on Syriam. Before 
they had joined forces, however, Ribeyro captured a boat, sent by the 
king of Prome to Binnya Lao to inform him that Prome’s army was on its 
way. Ribeyro sank the boat and beheaded its crew and officers.  Binnya 
Lao was threatened by the king of Toungoo as well, since the king of 
Toungoo had attacked him earlier in order to subject him to Toungoo’s 
control. While Binnya Lao had defeated the Toungoo army, he felt that it 
was probable that they would attack again. Making his headquarters 
near a “small tidal creek” near the fort of Syriam, Binnya Lao hesitated, 
waiting for the king of Prome’s army in order to attack Syriam while at 
the same time preparing to defend himself from the king of Toungoo.343  
Ribeyro decided to attack Binnya Lao since his army was 
obviously in disarray. He placed four wounded Portuguese near Binnya 
Lao’s headquarters at night and instructed them to beat drums and set 
off carbines when they saw rockets explode in the enemy camp. Ribeyro 
and his remaining men prepared to attack Binnya Lao, who expected the 
least trouble from the Portuguese since he knew of their small numbers: 
Binnya Lao had not even posted any sentries to watch for a possible 
Portuguese attack. The Portuguese snuck through Binnya Lao’s camp 
while everyone was asleep and, Ribeyro, entering Binnya Lao’s quarters, 
killed the Arakanese leader. The Portuguese fired a signal rocket and the 
four wounded Portuguese began to beat drums and fire the  carbines, 
leading the Arakanese to believe that they were being attacked by the 
king of Toungoo fled in disarray. The Portuguese then burned down the 
enemy encampment. The king of Prome retreated from his position when 
heard of Binnya Lao’s death.  He also recanted his alliance with Binnya 
Lao: 
 
When the fame of it spread, the King of Prome sent an envoy to 
Captain Salvador Ribeyro to assure him that the orders of his army 
were not to injure him but to fight the dead Lao, for setting up, 
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private subject as he was, to be King of Pegu; wherefore he thanked 
our Captain for ridding him of such an enemy, and cutting down in 
time the arrogance of a man hated by all for his ill-founded 
designs.344  
 
Binnya Dala’s Siege 
 
Binnya Dala was furious and wanted to revenge the death of his son-in-
law Binnya Lao.  He gathered munitions, supplies, and over eight 
thousand men and surrounded Syriam. In order to prevent an easy 
Portuguese victory, Binnya Dala took great precautions: 
 
To guard against the fury of the sudden attacks which he was told it 
was their habit to make when hard beset, he made another fort 
close to ours, exceeding ours greatly in size, but not less strong; for 
he had a great number of men, and every day more joined him, so 
that it might be called a veritable town rather than a fort. There 
were wide roads in it, and spacious squares, and public buildings 
for the residence both of Banha Dalá and the Ximins, or captains, 
and other officers of war and justice. It was enclosed by a massive 
palisade of wood, bound by two courses of timber and filled in with 
earth, and was so strong between the courses that it threw back the 
balls of the cannon which battered it...At its base was a hollow that 
ran all the way round; with raised approaches of firm earth to the 
gates required for the convenience of the inhabitants; these gates 
being watched during the day and shut at night, and always in 
charge of a good and trusty guard.345   
 
Binnya Dala’s siege continued for eight months. His attacks on the 
Portuguese came every night and only when it was dark, so as to 
minimize the effect of cannon, hand-grenades or “hand-bombs,” and 
musket-fire. In addition, the Portuguese were unable to concentrate their 
firepower since Binnya Dala’s men attacked from all sides at once. The 
effect of Binnya Dala’s siege was terrifying for the Portuguese: 
 
The enemy employed every possible artifice to inflict loss on our 
men. Sometimes they would first of all discharge thirteen pieces of 
artillery which they had in their fort, and with which they overshot 
ours if they took elevated aim; next followed a great noise of 
shouting, beating of kettledrums and other instruments of war, and 
rattle of musketry, and presently the enemy themselves would come 
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with a rush under cover of strong mantles made of wood, and some 
with a kind of paveses, or broad shields, and passing the hollow not 
without many losses would begin to come up our walls, only with 
great trouble to be beaten back. At other times they crept up in 
silence, unperceived until they began at close quarters to strike at 
the little band of soldiers...346  
 
The Portuguese defenders had become demoralized. They were 
afraid that since the fort at Syriam had not been built with the blessing 
of Goa, that no help would come. Soon, many of the Portuguese began to 
desert. The remaining Portuguese soldiers “took a mutinous tone” 
demanding that they abandon the fort since they could not defend it for 
very much longer. But Ribeyro encouraged his remaining followers. He 
argued that the viceroy would send help and if he did not, then Ribeyro 
would abandon the fort and they would all depart. As a guarantee 
against desertion en masse, Ribeyro had the ships in the port burned, 
blaming it on the enemy.347  
After eight months of siege, however, reinforcements arrived. 
Although it is unclear whether these were reinforcements sent by Goa or 
a chance passing of Portuguese ships, the defenders at Syriam were 
saved.348  A Portuguese merchant ship arrived at the sandbar and a few 
days later, so did seven more Portuguese merchant ships as well as five 
Portuguese galleys. The Portuguese ships brought eight hundred 
Portuguese mercenaries. Help came from the Mons as well, and in one 
case a Mon ximin (captain), Barragao, joined the Portuguese with fifteen 
hundred of his men.349 With his new men and supplies, Ribeyro felt 
that he was strong enough to lift the siege.350   
Ribeyro quickly prepared for an attack on Binnya Dala’s camp. He 
gathered together all the adventurers and made them pledge to follow his 
orders. Then Ribeyro, 
 
got in order plenty of ladders and broad and strong planks, to afford 
the soldiers a way across the hollow to the enemy’s fort, and 
prepared a great quantity of powder-jars in cases, for the orderlies 
to carry among those who had to throw them. He also gave orders to 
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347 Ibid., 122. 
348 Scott argues that these Portuguese forces may have only been an “opportune 
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rough-hew several thick logs, what the ancients called arietes, and 
with rams, to break in the gates when that time came.351  
 
Although the preparations for the attack had been conducted in secrecy, 
a Moslem “of the king of Arakan’s following” told Binnya Dala of what 
Ribeyro was planning. Binnya Dala then evacuated all the women and 
non-essential personnel from his fort. Since the powder-jars would likely 
inflict the most damage upon his forces, Binnya Dala had huge posts set 
up inside his walls and strung between them huge nets which would 
catch the powder-jars and send them flying back at the Portuguese when 
they attacked.352  
Ribeyro divided his forces into three sections. The first (and the 
main) section consisted of five hundred Portuguese and was under the 
command of João Pereyra, although Ribeyro would accompany this 
section as well. The first section also carried the equipment necessary to 
scale the walls. The second section consisted of one hundred and fifty 
Portuguese and was under the joint-command of Jorge de Barros de 
Azevedo and Sebastião Serrao de Anaya. This section was to occupy the 
ruined pagodas in front of the enemy’s main gate, in order to prevent any 
major counterattack against the main section. The third section also 
consisted of one hundred and fifty Portuguese, as well as one thousand 
Mons, under the command of Simão Barbosa Aranha. This section was 
to make a show of force from the tidal creek in a feint and thus draw off 
a large portion of the enemy from the main area of attack. 353  
The morning of the attack, just before dawn, the three sections left 
the fort by different gates. When the attack began, however, the 
Portuguese were taken by surprise by the preparations Binnya Dala 
made after being warned of the impending attack by the Arakanese 
informant. When Captain João Pereyra’s section scaled the enemy walls, 
the powder-jars they had thrown came flying back, killing many, 
including Pereyra, and causing many other Portuguese to retreat. In 
order to prevent a full-scale rout, Ribeyro joined the fighting, scaled the 
walls, and had his men cut through the netting, which allowed the 
powder-jars to fall in. After the powder-jars had taken their effect, 
Ribeyro and his men jumped into the fort. With men inside the fort, 
covered by musket-fire and powder-jars from their compatriots still on 
the enemy’s walls, the Portuguese took the main gate and opened it to 
the remaining Portuguese of the main section. The section under Simão 
Barbosa Aranha, which was posted at the tidal creek waited while 
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Ribeyro’s section attacked. Becoming impatient, however, Aranha 
attacked, leading the enemy to think that he was being attacked from all 
sides. Since Barbosa’s forces were mainly Mons, Binnya Dala’s forces felt 
that it would be easier to get through them than through Ribeyro’s 
Portuguese. Thus the enemy and Binnya Dala overran the forces at the 
tidal creek in order to make their escape.354   
 
Binnya Dala’s Counterattack 
 
The Portuguese force, however, soon diminished in numbers. First, the 
barter-trade between the Portuguese, Toungoo, and Prome merchants 
was now finishing up for the year and these merchants soon left.355  
Further, feeling that  Portuguese might no longer be challenged in Pegu, 
Ribeyro released all of his men to do as they wished; only two hundred of 
the men which the viceroy had sent remained.356 In addition, Ribeyro 
could depend upon Ximin Barragao and his Mon contingent.357    
The Arakanese returned again, however, “with many moving 
Castles, and several forts of fireworks.”358 These “moving castles” must 
have been very frightening to the Portuguese: 
 
[Binnya Dala] constructed many huge cars of three and four 
storeys, supported on strongest axles with enormous wheels, to be 
pushed along, or pulled with ropes, by a great number of men 
protected by long thick shields to enable them to lay the machine 
close alongside our Fort wall in spite of carbines and burning 
powder-jars. These tall towers were made of very dry timber, and 
stuffed with pitch, tar, and powder, so to blaze freely when set on 
fire close to the walls of the Portuguese Fort, which likewise were of 
wood...Moreover the Banha provided many men with mattocks, 
baskets, shovels and other instruments to fill in the hollow.359  
 
Ribeyro’s men, however, were short of gun-powder and powder-
jars. Despite this, Ribeyro gave inspiring speeches to his men and set 
about preparing any materials he could for defense. Boiling cauldrons of 
oil and water were begun, rocks were gathered to drop on the enemy, and 
missiles were prepared. In addition, Ribeyro saw to the aid of the Ximin 
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Barragao, who kept residence in defense-works which adjoined the 
Portuguese fort to the south, along the river. Many Portuguese were 
stationed here and Ribeyro sometimes helped in person.360  
Binnya Dala, however, realized that the section of the Portuguese 
fortress occupied by Ximin Barragao was the least fortified part of the 
Portuguese defense works and determined to make his main strike here. 
Binnya Dala began his attack after sunset. Five hundred enemy 
horsemen gathered on a ridge in front of the fort and then eight 
thousand soldiers of Binnya Dala’s army approached “with a din and 
hubbub of shouts, war-cries, and martial instruments of every kind.” 
Subsequently, Binnya Dala’s men drew up on all sides of the Portuguese 
fort and threw spears, fired their arquebuses and threw fire-bombs.  
Meanwhile, Binnya Dala had many of his men gather in small boats in 
order to sneak upon Barragao’s section of the fort. Although Binnya 
Dala’s men succeeded two times in entering Barragao’s defense-works 
they were repulsed both times.361 
Ribeyro had fifty of his men established as a reinforcement brigade 
under his command. This brigade went around the fort looking for weak 
spots in the defense. Since he saw Barragao’s section as the most 
vulnerable part of the fortress, Ribeyro had several huge trenches dug to 
prevent the approach of Binnya Dala’s moving castles. So vital were the 
Mons to his defense that Ribeyro often stationed himself among them 
during the fighting.362  
 As the Portuguese position became desperate, a “fiery meteor” 
appeared which frightened all of the Arakanese into retreat. As one 
Portuguese observer interpreted the meteor: 
 
...when the enemy’s attack was hottest and our men stood bravely 
to their ramparts, the Divine Majesty caused to appear above the 
Fort a wheel of fire equal to the circuit of the walls. Little by little it 
rose, growing ever larger, and then settled down with bright and 
burning flames upon the machines and the encampment of the 
enemy, to their great fear, and great comfort of our men, who seeing 
in the marvel the mercy of God’s pitiful hand, gave thanks and 
discharged their carbines and cannon with loud cries of joy and 
gladness. The assailants, interpreting the sign for a sure and 
veritable token of their own destruction, in the greatest terror 
abandoned their proud machines and their encampment with all 
their munitions, which our soldiers burned. The Banha, in despair 
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of attaining to royal dignity and fear of losing his own lordship. 
withdrew dejected to places of safety...363  
  
The Arakanese left behind their moving castles and fireworks, which the 
Portuguese destroyed.364 
 Binnya Dala first fled to his own territory of Dala, but local 
chieftains associated with Ribeyro harassed him into seeking refuge with 
the King of Prome. Other Arakanese and First Toungoo refugees from the 
Portuguese victory, fled to the ruler of Chismim (Bassein), which was a 
vassal of the king of Arakan. When this vassal ruler heard that the 
Portuguese had revolted against Arakan, he had his city and his feitoria 
fortified and entered into negotiations with the king of Arakan about 
what he should do. Min Yazagyi must have worried about losing his last 
foothold in Lower Burma, for he soon sent small pieces of artillery and 
musketeers to the Binnya of Cosmim so that the Portuguese would not 
be able to take over his city.365  
Ribeyro, for his part, made public declarations to the effect that all 
who had fought against him would be forgiven if they gave him their 
loyalty. He also took economic measures to reestablish the prosperity of 
Pegu.366 As the result of Ribeyro’s victory and his subsequent reforms, 
the Portuguese now won the support of many of the people of Pegu. 
Soon, the Portuguese had the support of over two thousand Mon men, 
who brought their families with them to settle in Syriam.367  
 
The Defeat of King Massinga 
 
In May, ships from Goa arrived. They carried letters from the viceroy and 
the King of Portugal. In these letters, De Brito was mistakenly given 
credit for Ribeyro’s victories, even though De Brito was in Goa the whole 
time. Ribeyro, however, felt that once the truth were known, he would be 
credited, and he continued to maintain the Portuguese position at 
Syriam. Ribeyro sent his own accounts of all that had happened to the 
viceroy.368  
At the same time, the Portuguese won a victory over King 
Massinga of Camelan. Binnya Lao wrote to Massinga, telling him of the 
poor condition of Pegu and how, if the king would come with an army, he 
                                                          
363 Mousinho, MacGregor trans., op. cit., 130. 
364 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 130. 
365 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 132. 
366 Mousinho, MacGregor trans., op. cit., 133. 
367 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 132. 
368 Ibid., vol. I, 131. 
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could make himself king of Pegu as well. Binnya Lao pledged his support, 
as well as that of the native inhabitants. Massinga saw this as a great 
opportunity to take the throne of Pegu, to which he seems to have had 
some right: he is said to have been “of the royal line of Pegu.”369  He 
brought his “family and household,” ten thousand soldiers, as well as 
attendants and women, in 150 ships to Pegu. Massinga stopped, 
however, at a important pagoda about a league from the Portuguese fort 
for ceremonies to inaugurate his takeover.370  
Ribeyro heard of Massinga’s landing and decided that his men, 
Portuguese or Mon, would not be able to stand another siege. Thus, 
Ribeyro decided to attack Massinga before Massinga could attack him. 
Leaving one hundred Portuguese in the fort, Ribeyro took one hundred 
and fifty men armed with carbines and artillery, in fifteen small boats 
down-river. There they waited along the rivers-edge, unseen by 
Massinga’s boats. Ribeyro sneaked upon Massinga’s fleet at a time that 
most of Massinga’s men were at the pagoda in ceremony. Massinga, 
however, had finished opening the ceremony and had returned to his 
fleet,  defended by only a fraction of his men. Ribeyro’s men easily 
defeated them:371 
 
Our men attacked with great noise of carbines and artillery, but 
hardly had need of their wonted dash on occasions of the kind, for 
the unexpected alarm threw the enemy in a panic and they fled after 
very little resistance. In the victor’s hands were left the multitude of 
nearly empty boats and seven pieces of artillery. Those who had 
landed, not feeling safe where they were, left their devotions and 
took to the jungle, trusting to its dense thickets to escape with their 
lives.372  
 
Massinga was killed and his territories were devastated so much, that no 
further threat was expected from this area.373  
As a result of this victory, Ribeyro soon accepted the support of 
fifteen binnyas and two hundred or so ximins, as well as that of 
thousands of Mon refugees who now came to Syriam for safety. By 
October 1613, Syriam had around fifteen thousand people engaged in 
agriculture.374  Ribeyro then received offers of friendship from the 
                                                          
369 Mousinho, MacGregor trans., op. cit., 132. 
370 Ibid., 132. 
371 Ibid., 133. 
372 Ibid., 133. 
373 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 130-131. 
374 Mousinho, MacGregor trans., op. cit., 133; Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 195. 
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Burmese kingdoms as well. The king of Toungoo, for example, sent an 
ambassador with five hundred horses and a gold headpiece inscribed 
with “King Massinga,” as a trophy for Ribeyro. The king of Ava sent 
“three pieces of orange-coloured damask.” The king of Chiengmai sent six 
golden roses and the king of Prome sent a congratulatory gift as well.375  
With the help of the increased population around Syriam, as well as that 
of the masons and quarriers sent from Goa, Ribeyro built a new fortress 
at Syriam. While Min Yazagyi was frantically trying to rebuild his military 
forces, which he had allowed to be destroyed fruitlessly under poor 
military commanders, five thousand Mons and Portuguese worked on 
their new fortress at Syriam  each day. Soon the Portuguese fortress 
seemed impregnable: 
 
[Ribeyro] marked a hillock which overlooked the wide and 
spacious plain on the bank of the river, having near it a well with 
a plentiful flow of good water. There he commenced the 
foundations of a good Fort, which he built almost in the form of a 
square, with a bastion at each corner...he made a double bastion, 
which as it stands higher and is constructed bigger, appears as 
the citadel of that Fort...The walls of the bastions are eleven spans 
thick, filled in with earth up to the artillery platform with its 
necessary portholes. The walls elsewhere are made of stone...the 
waves...break against our two bastions of Santa Cruz and S. 
Filippe, and between them the ship that come to that harbour can 
discharge and take in cargo in perfect safety under the protection 
of the artillery...the result is a Fort which, as it cannot be 
commanded by hostile artillery, can with ease not only defend 
itself but also take the offensive against the enemy.376   
 
De Brito in Goa 
 
But Ribeyro was not to rule Syriam for long: shortly after his final battle 
with Binnya Dala, De Brito was preparing to return to Syriam from Goa. 
Before he had left Goa, De Brito had won the favor of the viceroy. But for 
some time, the viceroy’s advisors were divided about what the viceroy 
should do. Some argued that the Portuguese had no right to Syriam, 
while others said that obtaining Syriam for the Estado da India was too 
great of an opportunity to pass up.  Some even argued that the 
Portuguese fortress at Syriam should be razed and control of the city 
given to the king of Chiengmai who, as Nan-dá-bayin’s brother, was the 
legitimate heir to the throne of Pegu. The viceroy arrived at a compromise 
                                                          
375 Mousinho, MacGregor trans., op. cit., 135. 
376 Ibid., 136-7. 
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and ordered an ambassador to the court of Chiengmai, with the provision 
that the Portuguese would remain in control of Syriam, but that the 
income belonged to the king of Chiengmai (presumably with the 
deduction of the costs of the Portuguese occupation).377 The viceroy, 
seeing great returns from the seemingly blessed De Brito, allowed De 
Brito to marry his niece.378 These “great returns” were manifold and 
have been provided by Guerreiro. A closer connection between De Brito 
and Goa, for example, would bring thousands of Portuguese “outlaws 
and refugees in this area” back within the Portuguese fold. Such a 
connection would increase government revenues by the establishment of 
new factories. Pegu was also a rich timber region, providing quality 
shipbuilding timber at a cheap cost. Pegu and Bengala, Guerreiro 
continues, could also serve as a base from which arms and supplies 
could be sent in any season to Portuguese possessions in the 
archipelago.379  The viceroy gave De Brito the titles of General of the 
Conquest of Pegu as well as Commander  of Syriam and much war 
material,  soldiers,380 and six ships (three galeotas, one galé, and two 
navios),381  with many good captains, including Mathias de Rez, 
Bernardo Soares de Albergaria, João Zuzarte Tição, Antonio Zombo 
d’Almeida, Francisco Mendes de Crasto, and Paulo do Rego.382  Further, 
priests for the “administration of Christianity” and “instructors for 
casting artillery” were also provided by the viceroy.383  De Brito wanted 
the crown of Pegu for himself, although he would claim it in the name of 
his own king, the king of Portugal and Spain.384  De Brito was also 
                                                          
377 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 133. 
378 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III., 131. 
379 Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 201-3. 
380 Maung Htin Aung, op. cit., 136. 
381 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 133; Ayres de Saldhana, however, seems to have reported 
that the six ships given to De Brito were really five navios and one galé. One of the uses 
for these ships seems to have been Saldhana’s order to De Brito to subjugate the 
“neighboring ports.” See Documento 5, 2 March 1605, letter from the king of Portugal to 
the viceroy of India, Dom Martin Affonso de Castro, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. I, 23. 
382 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 133. 
383 Documento 5, 2 March 1605, letter from the king of Portugal to the viceroy of 
India, Dom Martin Affonso de Castro, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. I, 24. The cannon 
foundries at Goa were well-known for their high quality work under the direction of 
members of the Dias and Tavares Bocarro family. See Charles Ralph Boxer, “Asian 
Potentates and European Artillery in the 16th-18th Centuries: A Footnote to Gibson-Hill,” 
Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 38, pt. 2 (December, 1965): 
159. 
384 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 131. 
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given jurisdiction over Bengala in return for his promise to bring the 
Portuguese renegades living there back into the service of the Estado da 
India.385  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
The Portuguese revolt at Syriam seems to indicate that there were 
problems in the way in which Min Yazagyi built his empire or in the way 
he decided to maintain it. An important problem was that Min Yazagyi  
became too dependent upon mercenaries to maintain his control of 
Arakan’s new possessions. He probably did this because the Portuguese 
and other mercenaries were considered to be the only forces a king had 
who would be directly loyal to the central court, as explained earlier. 
While previous Arakanese kings made effective use of mercenaries, these 
mercenaries never before replaced actual Arakanese garrisons. In the 
case of Chittagong, for example, a Portuguese settlement was already 
established and these Portuguese were eager to obtain the trade 
concessions which the Arakanese had offered. The Portuguese at 
Chittagong, then, had a reason to remain loyal to Arakan. The 
Portuguese at Syriam, however, merely handled the official trade for the 
Arakanese. Placing autonomous Portuguese mercenaries in a rich region, 
it seems to me, was a mistake on the part of Min Yazagyi, since it would 
only be a matter of time before greed would affect the loyalty of these 
Portuguese. Further, even at Chittagong, the Arakanese maintained a 
large Arakanese garrison. At Syriam, by contrast, the Portuguese were 
accompanied by other mercenaries who were often at odds with the 
Portuguese.  
While Min Yazagyi thus had no means of guaranteeing mercenary 
loyalty so far from Arakan, he was also placing too much trust in the 
Portuguese. There had been several indications that the Portuguese 
intended to revolt against his authority, but Min Yazagyi chose to ignore 
the warning signals. He refused to take precautions when Binnya Dala 
warned him of what the Portuguese were planning to do. And when the 
Portuguese openly revolted and planned to attack the Moslem 
mercenaries, Min Yazagyi chose instead to believe De Brito. This 
overwhelming trust in Portuguese good faith was a clear departure from 
the traditional caution which previous Arakanese kings took in using 
their Portuguese mercenaries.  
At the same time that Min Yazagyi was allowing his Portuguese 
mercenaries more autonomy, Min Yazagyi was also leaving the affairs of 
                                                          
385 Documento 80, 28 March 1608, letter from the king of Portugal to the viceroy of 
India, Dom Francisco d’Almeida, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. I, 243.386 Hall, “English 
Relations with Burma,” 9. 
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his kingdom increasingly to courtiers, while he played in a pleasure 
palace with his Mon queen. Min Yazagyi had no plans for expanding his 
empire after taking Pegu. Indeed, Min Yazagyi felt that this one victory, 
the sacking of his traditional enemy Pegu, had brought him both 
Arakanese and worldly legitimacy as a king. This is all that he wanted 
and he settled down to enjoy the fruits of his labors rather then assuring 
Arakan continued control of his expanded empire. Min Yazagyi then 
abandoned all of his concerns of the maintenance of the Arakanese state 
to his ministers. Unfortunately, he did not realize that these were not the 
same, capable group of men who had surrounded Min Bin. Min Yazagyi  
overestimated the loyalty of his Portuguese mercenaries: The Portuguese 
acted treacherously when they revolted against Min Yazagyi, since he 
had treated them well and had trusted them with holding Syriam for 
him. On the other hand, Min Yazagyi was negligent in giving the 
Portuguese the opportunity to revolt. 
 Arakanese attempts to retake Syriam were hampered by Min 
Yazagyi’s lack of care in selecting capable leaders for these expeditions or 
even in allocating sufficient resources for such a campaign.  At no time, 
for example, did Min Yazagyi send sufficient naval support for his troops 
when they attempted to retake Syriam and he left the command of the 
whole operation to Binnya Dala and Binnya Lao, who had already shown 
themselves to be incompetent as a military commanders. These two 
commanders wasted their best men in poorly-coordinated attacks and 
often simply attacked with no clear plan at all. Men and ships were rarely 
used in any sort of joint-assault on the Portuguese fortress and the 
Arakanese military leadership did not take advantage of their superior 
numbers in terms of either men or guns. At the same time, the 
Portuguese at Syriam were led by a very capable military leader who 
knew how to use a combination of Portuguese firepower and Mon 
auxiliaries effectively. Ribeyro won his victories with strategic 
concentrations of small numbers of troops, such as his placement of 
Portuguese vessels at the narrowest part of the river, or was due to the 
skillful use of surprise attacks. Ribeyro’s victories were the result of 
strategic and not tactical superiority, since Ribeyro won skirmishes even 
when his men had no cannon or lacked sufficient firearms. Further, 
Ribeyro’s plans were usually made possible with the help of Mon troops 
armed with traditional weapons, such as arrows and spears. The help of 
these Mon troops, for example, was essential during Binnya Dala’s siege 
of the Portuguese fortress and Ribeyro depended upon them so much 
that they were placed at the weakest points of the Portuguese fortress. 
The Portuguese victory was thus due Ribeyro’s ability to effectively 
coordinate the fighting skill of these Mons with Portuguese ships and 
firepower. 
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Chapter V 
The Great War: De Brito’s Kingdom and the Drain on Arakanese 
Resources, 1603-1607 
 
De Brito had conceived the not altogether unstatesmanlike project 
of building up in Lower Burma a province of the Portuguese Empire. 
He seems to have been of the stuff of empire-builders...de Brito 
managed to maintain his hold upon Syriam for thirteen years from 
1600 to 1613, and to confine all Burma’s sea-borne commerce to 
that port alone. 
D.G.E. Hall386  
 
After 1600 a change for the worse overcame the Portuguese. When 
their country was united with Spain and her resources were 
squandered on the European struggle in the Netherlands, she was 
unable to reinforce her eastern shipmen. The Dutch and English 
had arrived and threatened trade rivalry. In consequence the 
Portuguese were transformed from assured traders into cut-off and 
desperate adventurers. They realized that their empire of the sea 
was doomed, that being unable to look for help from Europe, they 
had  only their own wits and swords to uphold them and that 
situated on the borders of great oriental states, so many thousand 
miles from home, the duration of their prosperity could but be 
short. They became pirates. The Viceroy of Goa’s control over them, 
always slight, now disappeared. 
Maurice Collis and San Shwe Bu387 
 
 
These quotations indicate that De Brito was able to win some sort 
of legitimacy as the king of Syriam and that he was able to expand and 
strengthen his hold over Lower Burma. But how did De Brito expand his 
control of Lower Burma in the face of strong Arakanese attacks on his 
position over a four-year period and by what means did he ensure his 
political, military, and economic position at Syriam? Further, what did 
De Brito’s success, and Min Yazagyi’s failure, mean to Arakan?  
 
The Return of De Brito 
 
De Brito left Goa for Syriam in December 1603 with sixteen galleys and 
three hundred Portuguese soldiers.388 Upon his return to Syriam, De 
                                                          
387 Collis & San Shwe Bu, “Arakan’s Place in the Civilization of the Bay,” 44.  
388 Guerreiro, Payne’s trans., op. cit., 199-200. 
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Brito attempted to put things in order. He strengthened the fort, built a 
church and “marked out the boundaries of his capital.”389 Through his 
spies, Min Yazagyi soon learned of Philip de Brito’s return and, despite 
his attacks on Ribeyro, sent his greetings to De Brito as well as promises 
of rewards and honors.390  When Bartholomew Nogueira, the 
ambassador of the viceroy of Goa, arrived at Mrauk-U from Syriam, Min 
Yazagyi pretended that nothing was wrong and kept up the appearances 
of an undefeated conqueror. Min Yazagyi greeted Nogueira “with 
demonstrations of great happiness and love,” without indicating his 
hatred for De Brito.391  
 De Brito arranged the feitoria’s (customhouse or factory) 
regulations according to instructions he carried from the viceroy392  and 
ordered that all ships attempting to trade with Pegu or to use the waters 
to “make their entries” at Syriam. De Brito had the orders requiring 
Portuguese and other maritime merchant traffic to stop at Syriam 
published throughout the major ports of Southeast Asia, including 
Martaban, Tavoy, Tenasserim, and Junkceylon island.393  When some 
trading ships from the Coromandel coast refused to comply, De Brito 
sent Dom Francis de Moura with six ships, which successfully captured 
the vessels. A similar action was taken off the Tenessarim coast against 
                                                          
389 Scott, op. cit., 129. 
390 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 134. 
391 Ibid., vol. I, 135. 
392 By these orders, De Brito was rewarded with a third of the income of the feitoria 
and control of the feitoria for life. In the case of his death, his wife, Dona Luiza de 
Saldhana would receive compensation as deemed necessary by the viceroy of India. 
Further, Dona Luiza would then be remarried at the “pleasure of the viceroy” to a man of 
“quality” who would serve as captain of the fortress. De Brito’s son, however, would be 
taken care of until he was an adult. Then, De Brito’s son by Dona Luiza would take over 
control of the feitoria. See Document 5, 2 March 1605, Letter from the king of Portugal to 
the viceroy of India, Dom Martin Affonso de Castro, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. I, 23; 
Document 27, 23 January 1607, letter from the king of Portugal to the viceroy of India, 
Dom Martin Affonso de Castro, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. I, 111. 
393 Bocarro, op. cit., 135; these orders were clarified by the king of Portugal in a 
provision made on 13 September 1608, in which all ships of the Estado da India, east of 
the Coromandel coast were required to stop at Syriam and pay taxes. See Document 352, 
15 March 1613. Letter from the king of Portugal to the viceroy of India, Dom Jeronymo de 
Azevedo, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. II, 394. 
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two trading vessels from Aceh.394  De Brito’s forces took ships from 
other nations as well, including Cambay, Surrat, and Massulipatam:395  
 
Most of [De Brito’s] energy went in preventing smuggling; that is to 
say, in order to get his customs tolls, he kept ships cruising to 
prevent foreign craft from putting in anywhere in Burma save at 
Syriam. Syriam was already the chief port for the interior and now 
she became the only one. It made his fortune, but it disgusted the 
interior which had to pay increased prices on all foreign goods 
owing to such unprecedented customs efficiency.396  
 
Further, De Brito was ordered to prevent the Moslems, Turks, and Dutch 
from taking possession of the port of Syriam and presumably to prevent 
them from participating in the trade at Syriam as well.397  De Brito’s 
monopoly of trade of Lower Burma was so effective that: 
 
It was not expected...that during the period of his ascendancy the 
[English] East India Company would entertain any serious thought 
of trading to Burma.398  
 
Philip de Brito’s success seems to have fostered a poor state of affairs 
between Goa and Chiengmai: although the Portuguese representative, 
frei Francisco da Annunciação, had promised the revenues of Syriam to 
the king of Chiengmai, De Brito had not yet provided them, and it did not 
appear as if De Brito ever would.399  
 
The Arakanese-Toungoo Alliance  
 
Min Yazagyi, who lost the eastern section of his empire to the Portuguese 
while he was busy with his Mon queen, now decided to recapture his lost 
provinces in Lower Burma. At the end of 1603, the king of Toungoo 
complained to Min Yazagyi because he heard of De Brito’s plans to seize 
                                                          
394 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 131-132; Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 134. 
395 Document 120, 20 February 1610, letter from the king of Portugal to the viceroy 
of Goa, as reprinted in the letter of the viceroy, Ruy Lourenço de Tavora to the king of 
Portugal, 29 December 1610, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. I, 353. 
396 Harvey, History of Burma, 186. 
397 Document 5, 2 March 1605, letter from the king of Portugal to the viceroy of 
India, Dom Martin Affonso de Castro, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. I, 23. 
398 Hall, “English Relations with Burma,” 9. 
399 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 136. 
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some of his “outlying provinces” which were near Syriam.400 Min 
Yazagyi then proposed to the king of Toungoo that they make an alliance 
against De Brito, since De Brito was really a threat to them both.401 The 
proposal was carried to Toungoo by an ambassador and twenty small 
ships.402 The two kings agreed to attack De Brito together: Min Yazagyi 
would attack Syriam by sea, while the king of Toungoo would attack 
Syriam by land.403 The king of Toungoo then prepared an army of three 
hundred elephants, three thousand horses, and fifty thousand men,404  
who would be led by the upayaza, Nat-shin-naung.405 The Toungoo 
force “crossed the hills” and was to march along the Irrawaddy “to insure 
that Prome kept faith and joined in the venture.”406 Min Yazagyi’s force 
consisted of one hundred warships and one hundred transport ships, 
under the command of  Min Yazagyi’s eldest son, Min Khamaung, the 
Arakanese upayaza.407  
To support Min Khamaung, Min Yazagyi took a big risk and sent 
the cream of the Arakanese military command, including his captain-
                                                          
400 Damrong, “Our Wars,” 206; It is interesting that the king of Toungoo would seek 
Min Yazagyi’s help at this time, because it appears that Min Yazagyi’s fighting abilities 
were now questioned in Lower Burma. Indeed, Philip de Brito observed that “as far as the 
King of Arracam is concerned, even the Pegus in our fortress go out and seize his cattle, 
there being none to protect them.” See Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 205. 
401 Nai Thien, op. cit., 65. 
402 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 132-133. 
403 Nai Thien, op. cit., 65. 
404 I doubt the size of the Toungoo army was really as great as we are told in 
Hmannan Yazawindawgyi. (Nai Thien tr., 65). De Brito, for example, around this time 
estimated the king of Toungoo’s forces to be about three thousand Mons, fifteen 
thousand Burmese, and eight hundred cavalry, although no mention is made of 
elephants. I would guess that the actual figure for the Toungoo invasion force was 
probably one-fifth that given by Hmannan Yazawindawgyi. See Guerreiro, Payne trans., 
op. cit., 204. 
405 Nai Thien, op. cit., 65. I cannot imagine that the Toungoo force was equipped for 
siege operations, since, despite Toungoo’s possession of large numbers of artillery, 
“including even camelets,” it possessed little gunpowder, given to it by Min Yazagyi. See 
Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 204. 
406 Scott, op. cit., 129. 
407 Nai Thien op. cit., 65; De Brito, however, in a letter sent to the king of Portugal, 
dated 17 October 1605, claimed that the Arakanese forces consisted of seven hundred 
ships and seventeen thousand men: a clear exaggeration. The king of Portugal refers to 
this letter in his letter to the viceroy of India, Dom Francisco d’Almeida. See  Document 
80, 4 January 1608, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. I, 173. 
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general and “all the chief captains of his kingdom.”408 Min Khamaung 
was also accompanied by some people who were potential political 
leaders of Pegu and who were strongly pro-Arakanese, Nan-dá-bayin’s 
sons, Ximicolia and Marequestão (as they were known by the 
Portuguese).409 Further, over one thousand Arakanese army irregulars, 
mostly Mons and Burmans, and a contingent of elephants, accompanied 
the Arakanese force. This major Arakanese military force planned to first 
stop at the Arakanese vassal of Chismim and then move on to take 
Syriam.410 At first, De Brito doubted his ability to defend himself 
against such a powerful host. He thus decided to escape and had his 
ships armed with cannon and supplied with great stores of ammunition. 
After some reconsideration, however, De Brito decided to stay and 
fight.411  
 
Min Khamaung’s Failed Invasion 
 
To prevent the juncture of the forces of Arakan and Toungoo, De Brito 
sent Bartholomew Ferreyra and a naval force.412  The Portuguese 
surprised an advance squadron of ten Arakanese ships, sent ahead by 
Min Khamaung, off the cape of Negrais. After capturing this advance 
squadron, including much Arakanese artillery and munitions, the 
Portuguese squadron waited near the island of Caça for the remainder of 
Min Khamaung’s force. Min Khamaung soon learned of the Portuguese 
deployment and he gathered his scattered ships together and organized 
two tight formations. The Arakanese retreated and counterattacked three 
times. Since the Portuguese ships were much larger and better armed 
than the small Arakanese jalias, the Portuguese easily destroyed many of 
them from a distance. Soon, the Portuguese had killed over one 
thousand Arakanese and captured five hundred others. Taking 
advantage of the deeper draught of the Portuguese ships, Min Khamaung 
had his fleet pull up close to the shore and retreated beyond the reach of 
Portuguese guns. The Arakanese also damaged the Portuguese ships, 
which returned to Syriam to make repairs.413 The Arakanese then went 
to Chismim414  to reassemble their forces.415  
                                                          
408 Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 211. 
409 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 136. 
410 Ibid., vol. I, 137. 
411 Nai Thien, op. cit., 65. 
412 Damrong, op. cit., 206. 
413 Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 212. 
414 This is another name for Bassein, Lower Burma’s western port. 
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Once Min Khamaung’s fleet entered the river, however, many of 
his ships became caught on sandbanks. Min Khamaung’s fleet made 
repairs, which gave the Portuguese four days in which to prepare for an 
attack upon the Arakanese fleet as it passed Syriam.416 The Portuguese 
fleet took up positions around the point of Degu, less than a mile from 
Syriam.417  On 28 January 1605, the Arakanese fleet passing Syriam 
was caught by a Portuguese fleet of seven ships, and many smaller 
boats, under Paul del Rego Pinnero.  The Portuguese force was soon 
supplemented by the timely arrival of two ships which returned from a 
raiding mission near Martaban.418  The battle began to turn against the 
Arakanese and Min Khamaung, in retreat up river, accidentally took to a 
side-stream. Being thus cornered, the prince abandoned his fleet and 
over one thousand dead and fled overland.419 The Portuguese captured 
the abandoned Arakanese navy and its artillery, while the Arakanese 
force, which still amounted to three thousand men, including nine 
hundred musketeers, split up.420  Some of Min Khamaung’s men tried 
to make it back to Arakan on foot, while others fled to Prome and 
Toungoo. Others, “driven by hunger and the many other hardships which 
they had to suffer” surrendered to the Portuguese. Soon, out of Min 
Khamaung’s original force, only a few thousand were left.421   
 
The Portuguese Capture of Chismim and Min Khamaung 
 
While Min Khamaung’s forces took refuge in the forests, the Portuguese 
determined to take the undermanned city of Chismim, a vassal of 
Arakan. Paulo do Rego was sent with a major Portuguese force and he 
soon took it, as well as many prisoners, including Binnya Dala’s wife.422 
The city was sacked and everything which could be taken onto the 
Portuguese ships was taken as booty. While Paulo do Rego’s men were 
                                                                                                                                                               
415 Estimates of the size of Min Khamaung’s force vary. Damrong has put it at 4,000 
men, while it was thought to be about 17,000 men by the Portuguese government. See 
Damrong, op. cit., 206; Document 60, 4 January 1608, letter from the king of Portugal to 
the viceroy of Goa, Dom Francisco d’Almeida, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. I, 173. 
416 Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 213. 
417 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 138. 
418 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 132-3; Bocarro, op. cit., 138. 
419 Ibid., vol. III, 132-133. 
420 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 138. 
421 Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 212-3. 
422 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 132-133; Chismim remains in the possession of 
the Portuguese and forms the western base for De Brito’s “kingdom.” See Nai Thein, op. 
cit., 67. 
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loading the booty, Philip de Brito’s force, including fourteen jalias with 
sixty Portuguese and two hundred Mons, arrived in pursuit of Min 
Khamaung’s men. There, Philip de Brito received information regarding 
the whereabouts of Min Khamaung and subsequently resumed his 
search for the Arakanese prince.423  
De Brito called a council of his captains to decide what to do when 
they reached the vicinity of Min Khamaung’s refuge. While De Brito 
argued for caution, Dom Francisco de Moura, one of his captains, argued 
that the prince should be taken immediately. De Brito agreed and placed 
De Moura in charge of the assault force. De Moura was not entirely 
reckless and he had a Mon, called Chimitoto, and seven other Mons 
climb into some trees to watch for Min Khamaung, while De Moura and 
the rest of his force would lie in wait for the Arakanese force. The Mons 
captured a few of the Arakanese and from them De Moura knew the 
position of Min Khamaung. De Moura then attacked the Arakanese force, 
consisting of thirty-one hundred regular footsoldiers and nine hundred 
musketeers. The Mons in De Moura’s force attacked first, followed by the 
Portuguese; the Arakanese were taken by surprise.424 In the battle, 
Chimitoto, though wounded himself, slashed Min Khamaung in the face 
and captured him. Min Khamaung, wounded and defeated, was handed 
over to De Moura.425  In an attempt to rescue Min Khamaung, two 
thousand men of the king of Prome attacked but were repulsed.426 Min 
Khamaung realized that there was not much more he could do and 
offered to order an end to the fighting and his personal good behavior as 
a captive in exchange for the safety of his wives who had accompanied 
him. De Moura agreed, and the prince ordered his men to stop their 
attacks. De Moura and a Mon took Min Khamaung by the hand to De 
Brito.427  
In his defeat, however, Min Khamaung showed himself to be a 
natural and popular leader of his men. When his men saw him captured 
and being taken on the Portuguese ships, they dropped their weapons 
and loyally surrendered as well “to follow him a prisoner, as they had 
followed him in liberty.”428  De Brito saw Min Khamaung’s natural 
leadership abilities and treated his prisoner with a great deal of respect 
                                                          
423 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 139-140; Fariah y Sousa, op. cit.,  vol. III, 133. 
424 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 140-1. 
425 Ibid., vol. I, 142. 
426 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit.,  vol. III, 133; Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 142. 
427 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 142. 
428 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 133-4.  
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and care.429  The Portuguese now had thousands of Arakanese 
prisoners, as well as the crown prince, a bastard son of the king of 
Prome, and the captain-general of the Arakanese army. Further, the 
Portuguese captured over one thousand pieces of artillery.430 Nat-shin-
naung, the upayaza  of Toungoo, had not gotten further than Macao 
(Nan-dá-bayin’s old fortress) when he heard of what befell the Arakanese 
fleet.  Since there was nothing that he could do, Nat-shin-naung decided 
to wait at Macao for “further developments.”431  
De Brito’s fair treatment of Min Khamaung helped him to win 
further support from Mons: 
 
Nicote may...be a President to all Men, how to use their victories; for 
he not forgetting he had been a slave to the Prince now his Prisoner, 
served him with the same respect now, as he had done then. He 
watched him sleeping, holding his Buskins in his Hands with Arms 
across, a Ceremony used by the meanest with their Kings in those 
Parts, and himself attended him upon all Occasions. This generosity 
may well equal him with great Men, and purchased him together 
with other the like Proceedings, the Name of Changa, 
which...signifies Good Man.432 
 
De Brito, however, put Min Khamaung’s presence in Syriam to its 
greatest use as propaganda. Finding the fortress at Syriam in the charge 
of Dom Martin Affonso de Castro, who had brought three more ships 
from Goa to help supplement De Brito’s forces, De Brito was received 
with “great festivities.” Min Khamaung, his important prisoner, was 
brought into the fortress in grand style by being carried on a gilded 
throne, with young maids who were given to him to fulfill his every 
pleasure.433  By doing this, Philip de Brito probably wanted to make his 
victory appear even more glorious: while previous Portuguese victories 
had left Arakanese seamen and possibly Arakanese captains as captives 
of the Portuguese, Philip de Brito’s forces were now defeating and 
capturing princes, admirals, generals and other major military leaders of 
the Arakanese kingdom.  
But the continual wars with Arakan had taken their toll: De Brito 
informed the king of Portugal that he was unable to fulfill his promise of 
bringing the renegade Portuguese in Bengala back under the sway of 
                                                          
429 Ibid. 
430 Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 212-4. 
431 Nai Thien, op. cit., 66. 
432 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol III, 133-134. 
433 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 143. 
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Goa. Further, De Brito was forced to make excuses for the low profits 
earned by the feitoria at Syriam; he blamed the continual wars and the 
fact that the feitoria was very new and had not had sufficient time to 
make itself an attractive port of call. The solution which De Brito 
proposed was for the king of Portugal to forbid traders from going to 
Tenasserim, Martaban, Tavoy, and the island of Junkceylon, so that they 
would come to Syriam instead.434  
Min Yazagyi, practically alone in Mrauk-U among much less 
capable Arakanese leaders, realized that he needed Min Khamaung to 
help him keep his kingdom together. Min Yazagyi thus decided to 
negotiate with De Brito, and ask for Min Khamaung’s release. Min 
Yazagyi, however, seems to have doubted De Brito’s generosity in future 
negotiations for the release of his son, and instead Min Yazagyi asked the 
viceroy  of India, Dom Frei Aleixo de Meneses, to intercede on the behalf 
of Min Khamaung. When the viceroy of Goa heard that De Brito had 
captured Min Khamaung, he demanded that De Brito release the prince 
without ransom or anything else except for peace and the use of the 
fortress as a post for the soldiers of the king of Portugal.435 De Meneses 
probably wanted the conditions of the release of Min Khamaung to be as 
light as possible for the Arakanese since Portuguese trade with Arakan 
was growing despite the continual war between De Brito and Min Yazagyi 
in Lower Burma. As Scott explains, the viceroy took this position because 
“[t]here was not a little Portuguese trade with Arakan.”436 De Brito, 
however, was not inclined to surrender Min Khamaung to Min Yazagyi 
without forcing Arakan to pay a huge ransom. De Brito demanded fifty 
thousand cruzados despite the viceroy’s orders, “pretending that it was 
the Charge of the Fleet the King had obliged him to fit out.”  
For over a year, the negotiation teams of Arakan and Syriam 
haggled over technicalities, and different offers and counteroffers were 
made. At first, Min Yazagyi was willing to pay a smaller ransom without 
taking an oath to maintain peaceful relations with De Brito. Later, Min 
Yazagyi offered to transfer control of the lands of Ugila, neighboring 
Chittagong, to De Brito as well as a small ransom.437  Soon, however, 
Min Yazagyi had second thoughts about paying any ransom at all and De 
Brito’s refusal to proceed with the release of his son as the viceroy had 
                                                          
434 Document 60, 4 January 1608, letter from the king of Portugal to the viceroy of 
Goa, Dom Francisco d’Almeida, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. I, 174-5. 
435 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 144. 
436 Scott, op. cit., 129. 
437 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 144. 
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promised offended Min Yazagyi,438 who now gathered another invasion 
force to send against Syriam.439  
While Minyazagyi was fitting out the new expedition, a storm 
developed over Mrauk-U, during which lightning struck Min Yazagyi’s 
royal palace, the white elephant’s stall, and several important temples. 
Min Yazagyi’s Buddhist monks, the talapoins, saw this as an omen and 
they chastised Min Yazagyi for breaking his treaty with De Brito, 
prophetizing Min Yazagyi’s death. Min Yazagyi responded by putting 
thirty of the chief talapoins to death.440  
 
The Battle of Negrais, 31 March 1607 
 
Min Yazagyi planned to personally lead a huge Arakanese fleet: there 
were eight hundred oared ships (galeotas, jalias, etc.) and thirty-five 
hundred pieces of artillery. The crews of the ships reflected the diversity 
of Arakanese mercenaries, consisting of “Moors, Patans, Persians, and 
Malabars.”441  In all, Min Yazagyi gathered more than ten thousand 
men, many of whom were musketeers for this military expedition, and 
was also joined by the forces of the Arakanese dependency, Chocoria. In 
response to reports that Min Yazagyi had begun to amass this fleet, De 
Brito quickly brought together an attack fleet of eight galliots and four 
sanguicels, along with 240 Portuguese and many Mons. Paulo do Rego 
Pinheiro was placed in command of this force. Before the Arakanese fleet 
could leave Arakan, however, Do Rego raided the Arakanese coast, 
burning “every maritime town which he entered, and putting the 
inhabitants to the sword.”442  Using this as bait, Do Rego pulled his 
forces back to the point of Negrais and sat in waiting for the Arakanese 
fleet. When Min Yazagyi’s fleet arrived,443 the Arakanese saw Do Rego 
waiting for them and placed their ships close to shore in a easily 
defensible position: 
 
                                                          
438 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 139; or as Scott explains the “king preferred to 
risk the killing of his son to paying the money.” see Scott, op. cit., 129. 
439 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 139. 
440 De Brito was warned by the king of Prome of Min Yazagyi’s preparations and De 
Brito sent Natal Salerno to Melaka, where the viceroy of Goa had gone temporarily, to get 
help. The viceroy sent De Brito two gales and six navios. See Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. 
cit., 220-1, 224. 
441 Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 225. 
442 Ibid., 226. 
443 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 145; Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 225-6. 
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[The Arakanese] King declined the challenge, and taking shelter 
under the land, placed himself amongst the rocks and sandbanks, a 
position which gave him security whilst it was full of danger for our 
ships.444  
 
Soon, several of Min Yazagyi’s supply ships approached, not realizing 
that the main fleet was in hiding, and the Portuguese attacked them. A 
favorite of Min Yazagyi, Captain Maruja, led some jalias out of hiding to 
save the supply ships, but was killed in the process.445  
On 31 March 1607, Min Yazagyi decided to begin a formal battle 
with the Portuguese. Although Min Yazagyi ordered his fleet to attack at 
2 p.m., a terrible rainstorm delayed the attack until 4 p.m. The 
Portuguese, however, realized that their small numbers were no match 
for the Arakanese fleet in an open, traditional  battle, since “the very sea 
seemed to be hidden by the multitude of the King’s ships.” Instead, Paulo 
Do Rego turned the bulky size of his otherwise fast ships to his 
advantage: the Portuguese  drove through the Arakanese ships, firing 
and ramming as they went: 
 
...they assailed the enemy with the utmost impetuosity. Flinging 
themselves on that forest of ships, they penetrated it from van to 
rear, dealing destruction as they went. There was nothing which 
came in their way that they did not destroy, and many of the King’s 
galliots were left burning, or stranded, or sinking...Finding they had 
reached the rear of the enemy’s fleet, our ships turned about and 
renewed the attack with the same vigour as before, passing through 
the midst of the King’s ships and destroying all that lay in their 
path...446  
 
The Portuguese ceased their attack at 10 p.m., because Paulo Do Rego 
thought that it was unwise to continue the battle to long after nightfall. 
The Battle of Negrais left the Arakanese fleet in wreckage: large numbers 
of jalias and other light vessels were destroyed, and of Min Yazagyi’s 
larger ships, four of the large galliots were sunk, three were on fire, and 
fourteen others had run aground. Min Yazagyi’s naval command was 
nearly wiped out, with his chief admiral, the chief commander of his 
Islamic mercenaries, and many of his best captains all dead. Further, 
                                                          
444 Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 225-6. 
445 Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit.,  226. 
446 Ibid., 227. 
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eighteen hundred of Min Yazagyi’s naval personnel were dead and two 
thousand others were wounded.447  
Min Yazagyi was determined, however, to wipe out the Portuguese. 
Within six days he reassembled much of his fleet and repaired much of 
the damage done in the second battle of Negrais.448  At the same time, 
Min Yazagyi persuaded the king of Toungoo to besiege Syriam by land 
and to block up the port with forces,449  under the command of the king 
of Toungoo’s son, Maha Upayaza Nat-shin-naung.450  Min Yazagyi’s 
portion of the fleet was divided into four squadrons to attack the 
Portuguese fleet in port.451 Paulo do Rego was sent out with eighty ships 
to meet the Arakanese and Toungoo force at the point of Degu.452 The 
Arakanese fleet, however, had already reached that point and Do Rego 
approached so quickly that he found himself surrounded by the 
Arakanese. Further, his ship lodged on some submerged piles and could 
not escape as the Arakanese and Toungoos  “from every side bombarded 
[the] ship with grenades and canisters of gunpowder.” Since Do Rego’s 
ship was also the magazine for the Portuguese fleet, it carried a great 
quantity of gunpowder on board, which now caught fire. A Portuguese 
captain who had come to Do Rego’s aid, the Catholic priest Natal 
Salerno, Do Rego, Do Rego’s ship, and all of his men were all killed or 
destroyed by the explosion.453 
 
The Second Siege of Syriam 
 
The Portuguese were devastated by what happened to Do Rego, and the 
Portuguese fleet, without its great admiral, retreated back to Syriam to 
be repaired. In port, however, the Portuguese ships took on water as they 
were all “badly damaged by bombards,” from the Arakanese and the 
Toungoos. Important men fell on both sides, including Min Yazagyi’s 
vassal, the bayin of Chocoria. But the condition of the Portuguese 
defenders, with the fortress of Syriam effectively blockaded, the 
Portuguese fleet nearly destroyed, and the large numbers of Portuguese 
dead, seemed to indicate to the Arakanese and the Toungoos that the 
                                                          
447 Ibid., 227-8. 
448 Ibid 
449 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 139. 
450 Damrong, op. cit., 206; Nai Thien, op. cit., 66. 
451 Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 228. 
452 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 139; Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 145. 
453 Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 229; Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 145. 
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Portuguese were finished.454 Soon, Syriam was surrounded by land as 
well as by sea, with fewer than two hundred Portuguese and three 
thousand Mon defenders.455  
Min Yazagyi sent a representative to ask De Brito to come out of 
the fort and seek terms with Min Yazagyi in person. Min Yazagyi 
promised that De Brito would be well-treated, in consideration of the 
good treatment which Min Khamaung had received as a prisoner of De 
Brito. Min Khamaung urged De Brito to accept Min Yazagyi’s offer, since 
Paulo Do Rego was dead and the Portuguese situation was tenuous. Min 
Khamaung also promised that “he himself would intercede for him, in 
return for the kind treatment he had received.” In response to Min 
Yazagyi’s offer, De Brito insulted Min Yazagyi: 
 
To the King he replied that his promises of peace were only made to 
be broken...of the coming of the Princes of Tangu he made no 
account, for experience had taught him that their forces, like those 
of the King himself, were of little worth; that he would be only too 
pleased if he would summon other friendly kings to his aid, so that 
there might be some credit in holding the fortress, within which, he 
said, he had every expectation of entertaining His Majesty, as on a 
previous occasion he had entertained his son.456  
 
Min Yazagyi was furious. He swore his generals to an oath by 
which they would kill De Brito or die themselves. The Arakanese now 
adopted a policy of continuous attacks on the Portuguese fleet and the 
fortress of Syriam in order to wipe out the Portuguese by attrition. After 
three more Portuguese ships had been destroyed, De Brito realized what 
was happening and had all the remaining Portuguese ships pulled up 
onto the shore and added the crews to his land forces, making 
“preparations to meet the enemy henceforward in the field.” Min Yazagyi 
landed many of his men on shore as well, but kept the Arakanese fleet 
operational. While Arakanese and Toungoo land forces made continued 
assaults on the fortress at Syriam, Min Yazagyi’s fleet bombarded the 
Portuguese positions. For a month, the fighting was back and forth.457   
After two months, the siege had drained Syriam of supplies and 
the defenders were threatened by hunger. The Mons in Syriam were 
losing hope of winning against the Arakanese and De Brito realized that 
he would have to do something before he faced a desertion en masse of 
                                                          
454 Ibid 
455 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 146. 
456 Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 232. 
457 Ibid., 232-3.  
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his Mon auxiliaries. De Brito tried a new strategy and had all the 
remaining supplies in Syriam brought out for a great feast, which he held 
within the sight of several Arakanese prisoners. By doing this, De Brito 
made it seem as if the siege had no effect and that the Portuguese were 
well-prepared to hold out for several more months. And after that he sent 
the same Arakanese prisoners with a letter to Min Yazagyi. In the letter 
De Brito taunted Min Yazagyi: 
 
Very high and powerful king of Arakan, lord of the two white 
elephants. Do not toil in this siege because I expect by God to have 
you in this fortress as I have the prince your son. Your highness 
says to me that many people will die purely from hunger...look here 
at the supply to your ladies; since they have been captured...they 
are very fat and beautiful. And because I hope by God that soon 
your highness will be as your son, I will say nothing else.458  
 
This letter was read in front of the king and his captains and Min Yazagyi 
was so angered that he called De Brito a “son of a whore” and 
commanded his officers to “bring him to me, so that I can give him the 
punishment that he deserves.”459  While the officers planned the day 
and hour to take the fortress, Min Yazagyi personally questioned the 
Arakanese captives whom De Brito had dispatched with the letter. Min 
Yazagyi was most concerned with De Brito’s food supply and the state of 
the fortress. The released captives, however, informed the probably 
greatly disappointed Min Yazagyi that De Brito could hold out for 
possibly five more months, as De Brito hoped they would say. Min 
Yazagyi then left the siege under the command of his subordinates and 
left to spend the rainy season in Arakan, hoping that Syriam would fall 
to famine by the time he returned.460  
The king of Toungoo, however, misunderstood Min Yazagyi’s 
plans, and believed that the Arakanese were going to leave him alone to 
continue the siege. Thus, after a feint attack against the Portuguese 
fortress on 9 May 1607, the Toungoo force raised camp and secretly 
returned to Toungoo. The Mon defenders of Syriam happily went out 
from the fortress, surveyed the abandoned Toungoo camp and defense-
lines, and reported to De Brito that the Toungoos were gone. De Brito 
immediately had his men gather the abandoned food supplies and other 
                                                          
458 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 146-7. 
459 Ibid, vol. I, 147. 
460 Ibid 
 
 
 
SOAS BULLETIN OF BURMA RESEARCH 
 
SBBR 3.2 (AUTUMN 2005):974-1145 
 
1093
spoils, including artillery, that the Toungoo force was not able to bring 
with it.461   
Further De Brito realized that this was an opportunity to surprise 
the remaining  Arakanese forces, which had not been informed of the 
king of Toungoo’s retreat. A large number of Portuguese and Mons were 
sent out of Syriam, led by flags, fifes, and drums along the sides of the 
river, while other forces were deployed on the river, towards the 
Arakanese forces. The Arakanese were surprised by this as well as by the 
lack of any “trace of or signal from” the king of Toungoo.462  Min Yazagyi 
decided, on 10 May 1607, to lift the blockade and negotiate with De 
Brito. Min Yazagyi had previously made the release of Min Khamaung as 
the condition for the lifting of the siege. In his demands, however, Min 
Yazagyi referred to De Brito as his “subject” or literally as his slave. De 
Brito was angered by this and demanded to be addressed as an 
independent king as a condition for his release of Min Khamaung. Min 
Yazagyi and the king of Toungoo agreed to De Brito’s demand, since they 
feared that since De Brito’s son, Simon, was married to the daughter of 
Binnya Dala of Martaban, and since the king of Ayudhya was allied to 
Binnya Dala, that De Brito could count on the armed help of both 
Ayudhya and Martaban. But De Brito was also in no position to continue 
his defenses and agreed to surrender Min Khamaung if Min Yazagyi 
would withdraw and agree to no longer attack Syriam, as well as pay the 
indemnity which De Brito had previously demanded.463  
Once the Arakanese fleet returned home, De Brito had Min 
Khamaung put into a royal jalia and took him to Ranaung island, from 
where Min Khamaung would go to Mrauk-U unattended by Portuguese 
ships. De Brito’s men fired a volley salute as they left Min Khamaung’s 
ship. A stray pellet from the volley, however, killed Min Khamaung’s 
helmsman, which made Min Khamaung very suspicious of De Brito and, 
from then on, Min Khamaung planned De Brito’s annihilation.464 
However, Min Yazagyi had agreed to consider Syriam as an independent 
state, which marks the end of his control over this eastern section of the 
Arakanese empire.  
                                                          
461 Ibid., vol. I, 148; The captured Toungoo artillery likely took their place alongside 
De Brito’s guns cast at Goa and at his own foundry. This was a common practice 
throughout the Estado da India. As Boxer explains, for example, the artillery captured 
from an Achinese fleet in 1630 was redistributed throughout the Estado da India to 
Portuguese ports to supplement their own artillery reserves. See Boxer, “Asian Potentates 
and European Artillery,” 165. 
462 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 147-8. 
463 Nai Thien, op. cit., 66-7. 
464 See Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 144; Payne’s notes to Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 
267f. 
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The second siege of Syriam left all the major powers of Lower 
Burma with depleted military strength. Min Yazagyi was forced to run 
many of his ships aground and abandon them due to lack of men to man 
them. These losses meant that Min Yazagyi returned home with 262 
ships out of the force of twelve hundred with which he had begun his 
attack. Most of the Arakanese artillery had been lost, either in battle, or 
in the mud of Lower Burma. Min Yazagyi had also lost many of his 
Moslem mercenaries, bringing the total Arakanese dead to ten thousand 
men. Toungoo’s losses included Toungoo’s best captains, fifteen hundred 
men, six elephants, and forty horses.465  
The Portuguese were in a desperate position. Almost one hundred 
Portuguese were killed, including ten captains and the admiral Paulo do 
Rego. Large numbers of De Brito’s Mon allies were killed as well. The 
fortress of Syriam was in shambles, “[n]umbers of houses were 
destroyed, and churches, and many were wounded.” Earlier, De Brito, to 
strengthen himself further by alliances, had married Simon, his son by a 
previous wife, to a daughter of the governor of Martaban, Binnya 
Dala.466 Now, however, this and other alliances were in danger if De 
Brito could not show that he was still an important power in Lower 
Burma. First, De Brito built a Portuguese fortress near Pagoda point at 
the Cape of Negrais.467  After quick repair work to the fortress, De Brito 
had the remainder of his fleet put out to sea and the Portuguese combed 
the Bay of Bengal for ships. In one case, when an Islamic trading ship 
“very richly laden” refused to surrender, the Portuguese boarded it and 
killed all on board. After further acts of “piracy,” De Brito’s men felt that 
they had made their presence felt in the region again and brought back a 
large amount of booty to Syriam.468 On 12 January 1608, however, a 
fire burned the entire Portuguese fort to the ground. De Brito himself 
suffered major burns on one of his legs and his wife was almost killed. 
The fire destroyed the accumulated wealth of De Brito’s tiny kingdom: 
                                                          
465 Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 236-7. 
466 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 139-140; it is not clear whether Binnya Dala was 
Thai or Mon. See Scott, op. cit., 130. Payne has suggested that this was the same man 
who had fought De Brito for leadership of the customs-house at Syriam. I think that this 
is probably not the same Binnya Dala. Indeed, it is a title, not a personal name: binnya 
refers to a vassal king, and Dala can refer to the town of Dala or a number of other 
things. The title emerges from time to time throughout Burmese history, leading me to 
believe that it is quite common and that the similarity of names between the Mon leader 
at Syriam and the king of Martaban is simply a coincidence. 
467 See Document 120, 20 February 1610, letter from the king of Portugal to the 
viceroy of Goa, Ruy Lourenço de Tavora, reprinted in the letter of the same viceroy to the 
king, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. I, 355. 
468 Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 237. 
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All the goods and the treasure which were in the fortress perished. 
Houses, churches and their ornaments, provision stores, munitions 
stores--all were destroyed. Apart from these losses, the seriousness 
of which it would be impossible to exaggerate, the fortress was now 
rendered completely untenable.469  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
De Brito was able to win legitimacy as the king of Syriam and was able to 
expand and strengthen both his economic and political hold over Lower 
Burma. But how did De Brito expand his control of Lower Burma in the 
face of strong Arakanese attacks on his position over a four-year period 
and what by what means did he ensure his political, military, and 
economic position at Syriam? Further, what did De Brito’s success, and 
Min Yazagyi’s failure mean to Arakan?  
De Brito was able to win legitimacy just as Ribeyro had: by playing 
a Southeast Asian game. That is, De Brito set himself up as a local leader 
of the Mons and acted as other Mon, and Burmese for that matter, 
leaders did. De Brito did not seek territorial delineation and refused to 
waste men occupying useless territorial positions. Rather, like other 
maritime kingdoms of Lower Burma, De Brito based his strength on 
seapower and the ability to dominate trade and direct it to his power-
base, Syriam. Indeed, De Brito could not have hoped to maintain his 
influence on his own, and he sought marriage alliances and mutual 
defense treaties with other local leaders. Through effective use of 
indigenous models of statecraft, De Brito was able to win the support, 
though not direct control over, local myózas (local administrators). It is 
true, however, that sometime after 1607, De Brito changed his policies, 
began a strong forced Catholicization program and thus alienated his 
Mon subjects and allies, leading to his eventual downfall. But for the 
moment, De Brito truly was a local indigenous-style leader of Lower 
Burma and his influence spread over the eastern Irrawaddy delta. 
What did this mean to Min Yazagyi? For one thing, De Brito’s 
ability to maintain his economic, political and military strength meant 
that Lower Burma was no longer an easy target for Arakanese political 
and economic imperialism. The political and military coalition that 
brought down Nan-dá-bayin and made Pegu a relatively open region for 
Min Yazagyi’s expansion could not be brought together again, especially 
as Ava’s strength began to grow in the north and this threat prevented 
Prome, Toungoo, or even Chiengmai from committing sufficient aid to 
                                                          
469 Ibid., 238.470 Jadu-Nath Sarkar, The History of Bengal: Muslim Period, 1200-
1757, (Patna: Academica Asiatica, 1973):  363. 
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Arakan to crush De Brito. But more importantly, De Brito’s strength, 
based on a strong Portuguese mercenary fleet, supported by thousands 
of Mon troops, and protected by a strong, strategically located fortress, 
meant that Min Yazagyi was simply “throwing men away,” as well as 
creating a terrible drain on the economic resources of Arakan, in his 
repeated assaults. Min Yazagyi too easily allowed less capable men to 
lead his armies, especially when Min Khamaung, his son and possibly 
best military leader, was captured through a chance error and remained 
a prisoner during the two most vital years of the war. As the capable 
captains, crews, and soldiers on which Min Yazagyi’s earlier victories had 
depended were lost at sea or in useless assaults on Syriam, Min Yazagyi 
had to replace them quickly with less well-trained and less capable men. 
Indeed, by the time that Min Khamaung had been captured, it is possible 
that the effects of Arakanese losses under Binnya Dala, and others like 
him, had already taken place. When the decreasing effectiveness of the 
Arakanese armed forces was combined with the temporary loss of Min 
Khamaung, who had organized the brilliant harassment of Naresuan’s 
forces in 1600, the effect was devastating: Min Yazagyi was forced to 
abandon the Irrawaddy delta to De Brito and focus on events beginning 
to take place on his northwestern border. The damage which Min Yazagyi 
had done to his armed forces will be seen more clearly in the events 
taking place here after 1607, as will be shown in the following chapters. 
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Chapter VI 
Sebastião Gonçalves y Tibao, “King” of Sundiva and the Eclipse of 
Arakanese power in Bengal, 1607-1612 
 
[Gonçalves’] infamous career covered a brief period of ten years. 
Gonsalves had the making of a great leader, but his training and 
environments made of him a pirate of the lower type. For unrelieved 
cruelty and treachery his record had hardly any parallel, but with 
better education under more favourable circumstances, he might 
have been a Raleigh or a Drake. 
 
Jadu-Nath Sarkar470  
 
The decline and fall of the maritime state of Arakan must have 
contributed powerfully to [the] liberation of Bengali commerce. 
Contemporary Bengali literature is strewn with echoes of the dread 
produced in southern Bengal by the Maghs of Arakan and their 
allies the Portuguese freebooters. This alliance however was far from 
being smooth...Razagri [Min Yazagyi] feared, with reason, that de 
Brito would use Dianga...to overthrow the Arakan monarchy. He 
therefore attacked Dianga and drove the Portuguese out of it in 
1607. The Portuguese regrouped as an out and out pirate force in 
the island of Sundiva...under ‘king’ Sebastian Gonzales 
Tibao...Mughal expansion into the eastern coastal tracts of 
Noakhali...might have produced an alliance but Tibao preferred 
traitorously to capture the Arakan fleet ... The Sundiva Portuguese 
then raided up to the very walls of Mrohaung. 
 
Ashin Das Gupta and M.N. Pearson471  
 
These quotations indicate a general belief that Gonçalves was both 
of local importance in Arakan and Bengal and was treacherous. But what 
does this “pirate” have to do with the collapse of Min Yazagyi’s power in 
the west (Bengal)? 
In order to understand Gonçalves’ significance to Arakan, it 
should be remembered that while De Brito, by 1607, seemed to have 
succeeded in his venture to control Lower Burma economically, if not 
politically, he still faced the king of Arakan: Min Yazagyi still claimed 
suzerainty over Lower Burma, regardless of overt signs of friendship 
which he showed to De Brito. Arakan still had time to invade, defeat De 
Brito, and reclaim control over Syriam. But Gonçalves would prove to be 
                                                          
471 Ashin Das Gupta and M.N. Pearson (eds.), India and the Indian Ocean 1500-
1800, (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1987): 36. 
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a greater threat to Min Yazagyi than De Brito was. Further, Gonçalves 
would render Min Yazagyi’s stratagems for gaining control of Lower 
Burma defunct. 
Several questions can be asked regarding the rise of Gonçalves 
and how it affected the political climate in Lower Burma. How did 
Gonçalves come to power and why did he become an enemy of Min 
Yazagyi? Was Gonçalves following De Brito’s example, or was he forging a 
new style of leadership which did not follow indigenous traditions of 
political leaders? How did the distraction of Arakanese attention away 
from de Brito affect Arakan’s chances of reclaiming its recently-won 
eastern empire in Pegu? Was Portuguese control over Arakan’s former 
territories’ trade and society increased or at least consolidated? 
 
Arakanese Dianga 
 
While De Brito controlled Syriam, another important trading center, 
Dianga remained under Min Yazagyi’s control. Dianga, as mentioned 
earlier, was the port near Chittagong that Min Bin used to guard his 
northwestern frontier in exchange for trading concessions to the 
Portuguese. The Portuguese here profited from legitimate trade with 
Bengalese ports but often engaged in piracy as well.472 While De Brito’s 
example might seem likely to have influenced the Portuguese at Dianga, 
they made no signs of wishing to rebel against Min Yazagyi and for the 
moment Min Yazagyi made no sign that he feared losing Dianga to the 
Portuguese. 
Min Yazagyi soon had reason to worry, however, and his 
relationship with the Portuguese traders at Dianga changed significantly. 
De Brito decided that in order to govern the lower Irrawaddy River basin 
effectively, he would have to take Dianga from Arakan. This would 
prevent a rival trading base so close to Syriam from preventing his 
absolute control of Lower Burmese trade. De Brito thus hinted to Min 
Yazagyi that he wanted the port, and Min Yazagyi hinted that the 
transfer of control would be acceptable if De Brito officially requested 
it.473  De Brito was then “induced to send a number of Portuguese to 
settle” at Dianga by Min Yazagyi. A naval force was then sent by De Brito 
carrying his son, Marcos de Brito, as his ambassador in order to take 
                                                          
472 Phayre, History of Burma, 173. 
473 Guerreiro, however, seems to be under the impression that Min Yazagyi had 
agreed to transfer Dianga to Portuguese control under the treaty by which Min 
Khamaung was returned and by which Min Yazagyi agreed to recognize De Brito’s 
independence. I have reservations about this. I think that it is perhaps more likely that 
whatever promise Min Yazagyi may have made was misinterpreted by De Brito. See 
Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 220. 
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possession of the port. Some of the Portuguese living at Dianga, however, 
persuaded Min Yazagyi that De Brito intended to steal the kingdom of 
Arakan from him.474  Min Yazagyi summoned De Brito’s son and the 
accompanying Portuguese officers to his court and then killed them. 
Before this slaughter became known to the rest of the Portuguese, Min 
Yazagyi sent some forces to seize the Portuguese ships, which were taken 
and burned.475 
By now, Min Yazagyi had lost all patience with Portuguese tricks 
and, to further ensure that there would be no Portuguese threat to his 
kingdom, he attacked the Portuguese living in Dianga. The seven 
hundred or so Portuguese traders, as well as  their wives and children 
and Catholic priests, were secretly surrounded by Arakanese soldiers 
and then put to “sword and to fire.”476  Some of the Portuguese escaped 
into the woods, and nine or ten ships were able to make for sea.  One of 
the Portuguese who escaped was Sebastião Gonçalves,477 who arrived at 
Dianga from the Megna river with salt for trade just before the Arakanese 
slaughter.478 Gonçalves and the rest of the survivors who had escaped 
in the nine ships became pirates, robbing Arakanese traders and selling 
                                                          
474 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 154; Bocarro, op. cit., vol. II, 431; Fytche, 
however, believes that the King of Arakan had planned to betray De Brito from the 
begining of this episode and that this was simply “the old tale of Asiatic treachery.” See 
Fytche, op. cit., 53. 
475 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 154; Bocarro, op. cit., 432; See Document 120, 
20 February 1610, letter from the king of Portugal to the viceroy of Goa, Ruy Lourenço de 
Tavora, reprinted in the letter of the same viceroy to the king, in Documentos Remettidos, 
vol. I, 348-9. 
476 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. II, 432; Indeed, throughout Arakan, five thousand 
Christians were imprisoned and supposedly treated with “barbarous cruelty.” See 
Guerreiro, Payne trans., op. cit., 220. 
477 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 154; Gonçalves came to Southeast Asia from 
Portugal in 1605, and served as a soldier in Bengal. After a year or so, he saved enough 
money to buy his own boat, which he used to trade along the Bengalese coast. See 
Phayre, History of Burma, 174. J. Talboys Wheeler, however, argues that Gonçalves was 
also a deserter from the Portuguese. See Wheeler, op. cit., 504. I see no reason to disagree 
with either scholar. Indeed, it is quite probable that Gonçalves deserted from Portuguese 
service, considering the short tenure of his service. Bocarro adds further information, 
stating that Gonçalves was a “native of Santo Antonio do Tojal,” in Portugal, “of humble 
parents.” Gonçalves bought his ship with money he had earned as a foreman of some 
salt-ships. Gonçalves seems to have been expanding his trade from salt to other goods, 
for he was carrying cloth for sale in Dianga. See Bocarro, op. cit., vol. II, 431. 
478 Phayre, History of Burma, 174. 
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the booty in the ports of the king of Bacala, who was friendly to these 
Portuguese.479  
 
Dutch-Arakanese Alliance 
 
Min Yazagyi saw that he could not control or even trust the Portuguese 
and had now taken steps to eradicate their power. But De Brito’s earlier 
successes against Arakanese forces seemed to indicate that he was in no 
position to fight the Portuguese upstarts alone. Thus, Min Yazagyi turned 
to the new rising European power in Southeast Asia: the Dutch. 
Min Yazagyi asked the Dutch to trade in his country, hoping to 
“secure their aid,” against De Brito. Min Yazagyi as early as 1607 allowed 
Pieter Willemszoon Verhoeff to enter Arakan with his trade items from 
Masulipatam.480 A further mission was sent by the Dutch under Jan 
Gerritsz Ruyll in the same year.481  In order to make his gestures for an 
alliance more appealing, however, Min Yazagyi gave the Dutch 
permission to trade in neighboring areas over which he claimed 
suzerainty, but which he did not actually control: Bengal and Pegu.482 
As Verhoeff remarked: 
 
So would he give us to wit the aforesaid Castle in Pegu, the island of 
Sundiva, Chittagong, Dianga, or any other places in Bengal, as he 
had given the same previously to the Portuguese.483  
 
Verhoeff, greeted these offers of economic opportunities and suggested to 
the V.O.C. that trade factories should be set up in Pegu.484 Min 
Yazagyi’s negotiations with the Dutch worried the Portuguese, especially 
since it was believed in Lisbon that the transfer of Chittagong and 
Sundiva to the Dutch had already been accomplished.485  
Min Yazagyi was soon disappointed. The V.O.C. did set up a 
factory at Mrauk-U, but did not take advantage of the offer to trade in 
                                                          
479 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 155. 
480 D. W. Davies, A Primer of Dutch Seventeenth Century Overseas Trade. (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1961): 86. 
481 Hall, A History of Southeast Asia, 416. 
482 Davies, op. cit., 86. 
483 De Jonge, Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost-Indie (1595-1610), III, 
287-91, cited in Hall, A History of Southeast Asia, 416. 
484 Davies, op. cit., 86. 
485 See Document 120, 20 February 1610, letter from the king of Portugal to the 
viceroy of Goa, Ruy Lourenço de Tavora, reprinted in the letter of the same viceroy to the 
king, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. I, 347-9. 
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Pegu. This was not what Min Yazagyi wanted: he desperately wanted to 
shake De Brito’s control of Syriam and was willing to risk further 
European occupation of Syriam as long as it was not held by the 
Portuguese. Min Yazagyi intensified his offer by “present[ing]” San Iago 
(Syriam) to the Dutch, even though it was held by the Portuguese under 
Philip de Brito. Still, the Dutch made no efforts to trade in Pegu until 
1635.486 Min Yazagyi could thus only depend upon Dutch help against 
the Portuguese in Arakan: his claims to hold suzerainty over Lower 
Burma remained simply claims. 
 
The Reestablishment of Arakan’s Portuguese on Sundiva   
 
One of those who died at Dianga was Manuel de Mattos, commander of 
Dianga, who was also the “Lord of Sundiva,” since the death of Domingos 
Carvalho. Mattos had left Sundiva, as well as his young son, under the 
protection of Pero Gomes.487 Pero Gomes seems to have been a very 
poor administrator, since the king of Portugal refers to him as a “vile 
man of less substance than that of the conquistadores.” Gomes was of 
such a poor reputation that the king of Portugal suggested to the viceroy 
of India, Dom Francisco d’Almeida, that he should consider taking over 
direct administration of Sundiva if Mattos  continued to leave Gomes in a 
position of authority.488 When Fateh Khan, a Moslem employed by the 
Portuguese, heard of Mattos’ death, however, he decided to make himself 
the new lord of Sundiva and usurped power from the unpopular Pero 
Gomes. To guarantee his control, Fateh Khan had all of the thirty 
Portuguese traders on Sundiva, as well as their families, killed. All of the 
indigenous Christians and their wives and children were killed as well. 
Fateh Khan then gathered his “Moors” and Patanis and created his own 
fleet of forty ships, which he maintained with the revenue of the 
prosperous island.489  
Fateh Khan felt that he had a mission and displayed it 
prominently as an inscription on his flag: “Fateh Khan, by the grace of 
God, Lord of Sandwip, shedder of Christian blood and destroyer of the 
                                                          
486 Davies, op. cit., 86. 
487 Campos, op. cit., 82. 
488 The king also suggested that Sundiva could be used as a base to bring the 
scattered Portuguese renegades in Bengal back under Goa’s control, presumably with the 
belief that De Brito in Syriam was not able to keep his promise to do the same. See 
Document 60, 4 January 1608, letter from the king of Portugal to the viceroy of India, 
Dom Francisco d’Almeida, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. I, 176. 
489 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 155-156; Bocarro, op. cit., 432; Document 120, 
20 February 1610, letter from the king of Portugal to the viceroy of India, Ruy Louenço de 
Tavora, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. I, 347-8. 
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Portuguese nation.”490  Fateh Khan determined to wipe out Gonçalves’ 
Portuguese as well.491 Fateh Khan’s fleet circled the area looking for 
Gonçalves and the other survivors of the Dianga massacre. Finally, Fateh 
Khan found the Portuguese on Dakhin Shahbazpur island (or Deccan 
Shabazpore), which belonged to the king of Bacala, dividing the wealth 
they had captured in a year or so of local piracy.492  The Portuguese 
were in the midst of a heated debate over the division of spoils, with the 
primary contenders being Gonçalves and one of his subordinate jalia 
commanders, Sebastião Pinto. Sebastião Pinto decided to break away 
from the rest of the Portuguese and began to leave. As Fateh Khan was 
about to surprise the Portuguese, then, Pinto saw Fateh Khan’s forces 
and fired his guns at it. This noise of this bombardment warned the rest 
of Gonçalves’ men.493  Gonçalves attacked and the two forces fought 
throughout the night. Gonçalves’ forces consisted of ten ships and eighty 
Portuguese against Fateh Khan’s forty ships and eight hundred men.494 
The two forces fought until morning revealed that Fateh Khan was dead 
and his entire force either destroyed or captured.495 We are not told how 
the Portuguese managed to achieve this amazing victory, but I suspect 
that better arms and the fact that Fateh Khan’s men were inexperienced 
in battle, while Gonçalves’ men were professional ‘warriors’ may have 
gone a long way to ‘tip the scales’ in their favor. 
The Portuguese decided to take Fateh Khan’s leaderless domain, 
the island of Sundiva. However, Philip de Brito, in a letter to the king of 
Portugal had suggested that he should seize control of the region and 
make a fortress at Chittagong which would allow him to bring the 
Portuguese desperados in Bengala back under Goa’s control, albeit 
indirect. Further, De Brito would set up a feitoria at Chittagong and 
thereby assume control over the trade of the northeastern section of the 
Bay of Bengal. Gonçalves, however, was moving more quickly than the 
correspondence between Syriam and Lisbon.496  To further his own 
plans, Gonçalves now had additional Portuguese recruits from Bengala 
and other ports, many of them being refugees from Min Yazagyi’s 
pogroms. Further, Gonçalves persuaded the king of Bacala to join in the 
                                                          
490 Campos, op. cit., 82. 
491 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 155-156. 
492 Campos, op. cit., 82. 
493 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. II, 433. 
494 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 155-156. 
495 Campos, op. cit., 82. 
496 Document 120, 20 February 1610, letter from the king of Portugal to the viceroy 
of Goa, Ruy Lourenço de Tavora, Documentos Remettidos, vol. I, 349-50. 
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conquest, promising that “he would give him half the revenue of the 
island if he assisted him to conquer it.” By March 1609, Gonçalves had 
over forty jalias, a few oared navios, and four hundred Portuguese as well 
as a contingent of men and two hundred horses from the king of 
Bacala.497  
The Moslem fortress at Sundiva was well-prepared for defense by 
Fateh Khan’s brother. But Sundiva was a large island and the Moslems 
had no way of knowing at which point Gonçalves’ men would invade. 
Fateh Khan’s brother thus waited with a large number of men outside of 
the fortress, prepared to meet the Portuguese at the beaches as soon as 
the Portuguese ships appeared at sea. When the Portuguese made a 
beachhead and disembarked the Moslems quickly attacked them.498 
The Moslems fought determinedly, since they “expected no quarter,”499 
but they were forced back by the Portuguese landing, and fled to their 
fort, three leagues further inland. The Portuguese laid siege to the fort 
but, after two months, they were running low on supplies and 
ammunition which they could not bring up from their ships. The reason 
for this failure to maintain a sufficient supply line from the shore to the 
siege lines was that while the Moslems inside of the fortress made daily 
sallies outside and harried the besiegers, one thousand indigenous 
soldiers and two hundred Patani cavalry were lying in wait in the three 
league-long area between Gonçalves’ men and his ships. As the besiegers 
became the besieged in this manner, the Portuguese were hemmed in 
with the few remaining supplies they had brought with them. Further, 
noting the desperate Portuguese situation, the Moslem forces inside and 
outside of the fortress became more courageous.500  
The Portuguese were released from the impending danger of a 
final, massive counterattack against both their front and their rear, 
which they would probably lose, by Gaspar de Pina. Pina was a 
Castillian, the captain of some Portuguese mercenaries who served who 
served in the armies of some indigenous kings, and arrived at the port in 
his navio and some other ships. Pina’s forces included thirty musketeers 
as well as other soldiers, and was well-prepared for the skirmish with the 
Moslems which ensued when he and his men disembarked on shore at 
night. Pina and fifty of his men, including some of his mariners, marched 
the three leagues to Gonçalves’ siege lines, bringing the supplies to the 
                                                          
497 Ibid; Bocarro, op. cit., vol. II, 435. 
498 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. II, 436. 
499 Charles Stewart, 1813, The History of Bengal from the First Mohammedan 
Invasion until the Virtual Conquest of that Countrey by the English, a.d. 1757, (Delhi: 
Oriental Publishers, 1971): 208. 
500 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. II, 436. 
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Portuguese. To make his forces seem more considerable, Pina had his 
men carry numerous banners and torches and had them play trumpets 
and tambourines,501 which made the “moors” believe that the 
Portuguese were being joined by an even greater force. Gonçalves’ and 
Pina’s men subsequently overran the fort and killed all of the defenders, 
who numbered over one thousand.502  
Before Fateh Khan’s coup, the local inhabitants of Sundiva had 
lived under the Portuguese and they now begrudgingly accepted 
Gonçalves as their new leader. Gonçalves promised that he would not 
hurt any of them or their property, provided that they bring all of  the 
remaining Moslems on the island to him. When the local population 
returned with over one thousand captured Moslems, Gonçalves’ men 
beheaded them.503 Gonçalves thus became the independent lord of 
Sundiva, “an absolute Lord independent of any Prince, and his Orders 
had the force of Laws.”504 In other words, Gonçalves became the “king” 
of Sundiva island.505 “King” Gonçalves at first divided the land of 
Sundiva amongst his men as spoils, but subsequently took it back. 
Further, instead of giving the king of Bacala the promised half of the 
island’s revenues, Gonçalves attacked him and won.506 Further, 
Campos claims that Gonçalves also possessed “lands on the coast of 
Arakan.”507  
Gonçalves now commanded a sizable army and navy. His army 
included over one thousand Portuguese, two thousand indigenous 
troops, and a two-hundred-man cavalry. Gonçalves’ navy was just as 
considerable: it consisted of twenty oared navios, with metal-plated bows, 
which were armed with big falcões; seventy war jalias, not including the 
two hundred and fifty jalias and barges used by merchants; three big, 
oared galeotas,  each one with two twenty-five pound guns, and each one 
having mounted falcões.508  Gonçalves subsequently built a feitoria 
which served as the official source of revenue for the island (another 
source was piracy). Gonçalves also seemed to be the rising power in the 
region and many other neighboring rulers sought alliances with him. 
Gonçalves expanded his control by seizing the islands of Xavapur 
                                                          
501 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. II, 436-7. 
502 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 156-157. 
503 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. II, 437. 
504 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 156-157. 
505 Hall, Europe and Burma, 37. 
506 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 157. 
507 Campos, op. cit., 84. 
508 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. I, 138. 
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(Dakhin Shahbazpur?) and  Patelbanga from the king of Bacala and 
lands from other rulers as well.509 Gonçalves and his Portuguese had 
thus repeated what Ribeyro and De Brito had done at Syriam: Min 
Yazagyi was now threatened by rebellious Portuguese in the west as well 
as in the east. Fortunately for Min Yazagyi, however, the Portuguese at 
Sundiva and at Syriam would probably make no actions in concert 
against Arakan, since Gonçalves refused to recognize De Brito as his 
overlord as ordered by Goa and this fostered a hostility between these 
two Portuguese that was never overcome.510  
 
Anaporam’s Revolt 
 
Gonçalves soon became an even greater threat to Arakan than Min 
Yazagyi expected. Sundiva, for example, was geographically very close to 
Chittagong, much closer to Chittagong than Mrauk-U or even Ramu was. 
Given the traditional autonomy of Chittagong, and the tendency of the 
myozas there to be at odds with the king at Mrauk-U, Gonçalves had 
ample opportunity to attempt to destabilize Arakan politically. An 
occasion for this political intervention came in 1609, when Min Yazagyi 
and the governor of Chittagong, Anaporam, had a disagreement. 
Supposedly, Minyazagyi demanded that Anaporam give him an elephant 
that Anaporam possessed, which was said to be the greatest in all of 
Arakan. Anaporam refused to give the elephant up and Min Yazagyi, 
probably having made the demand in the first place as a test of 
Anaporam’s loyalty, sent an army against Chittagong. Anaporam allied 
himself to Gonçalves, who demanded Anaporam’s sister in return as his 
wife. With the terms of alliance agreed upon, Gonçalves and Anaporam 
attacked the Arakanese army unsuccessfully.511  With the Arakanese 
quickly approaching Chittagong, Gonçalves and De Brito consulted on 
how to manage the situation and it was decided to bring Anaporam and 
                                                          
509 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 158; These two islands were probably more of 
strategic value than anything else. As Stewart explains, “[T]heir only productions [are] 
rice and salt; and their climate is supposed to be unfavourable to European 
constitutions.” See Stewart, op. cit., 27f. Perhaps Stewart was only refering to Patelbanga, 
for Manrique has referred to Xavapur as containing “a large number of throny fruits, 
mainly limes of various species and of enormous size, which owing to the fertility of the 
soil are independent of the care of skilled gardeners and horticulturalists.” Indeed Luard 
notes in 1927, that the island had 400 villages and 270,000 inhabitants. See Manrique, 
op. cit., vol. I, 394f-395. 
510 Document 352, 15 March 1613, letter from the king of Portugal to the viceroy of 
India, Dom Jeronymo de Azevedo, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. II, 391. 
511 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 158. 
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his family back to Sundiva.512 Anaporam brought his fortune, his 
elephants, and his family to Sundiva, where he lived as an exile until his 
death, “not without suspicion of poison,” shortly afterward.513 
This brief attempt at intervening directly in Arakan was 
unsuccessful, but it was of major importance. Min Yazagyi faced a new 
threat on his northwestern border, possibly a greater threat than De 
Brito posed in Pegu. Min Yazagyi could also no longer depend upon his 
myozas for absolute loyalty, since they could depend upon Gonçalves’ 
support if they chose to rebel against central Arakanese control. Further, 
Arakanese military resources now had to be committed increasingly to 
defense rather than expansion, and even if Min Yazagyi chose to conduct 
any military campaigns at home or abroad he had to find some way to 
neutralize the threat posed by Sundiva. Gonçalves also had a ‘trump 
card’ which he might play given the right situation: he possessed a queen 
of the Arakanese royal house, the widow of Anaporam, whom he was now 
trying to marry to his brother, Antonio Tibao.514 Gonçalves was soon 
able to play this ‘trump card,’ due to problems which Min Yazagyi was 
having on his border with Bengal. 
 
The Sundiva-Arakanese Alliance 
 
The Mughal governor of Bengal, Sheikh Islam Khan, however, was 
attempting to conquer the Kingdom of Balua, the territory east of the 
Megna river. Since this kingdom was close to Sundiva, Min Yazagyi 
convinced Gonçalves to join him in a military campaign against the 
Mughals, who were threatening them both. Min Yazagyi gathered eighty 
thousand men, mostly musketeers, ten thousand Mon swordsmen,  and 
seven hundred castled elephants. In return for the return of Anaporam’s 
widow, Min Yazagyi also sent two hundred ships with naval personnel 
amounting to four thousand men to join Gonçalves’ fleet, under the 
supreme command of Gonçalves. The plan of action was that Gonçalves 
would hold off the Mughals until Min Yazagyi could get there. Gonçalves 
and Min Yazagyi would then divide the kingdom of Balua between them. 
                                                          
512 See Document 120, 29 December 1610, letter from the  viceroy of Goa, Ruy 
Lourenço de Tavora, to the king of Portugal, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. I, 356. 
513 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 158-9; Bocarro seems to believe that Gonçalves 
may have been the culprit since he had a great motive. In the case of Anaporam’s death, 
for example, Gonçalves would inherit all of Anaporam’s considerable wealth. See Bocarro, 
op. cit., vol. II, 439. 
514 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 158-9; Bocarro, op. cit., vol. II, 439. 
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To guarantee his promise to Min Yazagyi, Gonçalves provided his nephew 
and the sons of some of the Sundivanese Portuguese as hostages.515  
The arrangement went well at first. The Mughals were driven out 
of Balua and the Arakanese captured Lakhipur, “while Gonçalves barred 
their advance from the sea.”516  But Gonçalves for some reason did not 
keep the rest of the bargain. Gonçalves left the Dangatiar rivermouth and 
entered a creek on Defierta island. Then Gonçalves had the captains of 
the Arakanese ships brought together in a great council and murdered 
them all. The Portuguese also slaughtered much of the Arakanese crews, 
making slaves of the survivors. Gonçalves then returned to Sundiva.517 
Without Gonçalves’ blockade, the Mughal army was able to reach Balua 
by river. Min Yazagyi, who faced the Mughals alone, was severely 
defeated in a counterattack when the main Mughal force approached.518 
Min Yazagyi and his army took refuge in the Tippera forests, but the king 
of Tippera saw this as a good time to rebel and the Arakanese nobles 
were “put to the sword.” Min Yazagyi abandoned his army, and “mounted 
on a swift elephant,” fled to Chittagong,519  where he left “a strong 
garrison” and then returned to his capital.520 This was a major defeat 
for the Arakanese, since the Mughals had taken Bengal up to Chittagong 
and even Dianga was now threatened.521  
 
Gonçalves’ Invasion of Arakan 
 
Gonçalves then attacked the weakened Arakanese kingdom. Since much 
of the kingdom’s soldiers had been lost against the Mughal armies and 
since most in Arakan had not heard of Gonçalves’ failure to comply with 
the peace agreement, the Arakanese were easily surprised, as well as 
“totally unprotected.”522 Gonçalves destroyed all of Arakan’s coastal 
forts,523 including the major Arakanese installations at Ramu, 
                                                          
515 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 159-160. 
516 Campos, op. cit.,  87. 
517 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 159-160; The Arakanese captives were auctioned 
off in Sundiva at low prices to buyers from India and Melaka. See Bocarro, op. cit., vol. II, 
442. 
518 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 159-160. 
519 Campos, op. cit.,  87; Bocarro, op. cit., vol. II, 442. 
520 Phayre, History of Burma, 175; Bocarro, op. cit., 442. 
521 Maurice Collis and San Shwe Bu, “Dom Martin, 1606-1643: the First Burman to 
Visit Europe,” Journal of the Burma Research Society 16, pt. 1 (1926): 11. 
522 Stewart, op. cit., 218. 
523 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 161. 
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Chittagong, and Maju.524 Then Gonçalves sailed up the Lemro river and 
destroyed merchant ships from many countries,525 as well as capturing 
European merchant ships which were “probably Dutch.”526 But the 
Arakanese repulsed Gonçalves before too much damage was done,527  
although Min Yazagyi lost his personal pleasure-boat. In anger, Min 
Yazagyi had Gonçalves’ nephew impaled upon a spike and hung at a high 
point in Mrauk-U so that Gonçalves could see the body.528  
It was now clear that there was no possibility of future cooperation 
between Gonçalves and Min Yazagyi. Min Yazagyi now faced a strong 
Portuguese enemy on Sundiva island and the advanced forces of the 
Mughals in Bengal as a result of Gonçalves’ treachery. Further, the king 
of Tippera had joined the large number of enemies of Arakan. For the 
time being, Min Yazagyi could only gather his remaining forces, those not 
destroyed by Gonçalves or his enemies in Bengal, and strengthen key 
positions in the Arakanese defense system. Without the Portuguese at 
Dianga, Arakanese forces now had to be committed to the defense of 
Arakan’s northwest frontier in Bengala and Min Yazagyi moved a large 
fleet, with artillery to Chittagong and left it there while he returned to 
Mrauk-U to hold his court together. It is clear from the correspondence 
between Goa and Europe that there must have been some confusion 
about whom these new forces would be directed against. It was 
suggested that the Arakanese forces at Chittagong would be used to 
recapture the twelve Bengalese states, annexed by Min Bin generations 
before, from the Mughals, but an attack on the kingdom of Tippera 
seemed possible as well. Further, these forces might also have been 
designated for the capture of the island of Sundiva, which could then be 
fortified as an extension of Arakanese defenses against Mughal 
expansion.529  In any case, it is possible that Min Yazagyi did not know 
what to do with these forces, other than to maintain his control over 
Chittagong, to prevent yet another disastrous loss for Arakan. 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
Who was Gonçalves and what effect did he have upon Min Yazagyi’s 
empire? The general consensus seems to be that Gonçalves was simply a 
                                                          
524 Campos, op. cit., 87. 
525 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 161. 
526 Phayre, History of Burma, 175. 
527 Stewart, op. cit., 218. 
528 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 161. 
529 Document 268, 19 March 1612, letter from the king of Portugal to the viceroy of 
India, Dom Jeronymo de Azevedo, in Documentos Remmettidos, vol. II, 226. 
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pirate and that any attempt to see him as a local ruler is ill-informed. 
This view is supported by Das Gupta and Pearson as well as Fariah y 
Sousa. There is evidence, however, which was admitted by, or can be 
inferred from, the works of the above authors as well as the works of 
many others, that both Portuguese and indigenous people in Sundiva 
saw him as a legitimate ruler. Some  called him “king,” others called him 
“lord,” but all who joined him or negotiated with him saw Gonçalves as a 
local leader of some importance. As Maurice Collis and San Shwe Bu 
explain: 
 
It must be insisted that Tibau’s sovereignty was real. The Viceroy of 
Goa had no control nor aspired to any control over him. By 1610 he 
had become so prominent and important a figure in the Bay that 
Razagiri...invited Tibau to co-operate with him.530  
 
How then should we view Gonçalves? My own view is that 
Gonçalves was less of a king than a pirate. Gonçalves came to power 
because he had won the support of survivors from the Dianga massacre. 
But it is clear that these survivors did not act out of revenge when they 
organized and attempted to control the Arakanese coast. Instead these 
Portuguese survivors were motivated by a number of other things. First, 
the Portuguese at Dianga were typically deserters or adventurers who 
found life elsewhere in the Estado da India unbearable or distasteful and 
had no intention of going back to Goa or Portugal. Some, who could do 
so, probably went to other Portuguese trading stations. But a large 
number did not or could not go elsewhere and thus decided to join 
Gonçalves who offered them a way of continuing to live as they had at 
Dianga. Second, the Portuguese at Dianga probably realized that the lack 
of direct Portuguese government influence in the Bay of Bengal, and the 
absence of other large-scale European operations, meant that someone 
like Gonçalves, given men and ships, might easily control maritime trade 
off the Arakanese coast. Third, since the Portuguese at Dianga had 
traditional lived outside of the pale of Goa’s control and were 
autonomous in Arakan, these men probably had little difficulty in 
accepting a life of piracy. 
But Gonçalves was not De Brito and was not following his 
example. I see no evidence that Gonçalves saw any real importance in 
being called “king” or “lord.” Nor was Gonçalves interested in setting up 
feudal-like political arrangements with local potentates as De Brito was. 
                                                          
530 Maurice Collis and San Shwe Bu, “Dom Martin, 1606-1643,” 12.531 The authors 
are referring here to the period of Arakanese history between 1638 and 1785, I am using 
it, however, for this comparison because I think that it accurately describes Min Yazagyi’s 
reign. See Collis & Bu, “Arakan’s Place in the Civilization of the Bay,” 44. 
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Possibly this was due to the fact that Gonçalves did not rule over a 
substantial indigenous population on Sundiva as De Brito did at Syriam 
and thus needed no ideology to win local support. But neither did 
Gonçalves attempt to gain territory or political control elsewhere. I think 
this is evident by Gonçalves’ assaults on Arakan, which seemed to be 
directed more at reducing the Arakanese military capacity, rather than 
winning territorial control.  
Regardless of who Gonçalves was and why he did what he did in 
Arakan, however, it is clear that his actions had a tremendous impact on 
Min Yazagyi’s dream of making Arakan the preeminent power in Bengal 
and Lower Burma. First, Gonçalves spread Portuguese influence further 
afield on mainland Southeast Asia and confirmed the growing indigenous 
belief that the Portuguese were invincible and that Arakan was simply 
just another petty kingdom. Second, Gonçalves’ rise to power had set up 
another, closer Portuguese center than Goa, from which De Brito, who 
now controlled Arakan’s eastern territories in Pegu, might receive aid and 
supplies. But most importantly, the physical damage incurred from 
Gonçalves’ attacks upon Arakan and the continued threat he posed 
effectively removed Arakan as an actor in the politics of Lower Burma. 
Gonçalves’ treacherous actions also made sure that Min Yazagyi lost his 
position in Bengal bringing another threatening force to bear upon 
Arakan: the expanding Mughal empire.  
Min Yazagyi’s empire was collapsing around him, but much of this 
was not Min Yazagyi’s fault. He inherited a relationship between the 
Arakanese and their Portuguese mercenaries based on mutual trust. His 
predecessors depended upon Portuguese help for generations and for 
him to be suddenly wary of his Portuguese mercenaries is too much to 
expect. But something changed in their relationship and it took some 
time before Min Yazagyi realized it: Portuguese power in the east was 
declining rapidly and the Portuguese who now served the Arakanese were 
oriented more towards quick profit, rather than long-term planning and 
long-term loyalties or relationships with indigenous rulers. Min Yazagyi 
is at fault for attacking Dianga, when it is clear that the Portuguese at 
Dianga were not ready to rebel so easily as De Brito had been. Further, 
Min Yazagyi can be blamed for allowing a bad situation grow worse: 
many times he continued to trust the Portuguese after they had already 
proven to be untrustworthy. But then again, the changing political 
climate, the encroaching Mughal Empire and the anarchic situation in 
Pegu, often made it necessary for Min Yazagyi to seek Portuguese help 
even when it was not certain whether he would be tricked by them. 
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Chapter VII 
Arakan Rises Again, 1612-1622 
 
The causes that make men rich are often the same as ruin them. 
What a gambler has won he may lose by an identical throw. Mrauk-
U was glorious because wise kings took advantage of a strong 
alliance against distracted border states. It fell into poverty and 
contempt because weak kings were falsely served by their allies 
against united border states. 
 
Maurice Collis & San Shwe Bu531  
 
[T]he strength of Arakan lay mainly in the woods and swamps...Had 
the Kings of Arakan trusted to these defenses, and been content to 
remain in obscure independence at home, they might long have 
remained secure from landward foes. But, electing to become 
unnecessarily aggressive, their country lay at the mercy of foes on 
both sides. 
A. Ruxton MacMahon532   
 
 
These two quotations accurately describe two men: the first can be 
applied to Min Yazagyi, while the second accurately depicts the 
temperament of Min Khamaung, Min Yazagyi’s son and successor. By 
comparing these characterizations, two very different personalities are 
evident. While Min Yazagyi left the maintenance of his empire to others, 
Min Khamaung was a fighter. If we can keep their personalities in mind, 
they will be useful in examining how Min Khamaung faced the problems 
that had developed in Min Yazagyi’s reign.  
Several questions should be asked. How did the Min Khamaung 
overcome the problems caused by Min Yazagyi’s reign? Why did Min 
Khamaung’s able leadership lead to the destruction of the Portuguese? 
Was this a revival of Arakanese imperial might? I think that an 
examination of the fall of Min Yazagyi and the rise of Min Khamaung to 
power will help us to answer these questions. 
 
The Eclipse of Min Yazagyi’s power 
 
Min Yazagyi’s empire was now shaken by two Portuguese mercenary 
revolts. But Min Yazagyi was to face yet another revolt involving the 
Portuguese. With Portuguese support, Min Mangri, Min Yazagyi’s 
                                                          
532 A. Ruxton MacMahon, Far Cathay and Farther India, (London: Hurst and 
Blackett, 1893): 159-160. 
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youngest son, revolted against his father, who he and other members of 
the royal family had increasingly come to see as a weak and ineffective 
ruler. Significantly, Min Yazagyi would again depend upon his oldest son, 
Min Khamaung, to lead his armies in crushing the revolt. Min Yazagyi 
had not resumed active participation in the activities of his army, or his 
state for that matter, and Arakan was now being run by courtiers and 
rival princes of the royal family. 
One event in 1610, however, may have crystallized the Arakanese 
view that Min Yazagyi was bringing about the destruction of his 
kingdom.This was the refusal of other Burmese states to have anything 
to do with Arakan, indicating that Min Yazagyi’s credibility as a potential 
ally was low in Burma. Min Yazagyi, for example, proposed an alliance 
with the growing kingdom of Ava in northern Burma against Philip de 
Brito. But Min Yazagyi’s attempts “met with a rebuff.”533 Although Min 
Yazagyi’s attempts at an alliance with Ava met with failure, news of the 
“come and go of embassies” worried the Portuguese at Syriam enough so 
that Philip de Brito sought and gained an alliance with Nat-shin-naung 
of Toungoo.534 Since Toungoo already submitted as a vassal to Ava, this 
brought about a direct conflict between Ava and De Brito, a struggle 
which engulfed Lower Burma and precluded Arakanese intervention. 
At the same time that Min Yazagyi was losing control of his 
government, we can see the increasing power of Min Khamaung. Min 
Khamaung was a fighter and a very capable military commander and 
political leader. Although he had led three unsuccessful attempts to 
overthrow Min Yazagyi in the past, Min Khamaung was now working 
within the Min Yazagyi administration to build up his own power-base. 
One of the obstacles that stood between him and the kingship, however, 
was his younger brother Min Mangri. 
 
Min Mangri  
 
Min Yazagyi slowly began to realize that he was losing his grip over his 
empire and that Arakan was being whittled away by its enemies, both 
foreign and domestic. More importantly, he probably realized that he was 
also losing the world recognition of his kingship that he had tried so hard 
to gain. To strengthen his empire, Min Yazagyi tried to find weak points 
in the territories which remained under his control. Min Yazagyi no 
longer controlled lower Burma, but he could still save Arakan from the 
Mughals. Anaporam’s flight left Chittagong without a governor and now 
to secure Arakan’s border with Bengal, Min Yazagyi appointed his 
                                                          
533 J. S. Furnivall (ed. & trans.), “A Forgotten Chronicle,” Journal of the Burma 
Research Society 2, pt. 2 (1912): 164. 
534 Ibid. 
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promising younger son, Min Mangri, as the new governor of Chittagong, 
with the title Alamanja (or Alaman the governor).535  This decision was 
made because of Min Yazagyi’s observation of Min Mangri’s loyalty to 
him. The heir apparent Min Khamaung did not like Min Mangri, which 
was another reason that Min Yazagyi made his choice: 
 
[H]e sent him off...in order to obviate the growing enmity which 
existed between the two brothers, before it led to an actual rupture. 
This young and sagacious Prince had no doubt that the cause of his 
being made to leave the Court and his home by his father was the 
little love his elder brother had for him. This was due to the 
affection and admiration which his elder brother saw that he 
received from his father and every one, on account of his good 
qualities...536  
 
Min Mangri believed that when Min Khamaung took the throne 
Min Khamaung would have him killed. Min Mangri, considering the three 
revolts of Min Khamaung against his father, Min Yazagyi, argued that 
“an individual upon whom family ties lay so lightly, would make short 
work of him.”537 Min Mangri could also see that his father’s 
administration was weak and that if he moved quickly, he could grab the 
kingship for himself. Min Mangri decided to get an ally who could 
support his challenge to the throne of Arakan, and turned to Sebastião 
Gonçalves y Tibao. He sent an embassy requesting that a pact of alliance 
be made,538 and they agreed to seal the alliance with the marriage of 
Mangri’s daughter to Gonçalves’ son.539  
 
Chittagong Rebels 
 
In 1612, eighteen months after Min Mangri allied himself to Gonçalves, 
he revolted against his father.540 This must have presented Arakan with 
                                                          
535 See Luard’s note in Manrique, op. cit., vol. I, 301f. 
536 Manrique, op. cit., vol. I, 301. 
537 Collis & San Shwe Bu, “Dom Martin 1606-1643,” 12. 
538 Manrique, op. cit., vol. I, 304. 
539 Ibid., vol. I, 304. 
540 This is Collis & Bu’s account of the events of the revolt of Chittagong and its 
governor, Min Mangri, which they say is based on Arakanese chronicles. Fariah y Sousa, 
working on contemporary hearsay has provided a different account of the events and a 
different chronology. Sousa says that “Anaporam” the brother of Min Khamaung was 
simply defending himself when Min Khamaung demanded Anaporam’s great elephant, “to 
which all other elephants of that Country were said to allow a sort of superiority.” 
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a crisis of disastrous proportions;  not only had Arakan  lost Lower 
Burma, the bulk of its navy, its noble class in Tippera, and the island of 
Sundiva, now the entire northern third of the country, as well as its most 
profitable port, was in revolt. Min Yazagyi lost all sympathy for his son 
and unleashed his eldest son, Min Khamaung, with an army to defeat 
Min Mangri. Min Khamaung marched along the shore of the Bay of 
Bengal towards Chittagong. Min Khamaung was a good military 
commander and took the precaution of having his fleet move slowly along 
the shore “in order to preserve daily communication with the army.”541 
Min Khamaung’s army suffered a temporary setback when it was 
attacked and routed by the forces of the raja of Tippera, which took 
positions between Chittagong and Ramu.542  
Min Khamaung tried again and this time succeeded in pushing his 
army up the coast until they soon began to lay siege to Chittagong.543 
After four months, the people of Chittagong were starving and sent 
messages to Min Yazagyi that they would surrender, but Min Mangri and 
the Portuguese would not let them. As the defenses weakened, Min 
Mangri personally led the members of his court around the walls to 
bolster his men.  While doing so, Min Mangri was mortally wounded by a 
bullet. Min Mangri told the Portuguese not to let the people surrender 
because his children would be murdered if they did so. The Portuguese, 
realizing that all was lost, took Min Mangri’s son and daughter to Hughli 
in the Mughal kingdom for protection. Min Mangri, protected by his chief 
eunuch, refused to be baptized before his  death and remained a 
Buddhist.544  
Min Khamaung then entered Chittagong unopposed. He took time 
to attend the funeral of Min Mangri, but then hurried back to Mrauk-U. 
Gonçalves was able to remove some of Min Mangri’s wealth and 
elephants while Min Yazagyi, who might have continued his assaults on 
Gonçalves in earlier years, remained surprisingly uninterested in 
Gonçalves for the moment and ordered no attacks. It must have been 
                                                                                                                                                               
Anaporam supposedly then fled to Sundiva and giving Gonçalves his sister in marriage, 
the two leaders launched a failed invasion attempt. Sousa then says that Anaporam then 
died, with the suspicion of poison (Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 157-158.). Campos, in 
his The Portuguese in Bengal, (84-5), supports Sousa’s claim, citing similar accounts in 
other Portuguese histories. I have treated these differing accounts separately, because, 
after reviewing the evidence, I have come to the conclusion that they were indeed 
separate revolts. It is probable that Min Mangri was established as the governor of 
Chittagong to replace Anaporam in 1609-10.  
541 Phayre, History of Burma, 175. 
542 Stuart, op. cit., 69. 
543 Collis & Bu, “Dom Martin,” 12. 
544 Manrique, op. cit., vol. I, 310-4. 
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clear to Min Yazagyi that he was in no condition, after losing his eastern 
empire in Pegu to De Brito, to risk losing his western empire in Bengal to 
yet another Portuguese upstart by futilely throwing men and resources 
without a good stratagem for victory. Instead, Min Yazagyi seems to have 
decided to postpone his revenge on Gonçalves in order to strengthen his 
administration and find out what he was doing wrong in the 
management of his kingdom and his armies. Unfortunately, Min Yazagyi 
no longer had time to launch any major reforms, since he died within 
months, leaving Min Khamaung as Arakan’s new king. 
 
Min Khamaung Rebuilds Arakanese Might 
 
Min Khamaung had defeated Min Mangri, and his father, Min Yazagyi, 
was dead. As the new king of Arakan, Min Khamaung545  was free to 
make the military and administrative reforms that he felt were necessary. 
In order to do so, Min Khamaung realized that he needed the support of 
capable advisors and administrators. Thus, Min Khamaung requested 
that his old tutor, Ugga Byan, join him in his administration. Ugga Byan, 
however, refused because he was disgraced in Arakanese society and 
would only lessen Min Khamaung’s legitimacy by serving him: 
 
Public opinion, immemorial custom weighed on him. Once a 
pagoda-slave, always a pagoda-slave. It would have required a 
much greater King than Min-Kamaung to have overcome that 
conviction and to have reintroduced Ugga Byan into society. He was 
a disgraced man and in this utter degradation he remained for the 
rest of his life.546  
 
Min Khamaung’s plans for reform thus suffered a setback, since he 
planned on making use of the advice of Ugga Byan, who seemed far more 
capable than those members of the Arakanese court would had won 
positions in the government through court intrigue rather than ability. 
Although Min Khamaung would not have the help of Ugga Byan, he 
immediately began to rebuild the prestige and religious aura of the 
Arakanese kingship, which had decreased dramatically under Min 
Yazagyi.  Min Khamaung engaged in a large and impressive temple-
building program, which included the construction of the 
Thuparamaceti, Shwepara, and Ngwepara pagodas.547  
                                                          
545 As king, Min Khamaung (r. 1612-1622) was also known as Husain Shah. See 
Luard’s notes in Manrique, op. cit., vol. I, xxiii. 
546 Collis, “An Arakanese Poem,” 222. 
547 Forchhammer, op. cit., 16. 
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Further, Min Yazagyi’s years of allowing the government and 
military of Arakan to slip into the hands of corrupt ministers, to say 
nothing of the factional infighting of the royal family, had created a 
situation in which Min Khamaung was unable to push through reforms 
as quickly as his sixteenth century predecessors, such as Min Bin, had 
done. Min Khamaung’s first administrative reform was to end 
Chittagong’s traditional semi-autonomy and to bring it directly under the 
Arakanese king’s control. This was extremely important, because 
Chittagong was the linchpin in Arakan’s defense strategy on the western 
frontier in Bengal. Chittagong’s semi-autonomy, under a governor, had 
allowed it to rebel under Min Mangri and it was also dangerously close to 
the autonomous Portuguese settlement at Dianga. After Min Mangri’s 
death, Min Khamaung did not replace him with another governor, but 
instead appointed Min Soa as a viceroy “strictly under the control of the 
king of Arakan.”548  Min Khamaung could be sure of this man’s loyalty: 
he was a “grandee” of Arakan, and was a son of the late Nan-dá-bayin of 
Pegu, who had been a prisoner of De Brito, perhaps at the same time as 
Min Khamaung. As Manrique comments, this “man had tried his utmost 
to obtain this governorship, simply in order to be revenged on the 
Portuguese, whom he hated intensely.”549  Further, the new viceroy of 
Chittagong was tied to the ruling house by his marriage to Anaporam’s 
widow, who had fallen back into Arakanese hands.550  
 
Collapse of the Portuguese at Syriam 
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide an account of Philip de 
Brito’s activities at Syriam from 1608 to 1612, during which time Arakan 
had little to do with De Brito. But Syriam again took interest in 
Portuguese Syriam in 1613, when Anaukpetlun, the king of Ava, 
attacked Syriam with an army of 120,000 men and a navy of four 
hundred ships and six thousand Moslem mercenaries. De Brito’s forces 
consisted of about one hundred Portuguese and two thousand Mons. 
Further, De Brito’s forces lacked sufficient gunpowder.551 The siege was 
not lifted by any help from Goa,552  and during a general assault 
                                                          
548 Collis and Bu, “Dom Martin,” 17. 
549 Manrique, op. cit., vol. I, 88. 
550 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 158-9. 
551 Ibid., vol. III, 191-192. 
552 No help came from Goa to De Brito despite orders from the king of Portugal to do 
so. See Document 397, 20 December 1613, letter from the king of Portugal to the viceroy 
of India, Dom Jeronymo de Azevedo, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. II, 465. 
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ordered by Anaukpetlun on 7 April 1612, the outer perimeter of wooden 
walls was lost and the Portuguese were restricted to a brick redoubt.553  
Min Khamaung probably thought that this was an ideal situation 
in which he could reintroduce Arakanese influence into Lower Burma. De 
Brito, for example, had been so degraded, that he might happily submit 
to Arakanese control in order to save himself from Avan revenge for his 
sacrilege against Buddhism. Min Khamaung thus sent an Arakanese 
fleet of fifty ships to relieve Syriam. These ships, however, were captured 
by Anaukpetlun’s navy. De Brito’s forces were defeated soon after and De 
Brito was spitted on an iron spike, while his men were taken to the 
interior of Burma were they were resettled. This group of Portuguese 
were given local wives, producing a hereditary class of Burmese 
artillerymen who served the Burmese army for the next three centuries.  
De Brito’s fall actually benefited Min Khamaung and Arakan in 
some very important ways. First, Ava’s destruction of Syriam freed up 
Lower Burmese trade from the Portuguese restrictions which had led to 
its decline for almost a generation.554  Arakan had suffered from the 
economic blockade by De Brito and Gonçalves and now this blockade 
was broken. Second, the loss of the Portuguese fortress under De Brito 
rendered Gonçalves’ position less intimidating, since the only rival to 
Arakanese naval might in the area was now that of Gonçalves rather 
than the huge naval forces which De Brito and Gonçalves could muster 
together. Third, the image of Portuguese invincibility, which had grown 
through many years of Arakanese defeats was now broken, and 
psychologically at least, an Arakanese victory could revive the declining 
image that the Arakanese had of their own military prowess. 
 
Arakanese-Dutch Alliance 
 
The Portuguese at Sundiva were an immediate threat to the Arakanese 
kingdom, and Min Khamaung needed an immediate solution to the decay 
of Arakanese imperial might. Thus Min Khamaung took advantage of Min 
                                                          
553 Nai Thien, op. cit., 69; Harvey, History of Burma, 188. Interestingly, orders were 
sent by the king of Portugal on 15 March 1613, for all Portuguese ships trading in the 
Bay of Bengal to stop at Syriam and pay taxes. The orders probably did not reach Goa 
before De Brito was killed. See Document 352, 15 March 1613, letter from the king of 
Portugal to the viceroy of India, Dom Jeronymo de Azevedo, in Documentos Remettidos, 
vol. II, 391-5. 
554 Indeed, Pieter Willemszoon Verhoeff observed that as far away as Masulipatan, 
the “Moores...rejoice greatly at this conquest, hoping to get the trade of Pegu into their 
hands againe,” see Peter Floris (Pieter Willemszoon Verhoeff), Peter Floris: His Voyage to 
the East Indies in the Globe 1611-1615, edited and translated by W. H. Moreland. 
(London: Hakluyt Society. 1934): 336. 
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Yazagyi’s earlier attempts to win Dutch help against De Brito. Min 
Khamaung made overtures to the Dutch to help him crush Gonçalves. 
The Dutch were in no position to refuse Min Khamaung’s requests, 
because they were becoming heavily dependent on trade relations with 
Arakan: 
 
As there was a constant demand for slaves in the Dutch factories in 
the Archipelago, Dutch merchants soon became the King’s chief 
customers for these unhappy human beings (Bengalese prisoners of 
war). They also came to Arakan for rice. Their factories in the spice-
growing districts were in constant need of food supplies, and their 
agents were constantly busy wherever rice was to be had, and 
especially in Siam and Arakan.555  
 
The Dutch thus agreed to help Min Khamaung and sent a fleet and 
Dutch military advisors to aid the Arakanese army and navy. 
I think that Min Khamaung’s dependence upon Dutch help to 
reform Arakan indicates the depths to which Min Yazagyi’s misguided 
reign had taken Arakan. The guiding principle of the Arakanese kings in 
the sixteenth century had always been to make use of foreigners and 
foreign models.  These kings realized that they had to adapt foreign 
models to their culture and use them in an Arakanese way. Further, 
foreigners were used by the Arakanese kings in the development of the 
Arakanese army and fleet, but they had always made sure to keep a firm 
Arakanese hold over these men. Min Yazagyi failed to maintain a firm 
control over either his own court or his Portuguese mercenaries, and his 
kingdom crumbled around him. Min Khamaung inherited this poor state 
of affairs, and before he could adequately repair the damage done by Min 
Yazagyi, he had to find another foreign model and set it against the 
Portuguese.  
 
Gonçalves Invades Arakan 
 
Gonçalves’ position was endangered by Min Khamaung’s control of 
Chittagong. Realizing that the Arakanese would soon attack him, 
Gonçalves tried to hit Arakan first with some deadly blow which would 
forestall their plans. He decided to sack the Arakanese capital, Mrauk-U 
in 1615, but he needed more help and sent a representative to Dom 
Jeromyno de Azevedo, the viceroy of Goa.556  
                                                          
555 D.G.E. Hall, “Studies in Dutch Relations With Arakan,” Journal of the Burma 
Research Society 26, (1936): 3. 
556 Collis & Bu, “Dom Martin,” 12. 
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Gonçalves never before recognized Goa’s sovereignty over his 
“kingdom,” but now he proposed to subject himself to Portugal’s control. 
In return for official Portuguese help, Gonçalves promised to send the 
viceroy one galley of rice each year as tribute. Gonçalves also excused his 
previous treachery against Min Yazagyi as simply revenge for the Dianga 
massacre. What really won the viceroy’s support, however, was 
Gonçalves’ hint that the viceroy would get a share of the king of Arakan’s 
vast treasure.557  The viceroy, Don Jeronymo de Azvedo, won the 
sanction of the Portuguese court for his support of Gonçalves, and for his 
recommendation of a reward for Gonçalves by the Portuguese court for 
his activities at Sundiva.558 The viceroy, however, was as dishonest as 
Gonçalves was. Although he prepared a fleet to invade Arakan, he 
ordered the commander, the former governor of Ceylon, Dom Francis de 
Meneses Roxo, to attack without waiting for Gonçalves, since he “did not 
sufficiently appreciate the value of the assistance to be expected of the 
pirate.” The Goan fleet of fourteen “large galliots,” one flyboat (an 
extremely fast, light vessel), and one ‘pink’ (a warship with a narrow 
stern, providing it with greater speed and maneuverability) then left in 
mid-September 1615 for Arakan. On 3 October 1615, the Goan fleet 
arrived off the coast of Arakan and the captains made a council to decide 
what to do next.559  
Min Khamaung, however, heard of the Portuguese arrival and 
decided to strike the Portuguese first. On 15 October 1615, the surprised 
Portuguese were confronted with an Arakanese fleet so large “they could 
not see the end of it.” The Portuguese were also surprised to see that the 
Arakanese had been careful to secure the aid of their new European 
enemy in the Indian ocean: among the Arakanese craft was a Dutch pink 
and several ships carrying Dutch seamen. But the Portuguese realized 
too late that they were no match for the the Arakanese force. The Dutch 
pink fired first, followed by the Arakanese.  The first four Portuguese 
ships suffered a great deal of damage and their “Captains and many 
soldiers were killed.” The battle lasted a whole day, and at nightfall, the 
Portuguese retreated.560  
Due to the poor condition of his fleet, Meneses remained at bay 
until the middle of November,561 when Gonçalves arrived with fifty of his 
ships and furiously reprimanded Meneses for stupidly attacking without 
                                                          
557 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 225-6; Stewart, op. cit., 218-9. 
558 Document 556, 21 February 1615, letter from the king of Portugal to Dom 
Jeronymo de Azvedo, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. III, 271. 
559 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 225-226; Stewart, op. cit., 219. 
560 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 226; Phayre, History of Burma, 176. 
561 Stewart, op. cit., 220. 
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him. Min Khamaung spent his time furiously preparing for defenses for 
his capital: he had massive “earthen breastworks” constructed along the 
shore, to prevent a Portuguese landing; he had enormous numbers of 
Arakanese musketeers man the walls to shoot down into the Portuguese 
ships; and he had his fleet wait protected in an inlet.562  Min Khamaung 
also had the Dutch ships stand between the river and his fleet, 
anchoring them in such a way “so as to bring their broadside guns to 
bear on the assailants.”563  On 15 November, the combined Portuguese 
fleets began to sail upriver to attack Mrauk-U, the Arakanese capital. The 
Portuguese fleet was then split into two sections, one under Gonçalves 
and the other under Meneses. Once the Portuguese were alongside the 
Arakanese capital, however, they discovered that they had walked into 
Min Khamaung’s trap.564  
At noon, three squadrons of Arakanese ships attacked the 
Portuguese fleet. At first, the Portuguese seemed to be winning: 
Gonçalves’ squadron, facing the Arakanese left, repulsed the ships sent 
against it and the Portuguese pink defeated the Dutch pink. But Roxo’s 
squadron of the Portuguese fleet, facing the Arakanese right, was not as 
lucky. One Portuguese ship, commanded by Gaspar de Abreu had to be 
abandoned with everyone on board dead, while Roxo himself was killed 
after taking one musket-ball in the forehead and another in his left eye. 
Gonçalves, now sole commander of the Portuguese fleet, realized that 
Min Khamaung had outwitted him and signaled the retreat. The 
Portuguese fleet fled down the river as fast as it could to the rivermouth. 
Here it paused to bury some two hundred Portuguese at sea. After 
electing Dom Luis de Azevedo as Roxo’s replacement, the Portuguese 
fled: the Goan fleet for Goa and Gonçalves for Sundiva.565 As a warning 
to the Portuguese, Min Khamaung had the Portuguese captured by the 
Arakanese beheaded. Their heads were then placed on spears and lined 
up on the shore.566  
Min Khamaung had saved Arakan with Dutch help and Gonçalves’ 
kingdom was in no position to exist for very much longer. Gonçalves had 
lost even more men due to desertion than he did in battle. Many of his 
men, for example, joined Azevedo’s fleet on its return to Goa because 
Gonçalves’ “tyranny and oppression had alienated most of his 
                                                          
562 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 227-228; Phayre, History of Burma, 176; Stewart, 
op. cit., 220. 
563 Phayre, op. cit., 176. 
564 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 227-228; Phayre, History of Burma, 176; Stewart, 
op. cit., 220. 
565 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 227-228. 
566 Fytche, op. cit.,  58. 
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adherents.” The deserters “were glad to be rid of their hard-hearted 
master.”567 Gonçalves was desperate for more men to maintain his 
island kingdom and even begged Azevedo to leave behind his wounded. A 
similar occasion occurred soon after, when Dom Francisco’s fleet stayed 
at Sundiva during the monsoon. Min Yazagyi made various offers to the 
captains of this fleet to stay with him, but they refused. Gonçalves was 
so desperate that he even accepted an offer from the Mughal nawab 
(governor) of Bengal, in which Gonçalves would aid a Mughal attempt to 
take Chittagong, for which Gonçalves would receive two hundred 
thousand tangus (a local unit of currency). Some of the Portuguese 
captains and  men mutinied against this proposal and many of them left, 
spreading the word of Gonçalves’ plans to help the Mughals.568  
 
The Burmese Distraction, 1615 
 
Min Khamaung thus defeated a major Portuguese invasion, just as Min 
Bin did almost a century before. Min Khamaung was determined to 
follow up his victory by crushing Gonçalves at his base on Sundiva. 
Indeed, he seemed to be in a good position to do so: the Arakanese navy, 
which Gonçalves almost wiped out in 1612, had been largely rebuilt and 
now Arakan had the added support of the Dutch. But this favorable state 
of affairs was largely an illusion. Gonçalves had killed many of Arakan’s 
most experienced and capable naval commanders and these losses could 
not be replaced in so short a time. Further, the Dutch helped the 
Arakanese at Mrauk-U, because they were there trading, rather than 
purposely seeking a fight: the “Dutch were too busy with their own 
struggles with the Portuguese and with various native powers in the 
Archipelago to be willing to add to their commitments.”569 Min 
Khamaung thus had to depend upon his own devices in order to destroy 
Gonçalves’ stronghold. 
Min Khamaung first looked to Burma, which had defeated its own 
band of Portuguese mercenaries under De Brito and was now unified 
under the rule of Anaukpetlun. In order to outflank Gonçalves’ extensive 
island empire in the Bay of Bengal, Min Khamaung requested that 
Anaukpetlun cede some islands on the Burmese-Arakanese border to 
him. Anaukpetlun was furious, and in response sent his navy to raid 
Sandoway.570 Indeed, Anaukpetlun soon appeared to be the new great 
threat to Arakan. While Arakan was still fighting the Portuguese in the 
                                                          
567 Sarkar, op. cit., 363. 
568 Bocarro, op. cit., vol. II, 456, 477. 
569 D.G.E. Hall, “Studies in Dutch Relations With Arakan,” 12. 
570 Harvey, History of Burma, 189. 
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northwest, Anaukpetlun, who crushed De Brito in 1613 at Syriam, now, 
in 1616, sought a Portuguese-Burmese alliance. Anaukpetlun worried 
that the rival kingdoms of Ayudhya and Arakan might ally themselves 
with the Portuguese against him, and decided that he would win 
Portuguese support before they could. Anaukpetlun thus sent an 
embassy to Goa asking for peace and apologizing for the destruction of 
Syriam. Further, Anaukpetlun promised to return all of the Portuguese 
prisoners whom he had captured and resettled in the interior of Burma, 
presumably including the viceroy’s niece, whom Anaukpetlun made a 
slave. In a manner surprisingly similar to the proposals made by De Brito 
and Gonçalves to earlier viceroys, indicating that Anaukpetlun had 
probably learned something of the European ‘game’ just as De Brito had 
played the Burmese ‘game,’ Anaukpetlun promised that if the Portuguese 
joined him in an invasion of Arakan, the Portuguese could keep all of Min 
Khamaung’s treasure, with the exception of the white elephant.571  
Min Khamaung must have heard of these events and was probably 
very worried, so much so that his assault on Sundiva was delayed for a 
year. But Min Khamaung was under no real threat from Burma, since 
Anaukpetlun seems to have changed his mind about an alliance with the 
Portuguese. The viceroy of Goa accepted Anaukpetlun’s offers and sent  
his ambassador, Martin de Costa Falcam, to Burma to sign an official 
treaty. Anaukpetlun, however, avoided meeting Falcam, and Falcam 
spent many wasted hours waiting for his audience with the king: 
 
He spent many Days in solliciting an hour’s Audience, at length it 
was appointed at Midnight, and he was led in the dark to a Place 
where they ordered him to speak, for the King heared; he spoke and 
saw no King, nor heard no answer...He signified the desire he had of 
seeing the King, and was ordered to wait his going abroad. He went 
one Day upon an Elephant, and knowing Falcam waited in the 
Street to see him, never so much as turned his Eyes that way.572  
 
Falcam thus returned to Goa. If Min Khamaung heard of these events he 
should have been very relieved for he was now free to wipe out his old 
enemy, Gonçalves. 
 
Threat From Bengal 
 
Before Min Khamaung could turn his attention against Gonçalves, 
however, he was temporarily distracted by events in Bengal. In 1616, the 
Mughals attempted to take advantage of Arakan’s problems with 
                                                          
571 Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., vol. III, 255. 
572 Ibid., vol. III, 255-6. 
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Gonçalves and with Burma, by sending a large army of cavalry, 
musketeers, elephants, and one thousand ships against Chittagong. Min 
Khamaung responded by dividing his available forces into two sections. 
The first section, which he placed under the command of his chief 
general, consisted of 100,000 men, four hundred elephants, and one 
thousand ships. Min Khamaung sent this force ahead to fortify the 
strategic village of Kathgar, twenty miles to the northwest of Chittagong. 
Min Khamaung returned to Mrauk-U and gathered his second force, 
which consisted of 300,000 men, ten thousand cavalry, and elephants. 
Min Khamaung then marched up the coast to secure Chittagong.573 
In May, 1616, the first Arakanese force was attacked before it 
completed its fortifications. At first the Arakanese were nearly defeated, 
but the Mughal army hesitated in delivering the final attack, giving the 
Arakanese time to strengthen their positions. Soon, the Arakanese forced 
the Mughal army into retreat and captured the Mughal heavy 
artillery.574 Min Khamaung now moved quickly to destroy Sundiva 
before any further Mughal attacks could be made. 
 
The Final Battle, 1617 
 
Finally in 1617, Min Khamaung gathered together a force of Arakanese 
ships and attacked Sundiva. He took the island, had most of the 
Portuguese inhabitants killed, and had the Portuguese defense-works 
torn-down. The indigenous population, which now numbered over six 
thousand Christians, was resettled at Dianga.575  Gonçalves escaped, 
but, according to a dispatch to Lisbon sent by the Count of Redondo, he 
died later in 1617 at Hughli in Bengala.576  After taking Sundiva, Min 
Khamaung went on to take other strategic islands in the western 
Sundurbunds.577  Min Khamaung took the few remaining Portuguese 
survivors and forced them into his armies.578  All of the former 
Portuguese strongholds in northern Arakan were now retaken by Min 
                                                          
573 Sarkar, op. cit., 297. 
574 Ibid., 298. 
575 Letter no. 51, 8 February 1618, letter from the Count of Redondo to the king of 
Portugal, in Documentos Remettidos, vol. IV, 251-2.  
576 Ibid; E. Rehatsek, however, believes that Gonçalves was captured on Sundiva 
and was beheaded. See E. Rehatsek, “Historical Sketch of Portuguese India,” Calcutta 
Review 73 (1881): 321-362. 
577 Campos, op. cit., 155. 
578 Stuart, op. cit., 70. 
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Khamaung, and while Portuguese trade resumed in this area, it was from 
now on under strict Arakanese control.579  
Min Khamaung now turned all of his attention onto pushing 
Arakanese conquests into Bengal. He gathered a naval force of 
supposedly four thousand jalias, as well as seven hundred “floating 
batteries,” and attacked Mughal villages along the Megna river.580  
Further on along the coast, Min Khamaung pushed Arakanese conquests 
to Dacca.581 But the Bengalese soon seemed ready to counterattack, 
with cavalry as well as a naval force as large as that of Min Khamaung. 
Min Khamaung, however, seems to have had no intention of making the 
same mistake of over-extending his territory that Min Yazagyi had, and 
avoided a large battle. Instead Min Khamaung withdrew back into 
Arakanese territory, leaving one thousand jalias “for the protection of his 
border.”582  
 
A New Relationship 
 
Min Khamaung was “keen” on improving Arakan’s exports and his efforts 
were successful, though not until 1623, one year after Min Khamaung’s 
death. The trade relationship between Arakan and the Dutch after 1623 
grew significantly. While the Dutch factory at Mrauk-U which was 
established temporarily during the reign of King Min Yazagyi, under 
Jacob Dirckszoon Cortenhoof,583 was withdrawn in 1617, and in 1623 it 
was replaced by a more permanent trading station. The Dutch withdrew 
their factory in 1617 for several reasons: 
 
                                                          
579 The Portuguese, who probably resented the fact that Min Khamaung had 
undeniably beaten the Portuguese in northwestern Arakan and on Sundiva island, 
spread stories to undermine Min Khamaung’s credibility in their histories. One of these 
stories is found in Fariah y Sousa. It tells how when the victorious Min Khamaung 
returned to Chittagong, the Portuguese traders offered his white elephant a “bough thick 
fet with Figs.” The elephant would not eat it when it was said to bless the king of Ava, the 
Mughal emperor,or even for Min Khamaung. But when the bough was offered was offered 
for the king of Portugal, “the Elephant joyfully fnatched it in his Trunk.” Min Khamaung 
then punished the traitorous elephant by taken away its ornaments, its gold feed dish, 
and its gold chain. But the elephant would not eat without its royal trappings, and Min 
Khamang was forced to return the elephants’ possessions. See Fariah y Sousa, op. cit., 
vol. III, 296. 
580 Sarkar, op. cit., 303. 
581 Stuart, op. cit., 70. 
582 Sarkar, op. cit., 303. 
583 Gehl, Cambridge History of India, v, 34, cited in Hall, A History of Southeast Asia, 
416.  
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[because] of the small profits, which could be made there, and the 
great expenses the Company must first be put to, in order to 
establish the king again in his kingdom, which at present is much 
in trouble.584  
 
But  Min Khamaung stabilized the situation later in the same year and, 
by 1623, the Dutch felt safe increasing their presence in the region. 
The Dutch had a pressing need to become reinvolved in Arakanese 
trade: they were interested in Arakan’s new export commodity: slaves. 
While the Arakanese forces began to raid Mughal territories and the 
Indian coast, the “vast numbers of captives” were brought back to 
Arakan. The Portuguese who were removed from Sundiva and resettled 
around Chittagong played a key role in the raiding. As Manrique 
observed: 
 
[T]hey were authorized to take their vessels into the principality of 
Bengala, which belonged to the Great Mogol. Here they would sack 
and destroy all the villages and settlements on the banks of the 
Ganges...and besides removing all the most valuable things they 
found, would also take captive any people with whom they came 
into contact. This raiding was pronounced by the Provincial Council 
at Goa to be just, since the Mogors were not only invaders and 
tyrannical usurpers but also enemies of Christianity.585  
 
Some of the captives were picked by the king to become Arakanese 
slaves, while the remainder were sold to the Dutch who were “the chief 
customers” for the slaves, since the Dutch needed them in Batavia, 
which had been established in 1611.586 The growing importance of 
Arakanese slaves as an export commodity was felt in other markets as 
well: Arakan became a chief source of Aceh’s “servile labour.”587  
Indeed, between 1621 and 1624, Portuguese slavers brought forty-two 
thousand slaves for sale to Chittagong alone.588  Min Khamaung also 
began to sell rice to the Dutch, who needed supplies of rice to support 
the Dutch factories in the spice-growing districts.589  The Dutch  
                                                          
584 J.E. Heeres, Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum, vol. I, 412, cited in Hall, A 
History of Southeast Asia, 416. 
585 Manrique, op. cit., vol. I, 285. 
586 Furnivall, “Studies in Dutch Relations With Arakan,” 2-3, 12 
587 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680, vol. I, The 
Lands Below the Winds, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988): 133. 
588 Campos, op. cit., 105. 
589 Furnivall, “Studies in Dutch Relations With Arakan,” 2-3, 12 
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relationship with Arakan grew closer, but remained one of caution, as 
William Methwold observed in the early seventeenth century: 
 
[Min Khamaung] hath also divers times invited the Dutch and 
English to resort unto his countrey, but the Dutch by good 
experience, having had sometimes a factory there...avoyd his 
importunity; yet continue good correspondence with him and his 
people, as knowing it a plentifull country, and not inconvenient to 
supply themselves with many necessaries, if difference with nations 
should enforce them to that extremity...I have knowne divers 
Hollanders, that having expired their covenanted time of service 
with the East India Company, and so purchased...their freedome, 
have gone to serve this King, and received good countenance and 
content in his employment of them.590  
 
But Min Khamaung could not expect further Dutch military aid. 
Indeed, the Dutch “skillfully avoided giving [Min Khamaung] any aid 
against the Mughal.”591  But the Arakanese were determined to commit 
more resources to ending the Mughal threat which plagued them for 
generations and Min Khamaung now arranged for a new Arakanese-
Portuguese relationship. Min Khamaung looked to the captured 
Portuguese who had been resettled at Chittagong. Many were now used 
in the Arakanese navy, which was then used to spread Min Khamaung’s 
power over Sundiva island and the western Sunderbund delta, while Min 
Khamaung’s army conquered the districts of Noakhali, Backergunge, and 
the territory up to Murshidabad and Dacca, as well as forcing Tippera 
into vassalage.592 The Arakanese were now truly the masters in their 
relationship with the Portuguese. 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
How did the Arakanese overcome the problems caused by Min Yazagyi’s 
reign? How did Min Khamaung’s able leadership lead to the destruction 
of the Portuguese? Was this a revival of Arakanese imperial might? 
Min Khamaung was a very different leader than Min Yazagyi. He 
was, for example, a fighter and not the “lazy,” self-important, and 
incapable king that Min Yazagyi seems to have been. We have seen how 
Min Yazagyi focused his attentions on his new queen rather than on the 
                                                          
590 William Methwold, op. cit., 42-3. 
591 Furnivall, “Studies in Dutch Relations With Arakan,” 13. 
592 Harvey, History of Burma, 143.593 Victor B. Lieberman, “The Transfer of the 
Burmese Capital From Pegu to Ava,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, no. 1 (1980): 76. 
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safety of his kingdom in a previous chapter. But in the case of Min 
Khamaung, we see a king whose prime considerations were the strength 
and the safety of his realm. Min Khamaung, for example, did not engage 
in the building of useless passages through hills and the construction of 
huge pleasure palaces as Min Yazagyi did. Min  Khamaung, both as a 
prince and a king, personally led his armies into battle, while Min 
Yazagyi conducted his wars from his throne. Further, Min Khamaung 
kept a watchful eye out for developments at the court regarding court 
intrigue and plots, which Min Yazagyi had failed to do. I think that Min 
Khamaung was more of a realist than Min Yazagyi, since Min Khamaung 
appears to have been less concerned with the superficial trappings of 
kingship, such as elephants and prestige, than Min Yazagyi had been. 
Another example of Min Yazagyi’s lack of realism is in his handling of 
Min Khamaung: Min Khamaung  rebelled three times and was forgiven 
each time. I think that if the same thing had happened to Min 
Khamaung, Min Khamaung would not have been so lenient. 
Min Khamaung, however, did not have sufficient time to reform 
Arakan in the way that he might have wanted to. He died in 1622, five 
years after he conquered Sundiva. This time was too short to repair all 
the damage done by Min Yazagyi. Indeed, Min Khamaung had to look for 
help abroad to save Arakan from a simple pirate “lord.” But Min 
Khamaung’s use of the Dutch was in many ways similar to Min Bin’s use 
of the Portuguese almost a century earlier. The Dutch were given trade 
opportunities and Dutch fleets were used to help bolster and reconstruct 
the Arakanese navy. But unlike Min Yazagyi, Min Khamaung did not 
allow the Dutch to build up independent power-bases within Arakanese 
territory and did not let them play too great a role in Arakanese affairs 
outside of military reform. I think that we can almost see a cycle in this 
comparison: Min Khamaung shared Min Bin’s world-view and had he 
been followed by kings as capable as those who had followed Min Bin, I 
think that Arakan might have adopted Dutch military influences and 
technologies into their own system. 
Min Khamaung’s reign marked a revival in Arakanese strength. 
Min Khamaung had conquered Sundiva, which had never really been 
under Arakanese control, and he now held Dianga more firmly than the 
Arakanese had in their sixteenth century relationship with the 
Portuguese traders there. Further, in the 1620s, Min Khamaung pushed 
Arakanese power much deeper into Bengal than Arakan had ever done 
before. But Arakan was never to regain its hold over Pegu. Anaukpetlun, 
the Avan king had crushed De Brito in 1613 at Syriam and Pegu fell 
under Burmese control until the British conquest of Lower Burma in the 
nineteenth century. But in 1613, De Brito held Syriam with less than a 
hundred men and even then it took many months for the Avan king to 
defeat him. I think that if Syriam had remained under the control of the 
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Arakanese, with a well-led Arakanese garrison and an Arakanese 
administration, then Arakan would have been able to maintain its hold 
over Pegu for several centuries. 
Min Khamaung had thus repaired much of the damage that Min 
Yazagyi had done and a brief revival of Arakanese imperial strength 
ensued. But this revival was cut short in the mid-seventeenth century, 
as the Mughal Empire displaced the Arakanese in Bengal. Arakan then 
fell into a steep decline, losing territories in both the east and the west. 
This decline continued until 1784 when Arakan was conquered by the 
Burmese. Min Khamaung had repaired the damage done by Min Yazagyi 
in the short-term, but the long-term effects of Min Yazagyi’s reign were 
irreparable. 
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Thesis Conclusion 
 
 
I think it is clear that many factors were involved in Arakan’s 
development from an isolated state to an extensive empire. The 
Arakanese took advantage of the political and economic disorganization 
of the rival empires around them, Bengal in the mid-sixteenth century, 
and Pegu almost fifty years later. At the same time that the world around 
them was becoming more accessible, the Arakanese increasingly made 
their presence felt in maritime trade, especially that of the once 
Bengalese-controlled Bay of Bengal. The increased trade was furthered 
by Arakan’s growing relationship with the Portuguese trading world, just 
as Arakan’s military might grew with the help of Portuguese mercenaries 
which the increased trade revenues made possible. This scenario is 
strikingly similar to that posed by Victor Lieberman in regard to First 
Toungoo Dynasty’s short-lived, but powerful, empire of the last half of 
the sixteenth century. As Lieberman argues: 
 
Lower Burma’s success in the sixteenth century derived from a 
unique and basically unstable combination of factors which helped 
to compensate for its demographic inferiority: at roughly the same 
time as intensive Shan raids and the unchecked growth of tax-free 
religious estates disorganized the northern polity, the arrival of 
Portuguese guns and a gradual increase in Indian Ocean commerce 
strengthened the military and political position of the south. Under 
Bayin-naung, indigenous forces from the south, augmented by 
Portuguese and Muslim gunners, subjugated the lowlands around 
Ava and a vast arc of Tai-speaking states in an unprecedentedly 
short period.593  
 
But an explanation such as this, which attributes an expansion of 
political power only after economic growth and access to Portuguese 
military technology, does not tell us everything. Indeed, while I have 
argued that the disorganization of the Bengal, and then Burma, as well 
as the growing access to Arakan of Bay of Bengal maritime trade was 
pivotal to Arakan’s growth of power, I have argued that this process of 
political expansion preceded the beginning of economic expansion and 
the arrival of the Portuguese. It is true that mercenaries played a large, if 
sometimes exaggerated, role in the development of Arakanese power. But 
if we adapt Lieberman’s argument to Arakan, we are left empty-handed 
when we try to account for the goals of the Arakanese in this process.  
I have argued that the Arakanese played a fundamental role in 
determining their economic growth. That is, from the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, the Arakanese, cut-off from land based trade 
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opportunities sought new maritime opportunities. At first, Arakanese 
economic growth was targeted at Chittagong, which was a rich port. More 
importantly, Chittagong was tied into the Portuguese trading system in 
the Bay of Bengal and thus promised important economic opportunities. 
The employment of Portuguese mercenaries, and especially the defense 
arrangement with the Portuguese at Dianga, also brought Arakan closer 
to the the Portuguese trading system. Thus, while Lieberman seems to 
indicate that indigenous rulers saw the opportunity for political and 
economic expansion after the employment of Portuguese mercenaries 
and increased trade was available, I have argued that the Arakanese 
sought out an economic and military relationship with the Portuguese 
before maritime trade and Portuguese mercenaries or arms were 
available: Arakanese political expansion began in order to make possible 
Arakanese access to maritime trade and the employment of Portuguese 
mercenaries and traders, and thus a trade relationship with the 
Portuguese. In other words, it is true that increased revenues from 
maritime trade made the employment of further numbers of Portuguese 
mercenaries possible, but the Arakanese had fostered their relationship 
with the Portuguese much earlier in order to increase their access to 
maritime trade. 
Further, the question remains, how did problems in the 
Arakanese-Portuguese relationship bring about the temporary eclipse of 
Arakanese power under Min Yazagyi? I think it is clear that the economic 
and administrative problems in Min Yazagyi’s reign were pivotal. Arakan 
had grown much faster territorially than the Arakanese capacity to 
administer it effectively. Important political and economic centers, such 
as Chittagong, remained autonomous, while strategic areas such as 
Lower Burma depended upon the unchecked loyalty of Portuguese and 
Moslem mercenaries and local political leaders. Further, Lower Burma, 
devastated under Nan-dá-bayin, could not provide the economic 
resources necessary to offset the drain on Arakanese royal coffers to keep 
it and certainly not to recapture it when it later fell under De Brito’s 
control. These problems clearly led to  the opportunities for the 
Portuguese rebellions at Syriam and later at Sundiva. But there was also 
a seeming contradiction in Min Yazagyi’s reign, because at the same time 
that these rebellions seemed to indicate Arakanese weakness, Arakan 
had just reached its greatest territorial growth and presumably its zenith 
of power. The question that needs to be answered, then, is why did this 
seeming contradiction develop in Min Yazagyi’s reign and how did his son 
and successor, Min Khamaung, deal with it? 
The basis for the relationship between the Arakanese and the 
Portuguese mercenaries can be found in the reign of Min Bin, one half-
century before Min Yazagyi’s reign. Min Bin ruled an Arakanese state 
and society which had developed an approach to adapting to the outside 
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world in which they combined isolation and, at the same time, a 
receptivity to foreign cultural, religious, and political models. The 
Arakanese effectively used the isolated nature of their society, behind 
mountain ranges and swamplands, to prevent gigantic neighboring 
empires, such as Pegu and Bengal, from conquering their civilization. 
The Arakanese were also receptive to foreign models with which they 
came into contact due to Arakan’s location on important mainland trade 
routes. The Arakanese, and especially the Arakanese royal house, also 
came into contact with, and took advantage of,  foreign models through 
their involvement in maritime trade, which they conducted from the 
relative safety of their capital, Mrauk-U, which was on a river, sixty miles 
inland. 
This Arakanese approach to the world allowed the Arakanese to 
import foreign models and yet keep them under firm Arakanese control. 
The Arakanese used foreign religions, as well as their own animism, in a 
syncretic fashion, in order to express thoughts and basic beliefs which 
they already had, but which necessitated new rules of religious or social 
legitimation and new vocabularies. The same approach was applied to 
kingship, in which the Arakanese kings used a variety of old and new 
ideas of kingly legitimation. The most important use of the Arakanese 
world-view in Min Bin’s reign, however, was their adaptation of 
Portuguese models of warfare and Portuguese technology: while 
Portuguese models, and even Portuguese mercenaries were used by the 
Arakanese, the Arakanese were careful never to let the Arakanese basis 
of their military or society disappear or fall under the control of their 
Portuguese employees. 
While this Arakanese world-view allowed Arakan to develop from a 
small, isolated state to a great empire, which in 1600 stretched for one 
thousand miles along the mainland Southeast Asian coast at a depth of 
150-200 miles inland,594  something happened during the reign of Min 
Yazagyi. While the Arakanese kings throughout the sixteenth century 
had maintained a firm grip over their government and their Portuguese 
mercenaries, Min Yazagyi was caught up in his new-found prestige as a 
chakravartan, or at the very least a  ruler of great importance. He 
increasingly devoted his time to casual pursuits and let the governance 
of his kingdom fall into the hands of less capable men. At the same time 
that the Arakanese royal court split into rival factions, each with their 
own political and economic agendas, Min Yazagyi’s Portuguese 
mercenaries, especially at Syriam, were given autonomous control of 
their stations. The Portuguese decided to overthrow Arakanese tutelage 
while Min Yazagyi ignored the warnings of local commanders until it was 
too late to reverse the situation. 
                                                          
594 Collis & San Shwe Bu, “Arakan’s Place in the Civilization of the Bay,” 43. 
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Until Min Yazagyi’s reign, then, I think that the Arakanese were 
the dominant partner in the Arakanese-Portuguese relationship. When 
Min Yazagyi forgot the importance of the Arakanese king’s role in 
maintaining this dominance in their relationship, however, the 
Portuguese were given the opportunity to declare themselves 
independent. In response, Min Yazagyi, preoccupied with himself and his 
royal regalia, allowed his royal court to “fall prey” to factionalism and 
wasted the best of the Arakanese military forces in poorly-crafted 
campaigns under the command of local military leaders of doubtful 
abilities. This hurt Arakan’s credibility as a powerful empire and 
weakened the international alliance system, which  had been carefully 
constructed by past Arakanese kings. Further, the repeated Arakanese 
military disasters presented a tremendous drain on Arakanese economic 
resources which Min Yazagyi was not able to remedy. The collapse of 
Arakanese dominance in the Arakanese-Portuguese relationship, 
however, was short-lived. Min Khamaung, Min Yazagyi’s son and 
successor, brought the Arakanese government back firmly under 
monarchical control through his careful selection of new, capable 
military and civilian leaders. Min Yazagyi, in the tradition of Min Bin, 
sought a new foreign model, the Dutch, to help him defeat the 
Portuguese. But Min Khamaung deserves full credit for crushing the 
rebellious Portuguese who served the pirate “king” Sebastião Gonsalves y 
Tibau and brought an end to the last of the Portuguese rebellions. In 
Pegu, however, Min Khamaung was too late to reassert Arakanese 
dominance, since the Avan king, Anaukpetlun, had already crushed De 
Brito at Syriam and had brought Pegu under firm Avan control. Thus, a 
combination of new Arakanese leaders, the selection of a new foreign 
model, the resurrection of the nearly-destroyed maritime-based 
Arakanese economy, and Min Khamaung’s military genius, saved Arakan 
at least partially from the damage it had suffered under Min Yazagyi and 
the attendant Portuguese revolts. 
I think it should also be mentioned that the Portuguese 
mercenaries captured in both Syriam and the Sundiva campaigns, by 
Ava and Arakan, were forced to continue their service to both kingdoms 
as slaves. Anaukpetlun turned his Portuguese captives into a hereditary 
class of artillerymen whose descendants served in the Avan army for 
several centuries.595 In the case of Arakan, Min Khamaung, once 
himself a prisoner of the Portuguese, placed his Portuguese captives into 
Arakanese military units which guarded the northwestern border of 
Arakan in Bengal. The Arakanese-Portuguese relationship thus can be 
seen as a continuum of Arakanese dominance, with the exception of the 
hiatus of the reign of Min Yazagyi. 
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